dissenting:
In Reddy v. Community Health Foundation of Man, 171 W.Va. 368, 298 S.E.2d 906 (1982), we held that the common law rule that a covenant not to compete operates as a restraint on trade and is therefore void and unenforceable, had been replaced by the modern rule that an anti-competitive covenant will be upheld if it is supported by consideration, ancillary to a lawful contract, and both reasonable and consistent with the public interest. We also noted that even though a restrictive covenant benefits the employer only, if the covenant is part of a contract that contains mutual promises, there is adequate consideration for the covenant. 171 W.Va. at 372, 298 S.E.2d at 910.
The present facts adhere to these rules of law as Mr. Bostic’s restrictive covenant is part of a written employee contract, containing both his signature and the signature of his employer, Mr. Snodgrass. Mr. Bostic agreed not to engage in a similar business for a period of five years within any of the ten specified counties in which Appalachian was doing business. The majority asserts that this restriction was unreasonable because Mr. Bostic was not privy to any sensitive or confidential information, the appropriation or disclosure of which would result in injury to the employer. I believe this misconstrues the rule of reasonableness we painstakingly set out in Reddy and therefore I dissent.
We have expressly adopted the Rule of Reasonableness as a governing principle to determine if a restrictive covenant is enforceable, Pancake Realty v. Harber, 137 W.Va. 605, 73 S.E.2d 438 (1952); O. Hom-mel Co. v. Fink, 115 W.Va. 668, 177 S.E. 619 (1934) and used this as our measuring yardstick to uphold the doctor’s restrictive covenant not to practice medicine within a thirty mile radius of a community clinic for three years in Reddy supra. The three-dimensional method of inquiry to determine if a restrictive covenant is reasonable is the following: “A restraint is reasonable only if it (l) .is no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.” Reddy, 171 W.Va. at 374, 298 S.E.2d at 911.1
The majority asserts that the employer has not demonstrated any legitimate business interest worthy of protection by restrictive covenant because Mr. Bostic was not privy to any confidential information or trade secrets and Appalachian has not proved any protectible interest in its list of customers. However, Mr. Bostic’s skills are not merely “managerial” as in the precedent of Helms Boys, Inc. v. Brady, 171 W.Va. 66, 297 S.E.2d 840 (1982), which the majority finds controlling. Mr. Bostic specializes in chemical analysis of water samples, which is the core of Appalachian’s business and not merely a replaceable administrative talent. This is a legitimate business interest and one Appalachian found valuable as evidenced by their purchase of Mr. Bostic’s sole proprietorship in 1982.
The factual setting of the case before us is directly on point with the doctor’s employment in Reddy. In Reddy the hospital urged that the investment in supporting equipment and staff cannot be made economically if doctors can freely leave once their position with patients is secure. Reddy, 171 W.Va. at 382, 298 S.E.2d at 920. We agreed and held that the doctor’s restrictive covenant not to practice medicine within thirty miles for three years did not place undue hardship on his livelihood. Likewise, Appalachian cannot afford to have Mr. Bostic come along, gain the confi*390dence of all their customers and then set up a competitive business which takes away Appalachian’s livelihood by taking their former customers.
Accordingly, Appalachian did have a legitimate business interest to protect and their restrictive covenant in Mr. Bostic’s covenant was reasonable on its face and in light of public policy. Because the majority today directly contravenes our holding in Reddy v. Community Health Foundation of Man, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that BROTHERTON, J., joins in this dissent.
. See Solari Indus. Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 585, 264 A.2d 53, 61 (1970); accord Ins. Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, 499 P.2d 1252 (1972); Wood v. May, 73 Wash.2d 307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968). See also J. Grody, “Partial Enforcement of Post-Employment Restrictive Covenants,” 15 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 181 (1979).