dissenting in part and concurring in part.
Becausé I find that the majority departs substantially from well-settled estate planning precedent and disregards express statutory provisions intended to prevent fraud, I respectfully dissent.
I. Standing
First, I disagree with the majority that plaintiff lacks standing. The very case upon which the majority relies, Spivey v. Godfrey, *676258 N.C. 676, 129 S.E.2d 253 (1963), recognizes that a beneficiary does have standing to bring an action for conversion against an administrator without making any demands on the administrator or petitioning for his removal. Spivey stands for the proposition that, as a general rule, during the course of an orderly administration of an estate, a beneficiary may not bring suit to collect a debt of the estate without first making a demand upon the executor or seeking to have, the executor removed; however, Spivey emphasizes that a tort action against the administrator is not the same as an action to collect a debt. Id. at 677, 129 S.E.2d at 254. Our Supreme Court in Spivey expressly noted two examples in which beneficiaries had standing to bring tort actions against an administrator without first making a demand upon the administrator:
In at least two cases the Court has permitted the next of kin to maintain a suit against the representative of a defaulting administrator for a distributive share in the estate by making the administrator d.b.n. of the intestate a party defendant even though there were no allegations of collusion or refusal to bring suit. Hardy v. Miles, supra and Snipes v. Estates Administration, Inc., supra ....
In both Hardy and Snipes, plaintiffs were seeking to recover their distributive shares of an estate from the representative of a former administrator whom they alleged had wrongfully converted or failed to account for it. . . .
It is one situation when the next of kin sue an administrator for conversion or negligence and quite another when they attempt to take over the administrator’s duty.
Spivey, 258 N.C. 676, 677-78, 129 S.E.2d 253, 254-55 (emphasis added).
Thus, Spivey does not stand for the proposition that a beneficiary has no standing to bring an action for conversion without first petitioning the clerk of superior court for the administrator’s removal. Not only does the majority misconstrue Spivey, but they depart from a line of cases, which hold that claims against an administrator for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, and negligence “ ‘ “arise from [the] administration of an estate, [but] their resolution is not a part of ‘the administration, settlement and distribution of estates of decedents” ’ ” and cannot be brought by petition before the clerk of superior court, which has no jurisdiction over such claims. State ex *677rel. Pilard v. Berninger, 154 N.C. App. 45, 53, 571 S.E.2d 836, 842 (2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 694, 579 S.E.2d 100 (2003); see also Mullinex v. Mabry, 174 N.C. App. 839, 622 S.E.2d 523 (2005) (unpublished) (“[P]laintiffs allege constructive fraud on the part of [the administrator] with regard to her actions as personal agent for decedent prior to her death. Plaintiffs, therefore, have standing as decedent’s heirs to bring the action as successors to the rights of decedent.”). In re Estate of Parrish, 143 N.C. App. 244, 251, 547 S.E.2d 74, 78 (“We recognize that an action for damages resulting from a fiduciary’s breach of duty in the administration of a decedent’s estate is not a claim under the original jurisdiction of the clerk of court. Such actions should', therefore, be brought as civil actions in the trial division of Superior Court.”), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 69, 553 S.E.2d 201 (2001); In re Trust Under Will of Jacobs, 91 N.C. App. 138, 141-42, 370 S.E.2d 860, 863 (noting “our courts distinguish cases which ‘arise from’ the administration of an estate from those which are ‘a part of’ the administration and settlement of an estate”; only those matters “a part of’ the administration of an estate are within exclusive original jurisdiction of the clerk of superior court), disc. review denied, 323 N.C. 476, 373 S.E.2d 863 (1988).
Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleges claims of conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, improper payments, and constructive fraud. These claims arise from the administration of decedent’s estate, but are not part of the administration of the estate and could not have been brought before the clerk of superior court. Pilard, 154 N.C. App. at 54, 571 S.E.2d at 842. I, therefore, disagree with the majority that plaintiff, as a real party interest, was required to file a petition before the clerk of superior court to remove defendant as a condition precedent to having standing in the superior court. Not only was this not required, but this conclusion is a substantial departure from well-settled precedent and will create confusion for estate planning practitioners throughout the state.
II. Conversion
Next, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the undisputed evidence of record does not establish that defendant converted the funds contained in new accounts 6749-2 and 6753-6. “ ‘The tort of conversion is well defined as “an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” ’ ” Lake Mary Ltd. Part. v. Johnston, 145 N.C. *678App. 525, 531, 551 S.E.2d 546, 552 (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 363, 557 S.E.2d 538 (2001). “ ‘ “The essence of conversion is not the acquisition of property by the wrongdoer, but a wrongful deprivation of it to the owner[.]” ’ ” Id. at 532, 551 S.E.2d at 552 (citations omitted). Thus, “ ‘it is clear then that two essential elements are necessary in a complaint for conversion — there must be [1] ownership in the plaintiff and [2] a wrongful conversion by defendant.’ ” Id. (citations omitted).
Because the undisputed evidence shows, as a matter of law, that (1) plaintiff is the owner of the funds held in the new accounts at issue and (2) defendant has assumed control of those funds without plaintiff’s authorization, defendant has committed conversion with respect to those funds.
A. Plaintiff’s Ownership of New Accounts
First, I disagree with the majority that defendant has any valid ownership interest in the funds contained in new accounts 6749-2 and 6753-6. The majority’s analysis is erroneous in that it simply glosses over the undisputed evidence of record, which is that the signature cards for the new accounts at issue did not comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1 (2007), and therefore, did not create a valid right of survivorship in defendant. Without a right of survivorship, the funds contained in the new accounts at issue were part of decedent’s estate and belong to plaintiff as sole beneficiary of decedent’s estate.
It is well established that a right of survivorship cannot be created by the intentions of the parties without satisfactio'n of the statutory requirements. See, e.g., Mutual Community Savings Bank v. Boyd, 125 N.C. App. 118, 122, 479 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1997) (extrinsic or parol evidence of parties’ intent to establish joint tenancy with right of survivorship inadmissible); Powell v. First Union Nat. Bank, 98 N.C. App. 227, 229, 390 S.E.2d 461, 462 (1990) (regardless of clear intent of parties to establish joint savings account with right of survivorship, survivorship account not created where statutory requirements not met). Therefore, if the statutory requirements necessary to establish a right of survivorship in new accounts 6749-2 and 6753-6 were not satisfied, it is irrelevant that decedent may have intended for defendant to have had survivorship rights in those accounts.
Failure to Satisfy Requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1
The signature cards for new account 6749-2 and 6753-6 did not comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1.
*679(a) Requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1
Parties who desire to establish a joint deposit account with a right of survivorship may do so pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1. To establish this type of account under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1, all persons establishing the account must (1) sign a statement that (2) uses language conspicuously indicating the intent to establish such an account, and (3) the language used must be substantially similar to the form language provided in the statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1. We construe these statutory requirements strictly. In re Estate of Heffner, 99 N.C. App. 327, 330, 392 S.E.2d 770, 771-72 (1990).
(b) Failed Signatures under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-14.1(b)
A critical error in the majority’s analysis is their complete disregard of the express language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-14.1(b) (2007). Section 32A-14.1(b) prohibits an attorney-in-fact from exercising a power of attorney in favor of the attomey-in-fact, unless the power of attorney expressly authorizes the attorney-in-fact to do such things. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-14.1(b) provides:
[U]nless gifts are expressly authorized by the power of attorney, a power [of attorney] may not be exercised by the attorney-in-fact in favor of the attorney-in-fact or the estate, creditors, or the creditors of the estate of the attorney-in-fact.
In the instant case, the power of attorney expressly authorized defendant to engage in fifteen categories of transactions, including banking transactions and personal property transactions; it did not, however, expressly authorize defendant to make gifts of decedent’s property.
As discussed below, the survivorship rights associated with the source accounts were lost at the moment that those accounts were closed. Pilard, 154 N.C. App. at 56, 571 S.E.2d at 844 (“In any event, even if the demand deposit account carried a 100% right of survivor-ship feature, any such feature became of no consequence the moment [the defendant] transferred its assets into new certificates of deposit.”) By using the power of attorney to grant himself survivor-ship interests in the new accounts, defendant used the power of attorney in favor of himself, which is prohibited by § 32A-14.1(b); accordingly, those signatures fail.
Regardless of defendant’s intentions in opening the new accounts, whether actions are authorized under a power of attorney *680is a question of law, not fact. See Hutchins v. Dowell, 138 N.C. App. 673, 676-77, 531 S.E.2d 900, 902 (2000). In Honeycutt v. Farmers Merchants Bank, 126 N.C. App. 816, 819, 487 S.E.2d 166. 168 (1997), this Court noted that the statutory language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-14.1 was intended as a codification of existing North Carolina common law. See Honeycutt, 126 N.C. App. at 819-20, 487 S.E.2d at 168. Under well-established principles of North Carolina agency law,
[a]n agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency. In an agency relationship, at least in the case of an agent with the power to manage all the principal’s property, it is sufficient to raise a presumption of fraud when the principal transfers property to the agent. Self dealing by the agent is prohibited.
Id. at 820, 487 S.E.2d at 168 (citations omitted).
The majority has disregarded the legislative protection against fraud afforded by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-14.1(b). Because decedent was prohibited by statute from using the power of attorney in favor of himself and decedent never personally signed the signature cards for the new accounts, the signature cards for the new accounts only contain the valid signatures of one of the parties — not both of the parties; therefore, the signature cards do not comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1. Accordingly, no valid survivorship rights were created by virtue of the signature cards associated with the new accounts.
Survivorship Rights Do Not Transfer
Second, the undisputed evidence of record shows that defendant’s survivorship rights from the source accounts did not transfer to the new accounts at issue. It is well settled that the signature card from one joint account with right of survivorship cannot be used to create survivorship rights in a new account, unless there is some evidence, either on the face of the claimed agreement or the documents setting up the account that what is being put forward as the survivor-ship agreement was intended to govern the particular account in question. Napier v. High Point Bank & Trust Co., 100 N.C. App. 390, 393-94, 396 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 92, 403 S.E.2d 99 (1991) (holding that even though money used to purchase a certificate of deposit had been withdrawn from a joint account with survivorship rights, there was no right of survivorship in the certificate of deposit because there was nothing on the face of the certificate or on the signature card of the prior account to indicate *681that its provisions were intended to control the funds represented by the certificate).
Here, there is no evidence on the face of the signature cards for the source accounts or on the documents setting up the new accounts that the survivorship agreements for the source accounts were intended to govern the new accounts. Thus, the signature cards for the source accounts do not create survivorship rights in the funds contained in the new accounts. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that defendant’s survivorship rights in the source accounts were lost on 30 May 2003, when the source accounts were closed.
In sum, the majority erroneously concludes: “Defendant closed the two source -accounts he and decedent opened and owned as joint tenants with right of survivorship and opened the two new accounts which he and decedent again owned as joint tenants with right of survivorship.” It is clear that because of the protections against fraud afforded by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-14.1(b) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1, a caretaker may not use a power of attorney to make himself a joint account holder with a right of survivorship, unless the caretaker has express authority in the power of attorney to do so.
Because (1) the signature cards to the new accounts did not comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-146.1 and (2) defendant’s survivorship rights from the source accounts did not transfer to the new accounts, as a matter of law, defendant had no survivorship rights in new account 6749-2 nor in new account 6753-6. Thus, when decedent died, those funds became part of decedent’s estate.1 Plaintiff, as sole beneficiary of decedent’s estate is the owner of those funds.
B. Wrongful Deprivation by Defendant
As previously stated, “ ‘[t]he essence of conversion is not the acquisition of property by the wrongdoer, but a wrongful deprivation *682of it to the owner[.]’ ” Lake Mary Ltd. Part., 145 N.C. App. at 532, 551 S.E.2d at 552 (citation omitted). The majority erroneously focuses its analysis on defendant’s authority to withdraw the funds from the source accounts, rather than on defendant’s assumption of control over funds that he does not own.
This Court has stated that the authority of joint owners to withdraw from a joint bank account does “not release one depositor to a joint account from liability to another for withdrawal which constitutes wrongful conversion.” Myers v. Myers, 68 N.C. App. 177, 180, 314 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1984).
The instant facts are substantially analogous to the facts of Pilard, 154 N.C. App. at 47-50, 571 S.E.2d at 838-40. In Pilard, a wife and husband were listed on a joint bank account with a right of survivorship. Id. While the husband was very ill in the hospital, upon a bank teller’s recommendation and with no evidence of any fraudulant intent or bad faith on the part of the wife, the wife attempted to establish a new joint bank account with a right of survivorship by signing her husband’s name on the signature card. Id. Because the husband did not sign the signature card himself, the wife’s signature failed to establish a valid survivorship right in the funds held in the second bank account. Upon the husband’s death, the wife, who was the administrator of the husband’s estate, refused to distribute the funds held in the second account to the husband’s heirs. This Court held that despite the wife’s authority to withdraw the funds as a joint bank account holder on the first account, to the extent that the wife did not have a valid ownership interest in the funds held in the second account yet assumed ownership of those funds, the evidence was sufficient to support a claim of conversion against the wife.
Here, because defendant had no authority to sign decedent’s name under N.C. Gen. Stat. .§ 32A-14.1, defendant’s signatures have the same effect as the wife’s failed signature in Pilard — they failed to create valid survivorship interests in the new accounts. Here, as the majority notes, defendant was acting as decedent’s agent in withdrawing the funds from the source accounts; all of the funds deposited in the new accounts at issue, therefore, belonged to decedent, and now to plaintiff, as sole beneficiary of decedent’s estate. Despite defendant’s authority as a joint account holder to withdraw the funds from the source accounts, to the extent that defendant has no survivorship interest in those funds and has refused to distribute those funds to plaintiff, he is liable for conversion.
*683III. Equitable Subrogation
Finally, with regard to defendant’s claim for equitable subrogation, I concur with the majority.
. As an aside, I note that there is no evidence of an inter vivos gift from decedent to defendant. The evidence of record shows that decedent was the depositor of all of the funds held in the source accounts and that those funds were intended to pay for decedent’s expenses. Defendant has not introduced evidence of decedent’s donative intent or loss of dominion and control; accordingly, decedent’s estate is deemed owner of the funds which were transferred from the source accounts to the new accounts. See Smith v. Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 154-55, 120 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1961) (holding that a deposit by one party into an account in the names of both, standing alone, does not constitute a gift to the other; the depositor is deemed to be the owner of the funds, absent evidence of donative intent coupled with loss of dominion and control over the property).