After a rear-end collision, James D. Herr sued Bridget L. Withers, alleging negligence. When the jury awarded Herr $10,000, approximately $3,000 less than his claimed special damages, he initiated this appeal. In his sole enumeration, Herr contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury that to recover, he had to establish within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injury was the result of Withers’ negligence.
The evidence on Herr’s damages was hotly contested, primarily because the parties disputed whether a preexisting jaw problem necessitated Herr’s extensive dental work. Besides a neck sprain which was admittedly resolved after fifteen physical therapy sessions, Herr claimed that the collision caused jaw pain requiring forty-two visits to his dentist and eight crowns as well as permanent weakness to the lower left side of his face. Herr’s internist testified that the facial weakness was the result of a central seventh nerve palsy caused by head trauma. Herr’s dentist testified that the accident injured a joint in Herr’s jaw and required crowns to allow him to bite. Withers’ experts vigorously disputed Herr’s claim that the accident *421caused his oral problems with proof that he had preexisting bite abnormalities. They also testified that trauma did not cause the facial weakness. The record showed Herr had a history of jaw complaints going back to September 1980.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury
that in considering expert medical testimony a verdict cannot be formed on speculation or mere possibilities. In order for a plaintiff to recover damages for an injury arising from the negligence of another, it must be shown within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injury was the result of the defendant’s negligence. Speculation and possibilities are to be disregarded.
Herr objected, arguing that the charge incorrectly stated that “a reasonable degree of medical certainty” was the standard of proof for proximate causation. He maintained that the proper standard was a reasonable degree of medical probability. Held:
Without question, the standard of proof required to establish that an injury resulted from a defendant’s negligence is a preponderance of the evidence. Patillo v. Thompson, 106 Ga. App. 808, 811 (3) (128 SE2d 656) (1962). Unquestionably, that well-recognized standard for civil cases is not the functional equivalent of requiring certainty. Sanders v. Cowart, 231 Ga. App. 303, 304 (1) (499 SE2d 103) (1998); see Abdul-Majeed v. Emory Univ. Hosp., 225 Ga. App. 608-609 (484 SE2d 257) (1997); Maurer v. Chyatte, 173 Ga. App. 343, 344-345 (3) (326 SE2d 543) (1985); OCGA § 24-1-1 (5); compare Goggin v. Goldman, 209 Ga. App. 251, 253 (433 SE2d 85) (1993) (although medical malpractice actions require proof of causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, in negligence cases, as here, the proper standard is a preponderance of the evidence). To the extent that the charges in Leslie v. Williams, 235 Ga. App. 657, 659 (2) (510 SE2d 130) (1998); Johnson v. Cooper, 234 Ga. App. 753, 756-757 (2) (507 SE2d 559) (1998); Royal v. Davis Hauling Co., 164 Ga. App. 409, 410 (2) (297 SE2d 333) (1982)1 and Womack v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 131 *422Ga. App. 63, 65 (4) (205 SE2d 72) (1974), may hold otherwise, they are disapproved.* 2
We take issue with the dissent’s contention that we have indiscriminately commingled malpractice and negligence law. On the contrary, we have carefully differentiated the case law to make abundantly clear that the “reasonable degree of medical certainty” language should never be injected into a charge on causation in an ordinary negligence action.
Further, the dissent has overlooked the well-settled legal principle that reversal requires both harm and error. Sparti v. Joslin, 230 Ga. App. 346, 350 (3) (b) (496 SE2d 490) (1998); Gantt v. Bennett,231 Ga. App. 238, 242 (3) (499 SE2d 75) (1998). Despite the error in the charge, Herr won his case. The jury awarded him most, if not all, of the damages he proved. “Where a jury returns a verdict and it has the approval of the trial judge, the same must be affirmed on appeal if there is any evidence to support it as the jurors are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight and credit given the evidence.” (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. Cooper, 234 Ga. App. at 753.
Here, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, as we must, we find the evidence of damages supports the $10,000 award. Johnson v. Cooper, 234 Ga. App. at 753. At trial, Herr presented documentation of approximately $10,885.26 in medical specials.3 Of these expenses, $7,266.38 were for the controversial dental work. Thus, the jury’s award may cover this expense in its entirety notwithstanding the facts that Herr did not seek treatment for his jaw problem until almost four months after the accident and both Herr and his dentist admitted that Herr had received treatment on his jaw for essentially the same condition before the accident.
Herr’s documentation of his lost wages was even less precise. See Super Discount Markets v. Coney, 210 Ga. App. 659, 660 (2) (436 SE2d 803) (1993) (proof of lost wages must be “reasonably certain” and not speculative). He presented no tax returns. Instead, he testified that he averaged about $315 per week “or so” and missed work 47 days. However, after the first week, the days were nonconsecutive. Keplinger v. Cook, 115 Ga. App. 540, 541-542 (1) (154 SE2d 765) (1967). Herr offered no proof that each absence was accident-related. *423Even so, assuming they were, it is impossible to discern whether the verdict included all or part of the lost wages claim. At trial, Herr explicitly abandoned his request for future medical costs and lost wages.
Given the incomplete and controverted evidence, particularly that undermining Herr’s credibility and that offered to prove lost wages, we must conclude that the verdict was within the range of the evidence. Dept. of Transp. v. 19.646 Acres of Land, 178 Ga. App. 287, 288 (1) (342 SE2d 760) (1986). “We decline to substitute our judgment based upon a cold record for that of enlightened jurors who heard the evidence and saw the witnesses.” (Punctuation omitted.) Annis v. Tomberlin & Shelnutt Assoc., 195 Ga. App. 27, 32 (4) (392 SE2d 717) (1990). The $10,000 award was sufficiently commensurate with the proof of damages to preclude Herr from satisfying his burden of establishing the requisite harm. Dept. of Transp. v. 19.646 Acres of Land, 178 Ga. App. at 288 (1).
This ruling renders moot Withers’ motion to strike.
Judgment affirmed.
McMurray, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. Blackburn, J., concurs specially. Johnson, C. J, Andrews and Smith, JJ., concur in the judgment only. Pope, P. J., Beasley, P. J, and Ruffin, J., dissent.In Royal, the court charged as follows:
“[I]f you believe that from the evidence adduced that the cause of any injury or medical condition which may have been suffered by the plaintiff cannot be determined with certainty, but that it is a matter of speculation or conjecture, then in that event you would not be authorized to find a verdict against the defendants in any amount. And in such instance it would be your duty to return a verdict in favor of the defendants,) it being absolutely necessary for the plaintiff in order to recover damages from the defendants to show by a legal preponderance of the evidence that the loss complained of was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendants. In this connection I further instruct you that the law does not permit you to speculate or to guess about the existence of either the negligence or the injury claimed.”
*422Id. at 410 (2).
The trial court’s reliance on Womack, the sheer number of appeals involving similar charges, and the very existence of this appeal refute the dissent’s contention that such disapproval is unnecessary.
Because some of the documentation is illegible, we cannot set the exact amount with certainty. We subtracted a bill for $130 incurred in October 1995 (the collision occurred in June 1992) for ah office visit at Mulberry Medical Associates, P.C. which involved a urinalysis and CBC.