dissenting:
¶ 23 I respectfully dissent. I would also vacate the judgment, but I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the small claims jurisdictional statute. I do not believe that section 78-6-1 allows personal injury plaintiffs to bring claims for general damages such as pain and suffering and future economic losses.
¶ 24 The jurisdictional provision at issue in this case states in pertinent part:
(1) A small claims action is a civil action: (a) for the recovery of money where the amount claimed does not exceed $5,000 ... and where the defendant resides or the action of indebtedness was incurred within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is to be’maintained....
Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-l(a) (Supp.1999) (emphasis added). Although this provision could have been more clearly written, I believe the references to “recovery of money” and “action of indebtedness” evinced a legislative intent to limit the damages available in small claims actions to liquidated sums. Indeed, we have previously held that the small claims act “was established by the legislature to make it possible to dispose of certain actions in an informal manner from their inception to their end with the sole object of dispensing speedy justice between the parties.” Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d 1372, *1931374 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
¶ 25 As this case amply illustrates, moreover, an interpretation limiting small claims actions to liquidated special damages is the only one that accords with sound policy. The simplified procedures inherent in small claims actions cannot be adequately adapted to the evidentiary demands of inherently ambiguous general damages claims for pain and suffering or future economic losses. These types of claims nearly always require expert testimony from medical professionals, economic statisticians, accident reconstruction-ists, and the like. Yet the majority now remands this case for what, in effect, will be a full-blown trial on the merits of plaintiffs general damages claims. Surely, this is not the informal process of “dispos[ing] of minor money disputes by dispensing speedy justice between the parties,” id. at 1375, that was envisioned by the legislature when it authorized the creation of small claims courts.
¶26 Indeed, the parties in this case attempted to try complex general damages issues without the benefit of adequate procedures — either before or during trial — for filtering, narrowing, and assessing the testimony to be presented. As a consequence, the trial court futilely attempted to limit the scope of the proceedings by reducing live expert testimony to proffers by the attorneys. This resulted in an unnecessarily contentious and farcical proceeding where little, if any, useful information could be garnered about the very complicated claims presented. Several pages of the transcript are even devoted to a discussion of plaintiffs claim that his damages included the loss of a potential baseball career. A small claims action simply cannot be the correct context in which to litigate such issues.
¶ 27 Plaintiff clearly has a right to pursue his claims for general damages, but he attempted to do so in the wrong forum. If he desires such damages, he should file a traditional civil action in the district court. I would vacate the trial court’s award of general damages and remand -with instructions to limit recovery to liquidated special damages.1
. In this respect, I agree with the majority that plaintiff’s recovery is not necessarily limited by the fact that he has already received PIP benefits. So long as plaintiffs are not afforded a double recovery for items or costs already paid by no-fault PIP, they are entitled to claim up to $5,000 in liquidated special damages.