dissenting.
The jury specifically found that plaintiff filed his complaint against defendant “within three years after the time the bodily harm became apparent or reasonably to have become apparent to ... plaintiff, whichever occurred first” after receiving an instruction from the trial court on the discovery rule. The majority’s opinion correctly states the sole issue before this Court is whether the statute of limitations may be tolled until “discovery” by the aggrieved party for claims of criminal conversation. The discovery rule applies to this cause of action. I respectfully dissent.
I. The Majority’s Holding
The majority’s opinion contends the discovery rule is inapplicable to claims of criminal conversation due to: (1) the statutory design of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52; and (2) this Court’s holding in Coachman v. Gould, 122 N.C. App. 443, 470 S.E.2d 560 (1996).
*544The majority’s opinion concludes the discovery rule should not be applied to an action for criminal conversation due to it being specifically identified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5) as a claim to which a three year statute of limitations applies. Our appellate courts have extended the discovery rule to other subsections of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52. Robertson v. City of High Point, 129 N.C. App. 88, 91, 497 S.E.2d 300, 302 (the discovery rule could be applied to claims of trespass specifically enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(3)), disc. rev. denied, 348 N.C. 500, 510 S.E.2d 654, 654-55 (1998); Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 492-93, 329 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1985) (considering application of the discovery rule to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1)); Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 637, 325 S.E.2d 469, 477 (1985) (application of the discovery rule to injuries caused by the negligence of another); Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 327 N.C. 491, 507-08, 398 S.E.2d 586, 593-94 (1990) (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5) applies three year statute of limitations to negligence actions), reh’g denied, 328 N.C. 336, 402 S.E.2d 844 (1991). For the reasons discussed below, I believe N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) also applies to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5).
The statute of limitations for criminal conversation is three years, as provided by statute and case law. As the trial court stated in its ruling, my research fails to disclose any precedent that disallows application of the discovery rule to the tort of criminal conversation. The majority cites Coachman v. Gould as authority for the preclusion of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) from claims of criminal conversation. In Coachman, this Court determined that the plaintiffs action for criminal conversation was barred by the three year statute of limitations. 122 N.C. App. at 445-46, 470 S.E.2d at 562-63. However, in Coachman this Court did not address the possibility of the three year statute of limitations being tolled by the discovery rule. Id.
II. The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule is limited to “personal injury or physical damage to claimant’s property.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16). The applicable statute of limitations “shall not accrue until bodily harm to the claimant or physical damage to his property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to claimant.” Id.
The primary purpose of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) is that it is intended to apply to plaintiffs with latent injuries. Specifically, § 1-52(16) protects a potential plaintiff in the case of a latent *545injury by providing that a cause of action does not accrue until the injured party becomes aware or should reasonably have become aware of the existence of the injury. As soon as the injury becomes apparent to the claimant or should reasonably become apparent, the cause of action is complete and the limitation period begins to run.
Soderlund v. Kuch, 143 N.C. App. 361, 370, 546 S.E.2d 632, 638 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis supplied), disc. rev. denied, 353 N.C. 729, 551 S.E.2d 438-39 (2001).
A. Fraud and Criminal Conversation
The General Assembly’s application of a discovery rule to claims of fraud is instructive. Our Supreme Court held:
Fraud has no all-embracing definition. Because of the multifarious means by which human ingenuity is able to devise means to gain advantages by false suggestions and concealment of the truth, and in order that each case may be determined on its own facts, it has been wisely stated “that fraud is better left undefined,” lest, as Lord Hardwicke put it, “the craft of men should find a way of committing fraud which might escape a rule or definition.” However, in general terms, fraud may be said to embrace “all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to another or the taking of undue or unconscientious advantage of another.”.
Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 113, 63 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1951) (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Due to the clandestine and concealing nature of the tortfeasors, it is “difficult to establish with certainty when the statute of limitations on a claim of fraud begins to run.” Jennings v. Lindsey, 69 N.C. App. 710, 715, 318 S.E.2d 318, 321 (1984). Consequently, the General Assembly specifically provided claimants of fraud actions a discovery rule. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(9) (2003) (“For relief on the ground of fraud . . . the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting fraud....”). When there is concealment of material facts, “the statute of limitations does not bar a suit for relief on account of it, and thereby permit the statute which was designed to prevent fraud to become an instrument to perpetrate and perpetuate it.” Small v. Dorsett, 223 N.C. 754, 761, 28 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1944).
*546Criminal conversation is defined as “ ‘actual marriage between the spouses and sexual intercourse between defendant and the plaintiff’s spouse during the coverture.’ ” Nunn v. Allen, 154 N.C. App. 523, 535, 574 S.E.2d 35, 43 (2002) (quoting Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377, 380, 477 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1996)), motion dismissed, motion and disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 675, 577 S.E.2d 630, 631 (2003). “ ‘The gravamen of the cause of action ... is the defilement of plaintiff’s [spouse] by the defendant.’ ” Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C. App. 199, 200, 557 S.E.2d 189, 190 (2001) (quoting Chestnut v. Sutton, 207 N.C. 256, 257, 176 S.E. 743, 743 (1934)). The goal of the remedy is to protect a spouse’s interest in “ ‘the fundamental right of exclusive sexual intercourse between spouses, and also on the loss of consortium.’ ” Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 209, 170 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1969) (quotation omitted). “In determining damages a jury ‘may consider the loss of companionship, loss of services, mental anguish, humiliation, and fear of sexually transmitted disease. In addition, there may be recovery for the injury to health and family honor....’” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 147 N.C. App. 438, 442, 556 S.E.2d 25, 28 (2001) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 355 N.C. 747, 565 S.E.2d 191, 192 (2002).
Despite the simple elements of a valid marriage and sexual intercourse by a spouse with a third party, inherent in the cause of action are acts of deceit and concealment. Typically, the spouse and interloper do not flaunt their indiscretions in the open such that it becomes readily apparent to the aggrieved party, who is often the last to know. Rather, as in situations involving fraud, the acting parties seek to conceal their behavior, not just from the aggrieved, but also from the rest of the world. The party injured by the criminal conversation defendant often would be unable to discover the truth and subsequently suffer harm until some time after the fact.
Application of the discovery rule to claims of criminal conversation to protect the “fundamental right of exclusive sexual intercourse between spouses” is in line with North Carolina’s demonstrated interest in the importance of protecting marriage. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57(c) (2003) (“No husband or wife shall be compellable in any event to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during their marriage.”); Thompson v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 147, 154-55, 319 S.E.2d 315, 320-21 (1984) (attorneys representing a client in a divorce proceeding may not use contingent fee contracts since they tend to promote divorce and discourage reconciliation), rev’d on other grounds, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d 288 *547(1985); Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (the causes of action for criminal conversation and alienation of affections are recognized and valid in North Carolina); In re Webb, 70 N.C. App. 345, 350, 320 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1984) (“ ‘[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ”) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 504, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540 (1977)), aff’d, 313 N.C. 322, 327 S.E.2d 879, 879-80 (1985).
III. Conclusion
Our appellate courts have extended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) to many other subsections of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52. While the statute of limitations for criminal conversation and many other torts is three years, criminal conversation is an inherently deceitful, concealing, and deceptive act. As in cases of fraud, the parties involved intentionally and actively conceal and attempt to avoid discovery by the aggrieved spouse. An aggrieved party probably will not become aware of the commissions of adultery, if ever, until well after the acts occurred. A tortfeasor should not be awarded for exceptionally egregious behavior after secretive actions intended and devised to preclude discovery. The trial court properly ruled that the discovery rule applies and tolls the three year statute of limitations until the aggrieved party did or should have discovered defendant’s tortious acts. The jury specifically found as fact that plaintiff’s criminal conversation claim was filed “within three years after the time the bodily harm became apparent or reasonably to have become apparent to . . . plaintiff, whichever occurred first.” As “no fact tried by a jury... shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law[,]” U.S. Const. amend. VII; N.C. Const, art. I, § 19, defendant’s assignment of error should be overruled. I vote to affirm the jury’s verdict in plaintiff’s favor. I respectfully dissent.