dissenting. I dissent from the judgment based on the ruling that the lease violated the rule against perpetuities.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the lease dated October 25, 1940, are as follows: “2. To have and to hold the leased premises for a period of fifteen (15) years from the date of the completion of said Camp Gordon Airport for business, this said lease to be effective when said Airport has been completed and officially opened for business. 3. Lessee shall pay to lessor rent for the premises in the sum of five hundred fifty ($550) dollars per month, said rent to be paid semi-annually, in advance, lessee agrees to pay, at the time of the signing of this lease the sum of three thousand three hundred ($3,300) dollars, this being six months rent, in advance, provided, however, that in the event said Airport for any reason is not completed as contemplated, said money will be returned to lessee by lessor.” Paragraphs 2 and 3 of an amendment to the original lease are as follows: “2. The rental to be paid as set forth in the aforementioned lease is hereby reduced by the sum of $1,000 per annum so that the rental to be paid by the lessee to the lessor hereafter shall be $5,600 per annum, to be paid semi-annually in advance; provided that said reduced rental is paid for a period commencing July 1, 1943, and such payments are made regularly and continually throughout the life of said lease. If said payments are not made irrespective of the possession of the premises, then the lessee shall be obligated to pay rental as set forth in the original lease. It is understood that the cancellation of the reduction in rent is the only penalty provided for the non-payment of same during such period as the lessee is not in full enjoyment of the premises. It is not intended to reduce the term of the lease and the same shall be extended by whatever time the exclusive possession of the premises is retained by the United States, it being the intention of the parties that the lessee shall have full enjoyment of the *696leased premises for the full period of 15 years. 3. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 26 of the original lease are hereby amended insofar as said paragraphs may be in conflict with or modified by the foregoing provisions.”
The original lease was unilateral because the county did not obligate itself to complete the airport. The amendment cured the defect. Furthermore, the petition alleged that the airport had been completed prior to the lease amendment of 1943, and paragraph 2 of the lease amendment provided that the rental payments should begin July 1, 1943, regardless of possession of the airport by Southern Airways, which provision vested the lessee’s interest. Thus there was no contingency as to the completion of the airport or as to the vesting of sufficient interest of the lessee which cost it over $5,000 per year. It is indeed a novel doctrine, at least to me, that a defective or void contract cannot be perfected by amendment or new contract. The fact that the rental paid while the lessee was not in possession was later refunded is immaterial. If it was consideration by agreement there is a question whether the county could return it to the lessee.
Since the interest of the lessee vested at a time certain less than 21 years, the rule against perpetuities does not apply. Mitchell, Real Property in Georgia, 337-338; 70 C. J. S. 580, Perpetuities, § 4(d); 41 Am. Jur. 66-67, Perpetuities, § 22; Code § 85-902; 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1078; Wright v. Irving Trust Co., 70 F. 2d 245, 246; Field v. Howell, 6 Ga. 423, 431(3); Grant v. Grant, 187 Ga. 807, 816-17; Code § 85-701; Simes & Smith, “The Law of Future Interest,” § 82; Gray; “The Rule Against Perpetuities,” § 11; Simes & Smith, supra, § 1856; Gray, supra, § 970; 66 A. L. R. 2d 733.