This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia, which awarded William F. Julian, hereinafter referred to as appellee, $261.50 for the death of his dog which was killed by a dog owned by the appellants, Frank DeVincent and Emily DeVincent. This Court granted an appeal and supersedeas and the case was submitted without argument on the appellants’ brief September 14, 1971, for a decision of this Court.
The case was appealed to the Circuit Court from a judgment of a justice of the peace court and tried by the circuit court in lieu of a jury upon a stipulation of facts by the parties. It appears from the stipulation of facts recited in *321the record by the trial court that the appellants owned a large dog which had attacked two persons before the incident involved in this case. On the day in question appellants’ dog, which was running at large, ran up onto the appellee’s porch, attacked and killed his small dog. No statement with regard to the age of the appellee’s dog is contained in the record.
The Circuit Court, in awarding damages to the appellee, stated that the value of the dog was $178.70, which was the exact amount of judgment rendered by the justice of the peace and itemized in the record. This is the only evidence contained in the record with regard to damages, and is itemized as follows: “Surgery & Care (Dr. Doza Mgt.) $49.00, Burial and Exam (Dr. Stewart Mgt.) $29.70, Plus Sentimental value, Mental Cruelty of Julian’s children $100.00”, a total of $178.70. To this amount the Circuit Court added $75 for damages to the upholstery of appel-lee’s car caused by blood from the dog presumably while being transported to the veterinarian. The appellee’s dog had been registered but there was no assessed value placed on the dog for taxation purposes.
The appellants contend that there can be no recovery of any amount for the value of the dog because of the provisions of Code, 19-20-12, as amended, which reads in part as follows: “ * * * Any person whose dog shall be killed or injured wrongfully or unlawfully by any other person shall have a right of action against the person who shall so kill or injure such dog, but in no case can recovery be had in excess of the assessed value of such dog.” However, the following section of Code, 19-20-13, as amended, provides: “Any owner or keeper of any dog who permits such dog to run at large shall be liable for any damages inflicted upon the person or property of another by such dog while so running at large.” Code, 19-20-1, as amended, provides that any dog above the age of six months can be and is hereby declared to be personal property under the laws of this state.
*322It should be noted that Code, 19-20-12, as amended, which is primarily concerned with protection of registered dogs and criminal offenses in connection therewith, deals with recovery in civil actions against a person who kills or injures a dog belonging to any person. The next section, Code, 19-20-13, as amended, deals with the liability of any owner or keeper of any dog who permits such dog to run at large and damages the property of another person while it is allowed to rim at large. See Baer v. Tyler, 261 Mass. 138, 158 N.E. 536. The statute and decided cases in this state clearly classify dogs, if over six months of age, as property. Code, 19-20-1, as amended; State v. Voters, 134 W.Va. 690, 61 S.E.2d 521; State v. Blake, 95 W.Va. 467, 121 S.E. 488.
The case of State v. Voters, supra, held that a dog of proper age, as required by statute, which was not assessed for taxation purposes was property and subject to larceny.
In order to recover damages for a dog the market value, pecuniary value or some special value must be proved and the general rule is that damages for sentimental value or mental suffering are not recoverable. 3 C.J.S., Animals, § 234, page 1346; 1 A.L.R.3d, page 1000; Smith v. Palace Transp. Co., 253 N.Y.S. 87, 142 Misc. 93; Wilcox v. Butt’s Drug Stores, 38 N.M. 502, 35 P.2d 978.
In the case at bar there apparently was no attempt made by the parties to prove or to agree as to the value of the dog which was killed. The record contained no stipulation of facts signed by the parties and Rule 80 (e) R.C.P. was not followed.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County is therefore reversed.
Reversed.