dissenting.
The record shows, and the briefs adequately develop, that summary judgment for defendant was required by law.
The incident occurred on plaintiff’s way out, after she had entered the same way and had seen the black asphalt slope on the side of the concrete ramp. Nothing obstructed her view of it. She realized it was sloped. What is more, she had been there several times, when the condition was the same.
Additionally, her contradictory statements that there was something slick and rough are not explained. Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27, 30 (343 SE2d 680) (1986).
She said she did not know what caused her to fall. “I slipped, I suppose. My foot slipped as I stepped down,” she said. She could see the paving she fell on, which was where the slope started to level out at the bottom, and she agreed there was no foreign substance. Her opinion that it was unsafe was a conclusion she drew based solely on her unsubstantiated belief that many people fell on it.
There is no evidence of a latent danger or concealed hazard, as distinguished from the cases cited by plaintiff. Instead, it more closely approximates Thacker v. Matthews Tuxedo, 183 Ga. App. 474 (359 SE2d 231) (1987).
*365Decided December 20, 1989 Rehearing denied February 2, 1990 Robert B. Sumner, Mills & Chasteen, Ben B. Mills, Jr., for appellant. Gibson & Jackson, Douglas L. Gibson, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.