concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the majority. In my opinion, the eminent domain issue is in the last analysis simply a question of statutory construction. Our duty is no more than an interpretation of the phrase “private property.”
It has been said that there are four methods of judicial interpretation of statutes: the literal method, the golden rule method, the sound law approach, and the standard old rule method. The literal method simply dictates that we not depart from the plain meaning of the language of the statute. The golden rule method would direct that we follow the literal method unless it produces contradiction, absurdity or such an inconvenience as to insure that the legislature meant something else. The sound law approach is for the appellate court to make sense out of the statute but to be faithful to the legislative intent. Under this method, consideration should be given to the purpose of the statute in trying to make it at home with the whole body of the law. The standard old rule method is sometimes called the “mischief rule.” Here the appellate court seeks to find the law as it existed before the statute was passed and then identify the mischief sought to be corrected, the idea being that this would lead to the legislative intent and would protect the law as a seamless web.
I have attempted to apply each of these methods to the statute in question here. In doing so I am unable to reach the conclusion that the words “private property” mean lands owned by municipal corporations.