dissenting.
I agree that the investigative stop of the defendant’s automobile did not violate his rights under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. I do not agree, however, that the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the cocaine found under the back seat of the automobile he was driving. Therefore, I cannot join the majority in affirming the defendant’s conviction.
Although the drug courier profile used by the state police, officer did not justify his stopping the defendant’s automobile, it was a useful law enforcement tool available to him. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 384, 386, 369 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1988). The profile identified the defendant’s automobile for less intrusive investigation, which, in turn, led to the officer to see the bumper sticker, reading “Diaz Rental Car, Miami, Florida.” Based on his previous experience, the police officer knew that automobiles from local rental agencies, as the bumper sticker indicated this one to be, usually imposed substantial monetary penalties if the vehicles were taken out of the state of Florida. This aroused his suspicion of criminal activity — that the vehicle was stolen or had been taken out of Florida without proper authority. He contacted his dispatcher, requested a registration check and stopped the vehicle to talk to its occupants.
*593The officer thus had “specific and articulable facts” available to him “which, taken together with rationale inferences from those facts, reasonably” warranted his stopping the defendant’s vehicle to conduct further investigation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Therefore, I find it unnecessary to go further and discuss the implications of the rental agreement, the training manual of the Department of the State Police, whether the occupants of the vehicle were unshaven, whether they carried luggage or clothes visible inside the vehicle, or whether they displayed unusual nervousness in the presence of police officers at the toll plaza. Furthermore, even though the officer may have harbored some subjective hope of discovering narcotics activities, he had a sufficiently objective basis for legally stopping the car, thus rendering any subjective belief irrelevant. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
Even though the search was legal, affirmance of the defendant’s conviction does not necessarily follow. The Commonwealth still had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the cocaine which was found in the back seat. In concluding that the defendant had constructive possession, the majority relies on his presence in the automobile and his efforts to facilitate the police officer’s search of the car’s trunk.
The “ownership or occupancy” of a vehicle in which a controlled substance is found does not “create a presumption” of knowingly or intentionally possessing the substance. Code § 18.2-250. Furthermore, mere proximity to a controlled drug is insufficient to establish the elements of possession. Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986). Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt rests on the majority’s interpretation of the defendant’s efforts to facilitate the search of the automobile.
The defendant encouraged the police officer to search his vehicle. After the officer identified himself as a special agent of the state police, he asked to see the defendant’s driver’s license and registration papers, which the defendant produced without much delay. Before the police officer “could say anything else” the defendant opened the door of the car, got out and opened the trunk. The police officer asked if he was giving him permission to search the vehicle, and the defendant responded, “Yes.” When the police *594officer asked if he had any narcotics or contraband the defendant said, “No. Search the car.” Finally, the police officer told him, “You don’t have to let me search,” and the defendant responded, “Search the car. No narcotics. I am going to New York.”
The majority interprets this as an “attempt to draw the officer’s attention away from the back seat where the drugs were hidden.” There is, however, another equally reasonable but innocent, interpretation of the defendant’s action. He may not have known of the cocaine in the car and, either to demonstrate his innocence or to expedite getting back on the road, sought to facilitate the search.
If, instead of encouraging a search of the car, the defendant had discouraged the police from searching in the back seat, his action may have justified an inference of guilty knowledge. If the defendant had said nothing during the search until the officer reached the back seat and then had insisted that nothing was there, his assertion of knowledge about what was in the back seat, coupled with his silence during the remainder of the search, would have tended to prove his knowledge of the presence and character of the contraband. See Lane v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 716, 292 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1982). However, the opposite behavior, encouraging a search of the automobile, does not indicate knowledge of the presence and character of the contraband merely because the defendant encouraged the officer to start a search at a location other than where the drugs were found.
The defendant, who the police officer described as speaking with a heavy Spanish accent, testified at trial through an interpreter. He stated that he was forty-two years old and had lived in Cuba for thirty-seven years. He went on to explain that in Cuba, when the authorities stop an automobile, the driver is required to open his trunk and permit a search. Although the trial judge was free to reject the defendant’s explanation of his actions, the majority cannot now substitute a different explanation to infer the defendant’s supposed guilty knowledge.
Without the unjustified incrimination derived by the majority from the defendant’s actions, the evidence does not “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” and “form an unbroken chain . . . [linking] the defendant to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Boothe v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 484, 492, 358 S.E.2d 740, 745 (1987) (citing Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. *595164, 169, 313 S.E.2d 390, 393 (1984)) (citation omitted). The evidence did not exclude the thesis that the cocaine had been placed under the seat by someone before the defendant had rented the automobiles. See Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1984) (evidence insufficient where LSD was found in unfinished attic of defendant’s residence); Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 619, 623, 238 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1977) (evidence insufficient where drugs were found in hotel rented by defendant under false name); Behrens v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 131, 136, 348 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1986) (evidence insufficient where cocaine was found in motel room rented by defendant). Nor did the evidence exclude the thesis that the cocaine had been placed under the seat by the car’s other occupant without the defendant’s knowledge. See Crisman v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 17, 20, 87 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1955) (evidence insufficient where heroin was found on floor of automobile occupied by five men).
Therefore, although I concur in the conclusion that the search was legal, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction because of the lack of evidence that the defendant knew the cocaine was underneath the back seat of the automobile.