dissenting.
For the reasons stated herein and in the panel’s initial reversal of this conviction, see Castaneda v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 476, 370 S.E.2d 109 (1988), I would reverse this conviction and dismiss the indictment. See also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 384, 369 S.E.2d 423 (1988).
I
Special Agent Jones, of the Virginia State Police, was sitting in his vehicle on the emergency shoulder of Interstate 95 in the vicinity of several other state police vehicles when he “saw the passen*586ger and driver of the vehicle turn around in the seat and look toward us.” He testified that “when they did that, the vehicle swerved, almost striking the barrier.” On the basis of these observations he “decided [to] ... go north on 95 and check the vehicle out.” He followed the automobile a substantial distance (from exit 4 to ‘TOO yards north of exit 6”) before stopping it. He testified that he stopped the automobile because he concluded that it fit the drug courier profile and because he suspected that it was stolen.
The decision to stop the automobile because it fit the drug courier profile and momentarily swerved as the occupants looked at the assembled state police vehicles does not withstand fourth amendment scrutiny. See Taylor, 6 Va. App. at 388-89, 369 S.E.2d at 425; see also United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986). The majority concludes that Jones reasonably suspected that the automobile was stolen simply because Jones had learned two years earlier during an unrelated investigation that some local Florida rental companies imposed a substantial mileage fee if their automobiles were driven outside of Florida. The link between Jones knowledge of this information and his observation that the automobile driven by Castaneda was owned by a local rental company does not provide a rational, reasonable, or tenable basis upon which to base a finding of reasonable suspicion that the automobile was stolen. Jones testified as to why this information led him to conclude that the automobile was stolen:
Well, to me, it doesn’t seem to be very cost effective, because if he wants to rent a car from a national agency, he can do it cheaper than pay 50 cents a mile extra.
* * * *
[B]ut it just doesn’t make any sense. Why would somebody from Florida want to pay — and that’s a long way — 50 cents a mile from Florida. I’m not saying it is not possible, but it didn’t make any sense to me, why someone would want to do that.
The suspicion which Jones developed was not rationally connected with a belief that criminal conduct had occurred or was occurring. Jones simply used his knowledge of a fact to analyze what he observed, concluding that because it did not “make any *587sense” to him, therefore, it must be criminal. This type of intuitive logic does not suffice to justify a stop. Just because a police officer testifies that he observed conduct that he thought was unusual is an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that criminal conduct has occurred or is occurring. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 363 S.E.2d 708 (1988).
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the “stolen car” rationale that Jones used for stopping the automobile was purely pretextual. Jones testified that before he stopped the automobile:
I saw the Florida tags. I then saw the bumper sticker on the bumper of the vehicle. I pulled up beside it. I saw two occupants, dark complexioned, no visible luggage, like I testified, nothing hanging in the windows, and I decided to stop the vehicle for further investigation, based upon things that I have heard.
Q: Based upon the drug profile supplied to you?
A: Right, and the bumper sticker, my believing the vehicle shouldn’t be out of Florida; so I called my dispatcher and asked for registration check. In the meantime, I am going to stop the vehicle and talk to them.
Incredibly, despite his testimony that the automobile fit the drug profile, Jones denied suspecting that it contained drugs:
Q: Did you suspect the car was carrying narcotics prior to your stopping it?
A: I can’t say that I actually suspected it, you know. The possibility remains in your mind. Say, well, these pieces are falling together. I have had the training. I have seen the written memos. You look for certain things, and certainly, when I saw all of these things, it remains in my mind they could be carrying weapons, narcotics, the car could be stolen. It is just a lot of things. You don’t know until you stop the car, and then you talk to the people.
“[I]n determining whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation.” Smith, 799 F.2d at 708; see also United States v. Miller, *588821 F.2d 546, 549 (11th Cir. 1987). In view of the evidence presented in this case, the answer to such an inquiry must be in the negative. The stop was unreasonable not because Jones “secretly hoped to find evidence” of the narcotics, but because it was clear that a reasonable officer would have been uninterested in pursuing the driver of the Florida local rental agency automobile absent that hope. Miller, 821 F.2d at 549.
II
Although the Commonwealth established that cocaine was hidden beneath the back seat of the rental automobile, the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Castaneda knowingly and intentionally possessed the cocaine. The evidence does not establish that the bag in which the cocaine was located was visible to Castaneda or known by him to be in the rental automobile. According to the evidence, Trooper Childress searched the interior of the automobile for approximately ten minutes before lifting the back seat and finding the bag which he suspected of containing cocaine. After the dog “alerted” on the bag, Jones reached in “underneath the [back] seat” and retrieved the cocaine contained in “a Zayres shopping bag that had been rolled back.”
“[O]ccupancy of [a] . . . vehicle upon or in which a controlled substance was found shall not create a presumption that such person either knowingly or intentionally possessed such controlled substance.” Code § 18.2-250. “To establish ‘possession’ in a legal sense it is not sufficient to simply show actual or constructive possession of the drug by the defendant. The Commonwealth must also establish that the defendant intentionally and consciously possessed it with knowledge of its nature and character.” Buono v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 475, 476, 193 S.E.2d 798, 799 (1973). Moreover, the proof must amount to more than suspicion. “[Circumstances of suspicion, no matter how grave or strong, are not proof of guilt sufficient to support a verdict of guilty.” Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 619, 623, 238 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1977); see also Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 316 S.E.2d 739 (1984). In order to support a verdict of guilty, the Commonwealth is required to prove knowledge and intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Clodfelter, 218 Va. at 623, 238 S.E.2d at 822; Burton v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 711, 713, 213 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1975).
*589Castaneda testified that he, his wife, and Robert Castro went to Diaz Automobile Rental in Castaneda’s wife’s automobile and rented an automobile upon a daily rate. The rental agreement reflects that the mileage was free, and it quotes daily and weekly rental rates. Castaneda testified that he and Castro were making the trip to New York in order to visit Castro’s family. He also testified that he informed the person who rented the automobile to him that he and Castro were going to New York. Castaneda further testified that, after the automobile was rented, Castro drove the automobile to Castro’s home to prepare for the trip, and that Castaneda returned to his own home in his wife’s automobile. Castro then came for him and they began the trip.
Castaneda also testified that Castro was also his partner in an auto parts and tow truck service. He displayed to the trial judge his business card with that information. In addition, the automobile rental agreement offered in evidence listed Castaneda’s business as a towing service and contained a listing of the telephone number.
The record reveals that Castaneda, who came to the United States after immigrating from Cuba five years before his arrest, had never been convicted of a crime. He testified that after he gave Jones his license and papers he opened the trunk and emptied his bags without being directed to do so, because that was the required procedure when stopped by law enforcement officers in Cuba. He testified that he had never before been stopped by law enforcement officers in the United States, but naturally assumed that the same procedures were required.
While the [trier of fact] is the judge of both the weight of the testimony and the credibility of witnesses, it may not arbitrarily or without any justification therefor give no weight to material evidence, which is uncontradicted and is not inconsistent with any other evidence in the case, or refuse to credit the uncontradicted testimony of a witness, even though he be the accused, whose credibility has not been impeached, and whose testimony is not either in and of itself, or when viewed in the light of all the other evidence in the case, unreasonable or improbable, and is not inconsistent with any fact or circumstance to which there is testimony or of which there is evidence. There must be something to justify the *590[trier of fact] in not crediting and in disregarding the testimony of the accused other than the mere fact that he is the accused, or one of them.
Spratley v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 854, 864, 152 S.E. 362, 365 (1930); see also Holland v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 32, 41, 55 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1949); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 896, 903, 15 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1941). Even if the judge was privileged to disbelieve Castaneda’s reason for going immediately to the trunk and opening his bags, the inferences flowing from Castaneda’s conduct do not “satisfy the guarded judgment that both the corpus delicti and the criminal agency of the accused have been proved to the exclusion of any other rational hypothesis and to a moral certainty.” LaPrade v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 410, 418, 61 S.E.2d 313, 316 (1950).
Jones testified that he initially identified himself as a law enforcement officer and asked to see Castaneda’s driver’s license and registration papers. Jones testified that Castaneda “produced them without too much delay, and before I could say anything else, Mr. Castaneda opens the driver’s door, gets out, goes right to the trunk of the vehicle, opens it up . . ., unzips [a travel bag], and starts emptying it of clothing and other items.” Jones further testified:
I hadn’t said a word except, “Let me see your driver’s license and registration papers,” and as he was doing this, I said, “Are you giving me permission to search your vehicle?” And his reply, said, “Yes, you search the car.” I asked, “Are you carrying any narcotics or contraband?” “No. Search the car,” and then I told him, “You don’t have to let me search,” and he says, “Search the car. No narcotics. I am going to New York.” At about that time, Trooper Childress, the Trooper assigned to us, he arrived, and Mr. Castro, I asked him to step out of the vehicle, and I was talking to him. I informed Trooper Childress what had taken place before his arrival and of this man’s consent to search the vehicle. While I was talking to this man and to Mr. Castro, Trooper Childress started a search of the vehicle.
Although Trooper Jones testified that when he stopped Castaneda “he seemed to understand everything I was saying to him” and *591that “the further the search went, the less he understood English,” the evidence neither reflects that Castaneda understood nor spoke the English language sufficiently to have understood that he was not required to open his trunk in order to permit a search of his automobile.
The majority concludes that because Castaneda went to the trunk of the automobile after the stop and opened it without having been directed by Trooper Jones to do so, Castaneda intended to draw Trooper Jones’ attention from the back seat of the automobile. Upon this speculation the majority determines that the Commonwealth demonstrated “clear evidence of guilty knowledge.” Such a conclusion is not the only rational inference from the facts, and certainly is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Castaneda knew the cocaine was beneath the automobile’s rear seat. The officer testified that Castaneda willingly and unhesitatingly permitted a search of the entire vehicle at his request; thus, the majority’s speculation that Castaneda opened the trunk to somehow divert Officer Jones from the interior of the vehicle is not well founded. Indeed, the very evidence from which the majority draws its inference fails to negate the reasonable hypothesis of innocence because Castaneda’s conduct was also consistent with a lack of awareness of the presence of any drugs in the automobile, and hence a lack of guilty knowledge.
In Clodfelter, although the evidence established that narcotics were found in the hotel room that the defendant rented, that the defendant had the key to the room and had occupied the room, and that the defendant lied when questioned by the police and gave a false name, the Supreme Court held that the “evidence creates a strong suspicion of guilt but it falls short of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs found in the hotel room were ever actually or constructively possessed by Clodfelter with an awareness of their character.” 218 Va. at 623, 238 S.E.2d at 822; see also Brehens v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 131, 348 S.E.2d 430 (1986).
Where, as here, proof of Castaneda’s knowledge is based on circumstantial evidence, “all necessary circumstances must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Garland v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 182, 184, 300 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1983)(quoting Carter v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 528, 532, 290 S.E.2d 865, 867 *592(1982). “It is not sufficient that the evidence create a suspicion of guilt, however strong, or even a probability of guilt, but must exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt.” Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 34, 129 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963). “[Suspicion, no matter how strong, is insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction.” Hairston v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 183, 187, 360 S.E.2d 893, 895 (1987). Although the evidence is strong and may “show a probability of guilt,” Smith v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 927, 929, 243 S.E.2d 463, 464 (1978), “the evidence is insufficient to carry the Commonwealth’s case from the realm of probability and supposition into the area of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hall v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 533, 537, 303 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1983). For these reasons, I would reverse the conviction.