specially.
I concur in the judgment of reversal as this case falls squarely within the ambit of the rule, set forth in Morrow v. Southeastern Stages, 68 Ga. App. 142 (22 SE2d 336) (1942) and Toles v. Hair, 83 Ga. App. 144 (2) (63 SE2d 3) (1951), that the charge of accident is improper when the evidence clearly shows that the injury resulted exclusively from the negligence of one or both of the two involved vehicles.
I object too, however, and dissent to overruling Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 21 (132 SE2d 155) (1963); Palmore v. Stapleton, 157 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) (278 SE2d 476) (1981); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 53 (2) (279 SE2d 302) (1981); and Elder v. MARTA, 160 Ga. App. 78, 79 (4) (286 SE2d 315) (1981), all of which follow the principle: “An unavoidable accident is defined as one which under all the circumstances could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. In its proper use the term ‘accident’ excludes negligence; that is, an accident is an event which occurs without the fault, carelessness, or want of proper circumspection of the person affected, or which could not have been avoided by the use of that kind and degree of care necessary to the exigency and in the circumstances in which he was placed. The theory of ‘accident’ only *346applies when the injury does not result from the negligence of either party, and is a mere casualty not due to the negligence of anyone, [cit.], but may be due to the negligence of a third person not a party to the suit. [Cit.]” Palmore, supra at 692 (1).
I see no conflict between the foregoing principle and that enunciated by Morrow and Toles, supra, where we said: “Where the evidence plainly shows that the injuries of the plaintiff were due exclusively to the negligence of the defendant truck driver, or of the driver of the automobile, or of both, it was error for the court to charge the law of accident.” (Emphasis supplied.) Toles, supra at 144 (2). “ ‘In its proper use the term “accident”excludes negligence; that is, an accident is an event which occurs without the fault, carelessness, or want of proper circumspection of the person affected, or which could not have been avoided by the use of that kind and degree of care necessary to the exigency and in the circumstances in which he was placed. [Cit.]’ [Cit.] It is clear from the evidence that the plaintiffs injuries were caused either by the negligence of the driver of the automobile or that of the driver of the bus. The defendant did not plead accident, and the evidence did not raise any issue in that respect.” (Emphasis supplied.) Morrow, supra at 146. Thus, an examination of both Toles and Morrow shows no rule being laid down that an accident charge could only be used in the event the occurrence was wholly free from all negligence; that is, free even from the negligence of a third person not a party. The distinction between Toles and Morrow and the cases the majority would overrule can be demonstrated as follows: In both Toles and Morrow, a passenger of one vehicle sued the driver of the other vehicle and this Court held that a charge on accident was error because it was clear from the evidence that one or both of the two vehicles involved was directly responsible for the injury. In the cases the majority would overrule, a charge of accident was authorized in that there was evidence showing that a possible cause of the injury was the negligence of a vehicle other than the two vehicles involved in the lawsuit. While Elder v. MARTA, supra, involved a passenger as plaintiff, the driver of plaintiffs car was not the negligent non-litigant party and thus the case comes within this characterization. Only Baggett v. Jackson, 79 Ga. App. 460, 463 (54 SE2d 146) (1949), which the majority also overrules, fails to fit this mold. There, the plaintiff was a pedestrian, the defendant was a truck driver, and there was no third-party negligence or separate instrumentality involved. I would consent to the overruling of Baggett as its holding is inconsistent with Morrow and Toles. However, this would not involve the overruling of those cases where separate instrumentalities or conditions were responsible for the incident and a charge on accident was authorized. See, for example, *347Reece v. Callahan, 164 Ga. App. 131 (296 SE2d 425) (1982) (ice on road); Ware v. Alston, 112 Ga. App. 627, 631 (2) (145 SE2d 721) (1965) (sudden brake failure). See also Jackson v. Martin, 89 Ga. App. 344 (1) (79 SE2d 406) (1953) (rain slick pavement).
Although the result in Garrett v. Brannen, 164 Ga. App. 10 (296 SE2d 205) (1982), which involved a factual situation like Morrow (a passenger riding in one vehicle of the two vehicles in the collision sued the driver of the second vehicle), appears contrary to Morrow and Toles, the judgment was actually based on the harmless error premise: “In the present case it seems clear that one or both of the drivers of the colliding vehicles was at fault or the impact would not have occurred. The infant plaintiff, however, was a passenger in the vehicle, was not at fault, and negligence on the part of her father cannot be imputed to her. Under these circumstances, the instruction does not constitute reversible error.” (Emphasis supplied.) Garrett, supra at 11 (1). Thus, I believe Garrett is restricted to its peculiar circumstances and did not constitute an approval of the use of a charge on accident in such circumstances but found instead that such charge did not constitute reversible (harmful) error.
Therefore, because the cases which the majority would overrule involve a fact situation distinct from the situation here and in Toles and Morrow, I would reverse the instant case and distinguish the other cases save Baggett, supra, which I would overrule.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Birdsong join in this special concurrence, and Judge Pope concurs in part.