(dissenting).
I agree with the views expressed by Justice Henriod, but wish to proffer these additional comments.
The only' conceivable way to sustain the majority opinion is to segment the amendment into its separate sentences and arbitrarily refuse to construe them together, in spite of the references of one sentence to another. .
Section 28 of Article VIII provides:
The Legislature may provide uniform standards for mandatory retirement and for removal of judges from office. Legislation implementing this section shall be applicable only to conduct occurring subsequent to the effective date of such legislation. Any determination requiring the retirement or removal of a judge from office shall be subject to review, as to both law and facts, by the Supreme Court.
This section is additional to, and cumulative with, the methods of removal of justices and judges provided in sections 11 and 27 of this Article. [Emphasis added.]
I agree with the majority that the amendment confers upon the Legislature the power to provide uniform standards for mandatory retirement and removal of judges. I further agree that mandatory retirement cannot be equated with removal for misconduct. However, the conclusion of the majority that the amendment permits the legislature to set a standard based on age and without reference to conduct is inconsistent with the language of the amendment. It should be conceded that if the first sentence constituted the entire amendment, there would be a basis to support the construction advocated by the majority. However, the second sentence of the amendment specifies that the implementing legislation shall be applicable to conduct occurring subsequent to the effective date of such legislation. There are two alternative interpretations of this sentence. The mandatory retirement standards refer to conduct caused by age or disability *291as advocated by this dissent; or the distinction urged by the majority that the standards of mandatory retirement may be based solely on age and without reference to conduct, in which case the retirement legislation might be retroactive while the legislation concerning conduct only must be prospective. The third sentence resolves this potential conflict, i. e., it provides that any determination requiring the retirement or removal of a judge from office shall be subject to review by this court both as to law and facts. This review of a determination requiring retirement would be meaningless if retirement were determined solely by age. The words “any determination requiring the retirement” must mean some type of proceeding in which the conduct of an individual is reviewed to determine whether it comports with the standards provided by the legislature.
I am compelled to construe Section 28 as follows:
The legislature is empowered to enact prospectively uniform standards of conduct for the removal or retirement of judges, but in a proceeding where there is a determination requiring the retirement or removal of a judge from office, he is entitled to a review of both the law and the facts before the Supreme Court.
Section 49-7-1.1, U.C.A.1953, as enacted in 1969, provides for mandatory retirement of judges based solely on age and without reference to conduct. These standards do not comport with the provisions of Section. 28, Article VIII of the Constitution- of Utah and are therefore unconstitutional. The writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State to certify plaintiff’s election should be granted.