dissenting. ". . . Any contract for sale of lands, or any interest in, or concerning them.” Such a contract, to be binding on the promisor, must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged, or someone by him lawfully authorized. Code §20-401 (4). The contract herein alleged to have been breached was not in writing, it was not signed by the owner of tract "A,” and it concerned an interest in tract "A” and the lot owned by the plaintiff in a different and separate tract of land. The only way under the law which the promise made to restrict lots in tract "A” to residences could be legally made would have been for the owner of tract "A” to put a contract or plat on record so restricting the tract. This would have served a dual purpose: it would have protected owners of lots in the subdivision in which plaintiff’s lot was located from apartment use of the tract and it would have similarly protected the lots of all owners of lots in tract "A.” If this had been done, the *124plaintiff would not have been wronged as complained of in this action, and it also would have protected a transferee of the plaintiff, who is not protected under the oral contract alleged. The Statute of Frauds is not just an ornament, as shown by the numerous decisions of our courts. It was said in Cottrell v. Nurnberger, 131 W. Va. 391, 411 (47 SE2d 454, 5 ALR2d 1298): "To sanction the substitution of verbal declaration for written instruments in the creation or the transfer of certain interests and estates in land is to reject the wholesome experience of the past for uncertain memory and unrecorded expression and, in so doing, to adopt a course which is necessarily fraught with danger. This risk should never be undertaken except to prevent, in a clear case, the injustice which results from fraud or inequitable conduct; and whenever doubt on this point exists the requirements of these statutes should be strictly adhered to and enforced.” (Emphasis supplied). See Restatement, Property, Vol. 5, p. 3165, § 522, which reads: "(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a promise that certain land will be used in a particular way is subject to the provisions of the statute of frauds requiring promises which create interests in land to be in writing signed by the promisor. (2) A promise by the grantee in a deed poll, which promise is contained in the deed, that the land conveyed thereby will be used in a particular way is not subject to the provisions of the statute of frauds requiring promises which create interests in land to be signed by the promisor.”
The rulings in Columbia Valley Recreation Center v. Massie, 223 Ga. 151 (154 SE2d 215) control here. In Division 2 this court said: "The express covenants are shown by the exhibits not to cover the swimming pool lots and can not be made to cover them by deceit.” This statement seems to "cover” the question in this case.
The writing necessary to restrict the use of real estate, is a material term of such a contract, is not present in this case, and cannot be supplied by parol agreement. This court has applied this principle in numerous cases, even if the facts in the cases differ from this one. Taylor v. Smith, 221 *125Ga. 55 (142 SE2d 918); Awtrey v. Awtrey, 225 Ga. 666 (171 SE2d 126); Sanders v. Vaughn, 223 Ga. 274 (154 SE2d 616); Chapman v. Gordon, 29 Ga. 250; Kitchens v. Noland, 172 Ga. 684 (58 SE 562); Stonecypher v. Ga. Power Co., 183 Ga. 498 (1) (189 SE 13).
Westhampton, Inc. v. Kehoe, 227 Ga. 642 (182 SE2d 430) is distinguishable from this case in that in that case actual written restrictions were imposed by grantor-defendant on parts of the whole tract of land.
We have not been cited to a case supporting such a claim as the plaintiff makes in this case, nor have I found one or heard of one.
The motion of the defendants for summary judgments should have been granted.