The substantial issue before us is whether a group of students enrolled in a private college, incorporated as a charitable corporation under the laws of this State, have standing to challenge certain actions of its board of trustees as constituting breaches of duties to the college and its students.
This issue was made in a class action filed in the Superior Court of DeKalb County by William H. Miller, III, claiming to represent 107 other persons, against Reverend J. Don Alderhold and others individually and as Trustees of Atlanta Baptist College, KPIA Company and Gulfko, Inc.
The complaint alleged, insofar as necessary to recite here, that the trustees have failed and refused to promote the purposes and objectives of the college as defined in its charter, and have breached their duties to it and its students by deliberate acts of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance relating to its assets, each of which acts was designed to injure the college, the plaintiff and members of his class, all of which were designed to destroy the college as an institution of higher learning by wantonly wasting and deliberately dissipating the college’s assets and properties by specified acts. In this connection the complaint further alleged in substance that the trustees have entered *66into a contract to sell a substantial portion of the land of the college to the transferor of the corporate defendants; that they have offered to sell the remaining land to the Georgia Baptist Convention; and that they have continued to employ the president, who it is alleged, has destroyed the academic integrity of the college by failing to perform certain acts and by performing stated others.
The prayers of the complaint were, in substance, as follows: That a temporary injunction issue enjoining the trustees from taking any further action adverse to the best interest of the school as to stated matters; that a receiver be appointed to operate the college with responsibility to perform enumerated acts; that the trustees and the corporate defendants show cause why the agreement of sale and lease should not be rescinded; or that the trustees show cause why they should not pay to the college the difference between the amount realized from the transaction with Roger Properties, Inc., and its successors and the fair value of the property; that the corporate defendants be enjoined from further alienation of the property referred to in the deed to them; and for general relief.
To this complaint the individual defendants and the corporate defendants filed separate motions to dismiss and also separate answers which denied the essential allegations of the complaint. The answer of the corporate defendants also sought certain affirmative relief not required to be recited here.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to strike the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss for want of particularity.
The plaintiff also moved for a continuance of the hearing upon the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Both of the plaintiff’s motions were denied and the case was dismissed. This appeal was then brought.
The motion to strike the defendants’ motion to dismiss is not meritorious. The motion to dismiss recited that "the complaint fails to state any claim for any relief which can be granted to the plaintiff.” This is sufficient particularity. *67It conforms to the requirements of the Civil Practice Act. See Code Ann. §81A-112 and the forms set forth in Code Ann. § 81A-319.
The plaintiff’s motion for continuance of the hearing upon the motion to dismiss was properly denied. No abuse of discretion was shown.
The trial court was correct in sustaining the motions of the individual and corporate defendants to dismiss the complaints.
The plaintiff and the other students, who allegedly are members of the class, lack the standing necessary to bring this suit. For this reason alone the action cannot be maintained.
It is apparent from the complaint that the plaintiff and the 107 other students of Atlanta Baptist College whom he claims to represent are endeavoring to show that a charitable trust has been created; that the trustees have breached their duties in its administration; and that they as beneficiaries are attempting to enforce the trust.
We cannot agree.
The Atlanta Baptist College is a private corporation. Its primary and foremost purpose is the education of people. The relation between the plaintiff student and the college is essentially contractual in character. John B. Stetson University v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510 (7) (102 S 637); Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121 (122 A 220); 15 AmJur2d 604, § 17; 14 CJS 1358, § 24.
In White v. Neff, 52 Ohio St. 375 (40 NE 720, 28 LRA 409), it was said: "In common acceptation colleges are not 'charitable institutions’ although in law they administer a public charity. This means no more than that the public are incidentally benefited by the education of some of its members the immediate advantage accruing to the individual members who have received instruction.”
"The operation of a private college or university is touched with eleemosynary characteristics. Even though the public has a great interest in seeing these institutions encouraged and supported, they are operated as a private *68business.” University of Miami v. Militana, 184 S. 2d 701, 704 (Fla.)
Chief Justice Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 518, 641 (1819), in discussing the question as to whose benefit the property given to Dartmouth College was secured, said: "Yet a question remains to be considered, of more real difficulty, on which more doubt has been entertained than on all that have been discussed. The founders of the college, at least those whose contributions were in money, have parted with the property bestowed upon it, and their representatives have no interest in that property. The donors of land are equally without interest, so long as the corporation shall exist. Could they be found, they are unaffected by any alteration in its constitution, and probably regardless of its form, or even of its existence. The students are fluctuating, and no individual among our youth has a vested interest in the institution, which can be asserted in a court of justice.”
In Trustees of Martin Institute v. Maddox, 139 Ga. 491, 493 (77 SE 629), the plaintiffs as residents of Jackson County, but not living in the City of Jefferson, sought to enjoin the Trustees of Martin Institute from charging tuition for their children attending the school so long as free tuition is given pupils residing in the City of Jefferson. This court in holding that the Martin Institute was a private institution said: "By the second item of Mr. Martin’s will a bequest of certain stock was given to the trustees of this institution, without restriction as to its use. The trustees were given plenary power over this bequest; they could use it in the construction of buildings, the payment of teachers, or in any way promotive of the general design of the academy. Mr. Martin’s generosity was not to the pupils of school age in the County of Jackson, but to a chartered educational institution. This institution was managed by trustees, and his benefaction was to them, to be employed in the management and operation of the academy. Cumming v. Trustees of Reid Memorial Church, 64 Ga. 105. No express trust was created for the citizens of Jackson Coun*69ty, and the terse and positive words of the will admit of no such implication. The plaintiffs have no financial interest in the Martin fund, and therefore have no right to interfere with the discretion of the trustees in their use of it in the management and operation of the school.”
One attending a private college has no vested financial interest in the institution. As a student he has no standing in court to challenge the act of the trustees or others in the operation and management of the college.
It is inconceivable that one 18-year-old boy or girl the day after his or her admission to a private college could go into court or through the State’s Attorneys, and seek to enjoin the trustees in the management and operation of the college, and ask for a receiver solely because he or she was a student. As Chief Justice Marshall said in the Dartmouth College case, supra, "Students are fluctuating and no individual among our youth has a vested interest in the institution which can be asserted in a court of justice.”
In view of the ruling in Division 3, it is not necessary to rule on the plaintiff’s enumeration that the trial court erred in refusing to consider rescission of the sale and lease contract because of mootness.
The rulings of the trial court were correct.
Judgments affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Grice, Undercofler and Felton, JJ., who concur specially.