This cause.of action arises from Joseph Horry, Jr.’s (“plaintiff’) claims that David H. Woodbury (“defendant”), in his individual capacity and as executor of the estate of Ruth N. Horry (“decedent”), engaged in improper conduct while acting under a power of attorney for decedent and while serving as the executor of decedent’s estate.
The affidavits and evidence before the superior court, relevant to this appeal, tended to show that decedent and defendant, decedent’s cousin, maintained a close relationship. On 13 April 1999, decedent and defendant entered the branch of Mechanics & Farmers Bank at which decedent regularly banked and opened savings account number *****5508-4 (“source account 5508-4”), naming decedent and defendant as joint account owners with rights of survivorship. That account was initially opened with $64,802.42 of decedent’s funds. Both decedent and defendant individually signed the signature card for that account.
On 13 March 2000, decedent executed a durable power of attorney naming defendant as attorney-in-fact. The power of attor*671ney expressly authorized defendant to engage in fifteen categories of transactions, including banking transactions and personal property transactions.
On 3 October 2000, decedent and defendant opened money market account number *****5900-0 (“source account 5900-0”), naming decedent and defendant as joint account owners with rights of survivorship. That account was initially opened with $63,107.12 of decedent’s funds. Both decedent and defendant individually signed the signature card for that account.
In November of 2002, plaintiff, decedent’s nephew and sole beneficiary under decedent’s will, who lived in New York, was experiencing financial difficulties and contacted defendant seeking financial assistance. Sometime prior to 30 May 2003, source account 5508-4 was pledged as security for a loan from Mechanics & Farmers Bank to plaintiff. After partial repayment of the loan, plaintiff defaulted. On 30 May 2003, Mechanics & Farmers Bank closed source account 5508-4, using a portion of the funds from that account to pay the unpaid balance of plaintiff’s loan.
On that same day, 30 May 2003, defendant individually opened the two accounts at issue in this appeal. Defendant used the balance of funds previously held in source account 5508-4 as the initial deposit for account number *****6749-2 (“new account 6749-2”), which named decedent and defendant as joint account owners. On the signature card for new account 6749-2, defendant signed defendant’s name as owner and decedent’s name in defendant’s capacity as attorney-in-fact for decedent. In addition, because decedent was being moved to a skilled nursing facility, upon the recommendation of a bank employee, defendant closed source account 5900-0 and used the funds held in that account as the initial deposit for account number *****6753-6 (“new account 6753-6”), which he individually signed and also named decedent and defendant as joint account owners. New account 6753-6 was recommended because it would enable defendant to make three withdrawals per month without being charged a service fee. On the signature card for new account 6753-6, defendant signed his name individually as owner as well as decedent’s name in defendant’s capacity as attorney-in-fact for decedent.
On 1 June 2003, decedent died. Defendant asserted ownership to the funds to all the aforementioned joint bank accounts. On 21 October 2004, plaintiff filed an action against defendant asserting claims that defendant made improper payments, engaged in *672constructive fraud, breached his fiduciary duty, and converted decedent’s funds.
On 21 September 2005, Superior Court Judge Steve A. Balog granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff for claims against defendant for the funds deposited in: (1) new account 6753-6, in the amount of $60,962.14; and (2) new account 6749-2, in the amount of $71,412.08. Defendant appeals.
I. Issues
Defendant argues the trial court erred when it: (1) granted partial summary judgment against defendant for funds deposited in new accounts 6749-2 and 6753-6; and (2) failed to grant decedent and defendant, in his individual capacity, a right of equitable subrogation against plaintiff for funds paid from source account 5508-4 due to plaintiff’s default on the loan for which the account was pledged as collateral.
II. Standing
Our Supreme Court has stated:
Pending the administration of an estate, it is well settled that title to personal property of an intestate vests in his administrator and not his next of kin. Therefore, it necessarily follows that the administrator, and not creditors or next of kin, is the proper party to bring an action to collect a debt due the estate or to recover specific personal property. If a debt is due a decedent, it can be collected only by his administrator.
To this general rule, however, there are certain exceptions. If the administrator has refused to bring the action to collect the assets; if there is collusion between a debtor and a personal representative — particularly if the latter is insolvent; or, if some other peculiar circumstance warrants it, the creditors or next of kin may bring the action which the personal representative should have brought. However, in such a case the administrator must be a party defendant.
Spivey v. Godfrey, 258 N.C. 676, 677, 129 S.E.2d 253, 254 (1963) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Here, no allegations or demands in the complaint support any of the stated exceptions. “In a proper case, a personal representative may be removed for failure to prosecute or defend actions in behalf *673of the estate he represents. But clearly a request to sue and a refusal would be conditions precedent.” Id. at 679, 129 S.E.2d at 256 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has no standing to challenge defendant’s conduct prior to decedent’s death. Without proper standing, the superior court acquired no jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff’s claims. See Aubin v. Susi, 149 N.C. App. 320, 324, 560 S.E.2d 875, 878-79, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 610, 574 S.E.2d 474 (2002) (“Standing is a necessary prerequisite to a court’s proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, issues pertaining to standing may be raised for the first time on appeal, including sua sponte by the Court.” (Citations omitted)). Absence of jurisdiction can be raised at any time, including on appeal and ex mero moto. Id.
As a beneficiary of the estate, plaintiff’s challenges to defendant’s actions prior to decedent’s death must be asserted by a demand upon the executor, or by seeking to remove the executor through petition before the clerk of superior court. Spivey, 258 N.C. at 677, 129 S.E.2d at 254. No allegations in the complaint and no evidence in the record shows that plaintiff did either of the conditions precedent prior to filing this action. Plaintiff has no standing and the superior court acquired no jurisdiction over this action. Aubin, 149 N.C. App. at 324, 560 S.E.2d at 878-79. Plaintiff, as a creditor, next of kin, or beneficiary of the estate, cannot assert a jus tertii claim for a debt due to the decedent without a demand upon the executor or petition before the clerk of superior court to remove the executor. Spivey, 258 N.C. at 677, 129 S.E.2d at 254; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-l(a) (2003) (“Upon the death of any person, all demands whatsoever, and rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding, existing in favor of or against such person, except as provided in subsection (b) hereof, shall survive to and against the personal representative or collector of his estate.”); see also Holmes v. Godwin, 69 N.C. 467, 470 (1873) (“In general, jus tertii[,] [the right of a third party,] cannot be set up as a defense by the defendant, unless he can in some way connect himself with the third party.”).
III. Conversion Claim
Even if plaintiff had standing, he cannot legally establish a claim of conversion. The signature cards for source accounts numbered 5508-4 and 5900-0 were personally signed by decedent and defendant,specifically listed both parties as owners of the accounts, and contained the following language:
*674We understand that by establishing a joint account under the provisions of North Carolina General Statute 53-146.1 that:
1. The bank may pay the money in the account to, or on the order of, any person named in the account unless we have agreed with the bank that withdrawals require more than one signature....
(Emphasis supplied). No evidence in the record shows that decedent and defendant agreed with or required the bank to demand that withdrawals contain both owners’ signatures.
When a person deposits funds into a joint account with another, the other is designated the depositor’s agent with authority to withdraw the funds. Smith v. Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 155, 120 S.E.2d 575, 579 (1961). A principal may maintain an action in conversion to recover funds converted by their agent. See Finance Co. v. Holder, 235 N.C. 96, 99, 68 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1952) (“[T]he cause of action set out in plaintiff’s complaint sounds in tort for conversion of funds.” (Citation omitted)).
Our Supreme Court has defined the tort of conversion as “an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Peed v. Burleson’s, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439, 94 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956) (quotation omitted).
Defendant closed the two source accounts he and decedent had individually opened and owned as joint tenants with rights of survivorship and opened the two new accounts which he and decedent again owned as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Defendant’s actions did not constitute “an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Id. As a matter of law plaintiff cannot establish that defendant’s actions constituted conversion of the source account of which defendant and decedent individually opened and owned as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.
IV. Claim for Equitable Subrogation
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to grant decedent and defendant, in his individual capacity, a right of equitable subrogation against plaintiff for the funds paid from source account 5508-4 due to plaintiff’s default on a loan for which the account was *675pledged as collateral. Defendant attempts to bring this claim for the first time on appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(c) (2007). Defendant’s reliance on Rule 54(c) is misplaced. Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 286, 291, 517 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1999) (refusing to consider a claim for the first time on appeal where the party’s pleadings did not allege facts sufficient to support the claim). This assignment of error is overruled.
V. Conclusion
As a beneficiary of the estate, plaintiff’s challenges to defendant’s actions prior to decedent’s death must be asserted by a prior demand upon the executor, or by seeking to remove the executor through petition before the clerk of superior court. Spivey, 258 N.C. at 677, 129 S.E.2d at 254. No allegations in the complaint and no evidence in the record shows that plaintiff did either of these conditions precedent prior to filing this action. Plaintiff has no standing and the superior court acquired no jurisdiction over this action. Aubin, 149 N.C. App. at 324, 560 S.E.2d at 878-79.
Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for conversion against defendant, who was a true and rightful owner of the funds, with full authority to withdraw. Peed, 244 N.C. at 439, 94 S.E.2d at 353. The superior court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff for conversion of funds deposited into the two new accounts. We reverse and remand with instruction to the trial court to enter an order dismissing plaintiff’s claims.
Reversed and Remanded
Judge STROUD concurs. Judge McCULLOUGH concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion.