Construing the equivocal or contradictory allegations of fact against the pleader-—-where it is alleged in one paragraph of the petition that Fletcher followed behind the truck at the time the latter stopped at a distance of 50 feet, and that he was negligent in following behind the truck a distance of 55 feet—the latter figure will be controlling. Similarly, where it is alleged that Fletcher followed behind the truck for a distance *366of “approximately 3 miles” at a speed of 55 miles per hour, but it is also alleged that the truck’s rate of speed was “approximately 50 miles per hour,” the speed of the Fletcher vehicle will be taken to be 50 miles per hour since, had he exceeded this speed, he would necessarily have passed the truck during the 3-mile interval. The Florida night speed limit being pleaded as 50 miles per hour, no negligence in exceeding this limit is alleged. The two remaining allegations charged as gross negligence are as follows: “In driving his said automobile in too close proximity to the motor vehicle preceding him, to wit—55 feet; in driving his automobile in such close proximity to the motor vehicle preceding him at such a high and reckless rate of speed that he was unable to stop the same without crossing the center line of the road on which he was driving.” It is further alleged that Fletcher was driving his automobile at an excessive and dangerous rate of speed at that time and place, that the vehicle was out of his control, and that this was the proximate cause of the collision insofar as he was concerned. It clearly appears, therefore, from these allegations, that Fletcher was following the truck in front of him so rapidly and so closely that, when the latter made a sudden stop, he was unable to control his vehicle, and, because of this fact, ran it across the center line of the road into the oncoming path of another fast-moving vehicle. It may be gross negligence for one to hit a plainly visible lighted object in the road at night. West v. Rosenberg, 44 Ga. App. 211 (1) (160 S. E. 808). This court does not think it should be said as a matter of law that it cannot be gross negligence for one to hit a plainly visible vehicle under like circumstances because of lack of control over one’s automobile, although the vehicle has made a sudden stop, as this would be a jury question and depend on all the circumstances of the case. If that is so, it may be argued with even greater propriety that we should not say as a matter of law that it is not gross negligence, under the same circumstances, to turn directly into the path of an' oncoming vehicle. Where the minds of reasonable men may disagree as to whether or not an act constitutes negligence, and, if negligence, what degree of negligence the act constitutes, this is a jury question. Jordan v. Lee, 51 Ga. App. 99 (2) (179 S. E. 739); Georgia Power Co. v. Blum, 80 Ga. App. 618 (2) (57 S. E. 2d 18). Nothing to the contrary is held *367in Peavy v. Peavy, 36 Ga. App. 202 (136 S. E. 96), relied on by the plaintiff in error. In that case it was held merely that a violation of a 10-mile per hour speed limit at an intersection was not gross negligence. That case contained no allegation that the host’s car was out of control. The question is not speed alone, but whether the speed, whatever it is, is such that the automobile is out of control. Moore v. Bryan, 52 Ga. App. 272, 282 (183 S. E. 117). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling the general demurrer of the defendant Fletcher.
It follows that the court had jurisdiction of the case because the petition set out a cause of action against Fletcher, a resident of the county, and properly overruled the ground of demurrer of the defendant Hicks, an alleged joint tortfeasor residing in another county, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of him in that no cause of action was alleged against the sole resident defendant.
As to the defendant Hicks, it is alleged that he was traveling at 80 miles per hour, which is 30 miles per hour over the speed limit and constitutes negligence per se; that, had he not been guilty of such negligence, the injuries to the plaintiffs would not have occurred, which is supported by allegations that there was room for the Hicks car to pass the Fletcher car on the right, but that Hicks continued down “the center of the center line” of the road. Further, it is obvious that, had Hicks not been traveling at such rate of speed, the collision might not have occurred, or the impact and injuries might have been less. It is therefore a jury question as to whether the negligence of Hicks was a proximate concurring cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. Brady v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 63 Ga. App. 50 (10 S. E. 2d 133).
Cases Nos. 35513 and 35514 were assigned for argument before and heard by the first division of this court. Cases Nos. 35577 and 35578 were assigned for argument before and heard.by the second division. On consideration, a dissent developed in each division as to all the cases. As a result all cases were considered by the whole court as provided by the act of 1945 (Ga. L. 1945, p. 232), and were assigned to the writer for the preparation of opinions in accordance with the view of the majority.
Judgments affirmed in all cases.
Townsend, Carlisle, and Quillian, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., and Gardner, P. J., dissent.