dissenting.
I would reverse Josephs’ conviction because I find that the evidence offered by the Commonwealth at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana.
At trial, the evidence before the court was that Josephs and her five year old daughter were travelling in the back seat of a Florida rental car being driven to New York, which was stopped by the police in Hanover, Virginia. Neither Josephs’ name nor that of the driver was listed on the rental agreement and the officer testified *111that he contacted Florida and received information that the vehicle’s occupants were not authorized to have the car. A small suitcase belonging to Josephs was found in the trunk of the car, along with a larger suitcase, which belonged to the driver, and four plastic garbage bags containing 130 pounds of marijuana. The bags were closed but emitted a very strong odor of marijuana. Josephs told the officer that she did not know about the drugs, that she lived in Miami, had left Miami with the driver of the car and was just riding to New York. The officer’s notes contained an additional statement made by Josephs after she was arrested: “1st time I’ve driven with that stuff.” Marijuana was not found either on Josephs’ person or in the inside of the car. Evidence was presented that Miami was approximately 1000 miles away from Hanover.
“To support a conviction based on constructive possession, the Commonwealth ‘must point to evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of the accused, or other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the substance and that it was subject to his dominion and control.’ ” Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986)(quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1984)); Behrens v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 131, 135, 348 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1986). “Suspicious circumstances, including proximity to a controlled drug, are insufficient to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance.” Behrens, 3 Va. App. at 135, 348 S.E.2d at 432. In essence, the facts show that Josephs had travelled approximately 1000 miles in a car which had a large quantity of narcotics in the trunk, that Josephs was not an authorized occupant of the vehicle, and that her personal luggage was located in the trunk of the vehicle. The Commonwealth introduced only one statement made by Josephs suggesting knowledge of the contents of the trunk and this was made after she had been arrested for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Viewing this evidence, and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as is required on appeal, Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988) (citations omitted), I find that this evidence is insufficient to prove that the drugs found in the trunk of the car were constructively possessed by Josephs with an awareness of their character. See Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 619, 623, 238 S.E.2d 820, *112822 (1977).
Because I find that the evidence offered at trial by the Commonwealth, even if it was properly admitted, was insufficient as a matter of law, I do not address the issue of standing or admissibility of the evidence as set forth by either the majority or the dissenting opinions. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the trial court and dismiss Josephs’ conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana.