dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
1. There can be no doubt that defendant in this case could not, consistent with the Constitution, be compelled to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothing. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501, 512 (96 SC 1691, 48 LE2d 126) (1976); see Sharpe v. State, 119 Ga. App. 222 (1) (166 SE2d 645) (1969). Further, the record on appeal discloses defendant’s timely objection to being tried before a jury “dressed in prison garb... .” The state conceded at trial that defendant’s clothing was indeed “prison issue clothing.” Nevertheless, the only description in the record here as to the physical appearance of the subject prison issue clothing was a witness’ identification of defendant at trial as “[t]he gentleman... in the light blue shirt.”
It is well established that the burden is on the party challenging the legality of a decision to prove error by the record, and that there is a presumption in favor of the regularity and legality of all proceedings in the court below. See Bridges v. State, 227 Ga. 24 (2) (178 SE2d 861) (1970). Simply because the subject clothing was supplied by an incarcerating authority does not support the majority’s conclusion that the clothing was “identifiable” as prison clothing. See, e.g., Whittington v. State, 155 Ga. App. 667 (1) (272 SE2d 532) (1980); Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga. App. 835 (1) (270 SE2d 61) (1980). In the absence of an affirmative showing in the record here that the subject clothing was “identifiable” as prison clothing, this enumeration of error presents no ground for reversal.
2. My review of the record discloses no error for any reason assigned by defendant in the trial court’s admitting into evidence oral testimony as to his written inculpatory statement.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Judge Banke and Judge Carley join in this dissent.