dissenting.
Under DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465 (169 SE2d 801) (1969), an accusation must definitely inform the accused of the charges against him so that he may prepare a defense and not be surprised at trial, and protect an accused against another prosecution for the same offense. That criteria was met in the instant case, and the majority opinion reaches the opposite conclusion only by observing strict, highly technical dictionary definitions of two words, at the expense of seeking substance and the justice of a common sense approach.
In this case, the appellant was accused of shoplifting by altering the price tags on some merchandise, specifically by changing the prices on those items. The proof adduced at trial showed that the appellant actually substituted the price tags with those of less expensive goods. The majority is unable to present a convincing explanation of how the accusation in this case failed to inform the appellant of the charges against her so that she could prepare a defense, avoid surprise at trial, and be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.
The appellant’s conduct fell within the prohibitions of two subsections of OCGA § 16-8-14 (a). Perhaps it would have been preferable to accuse the appellant under OCGA § 16-8-14 (a) (4), which specifically concerns interchanging prices, but no strained construction is necessary to conclude that OCGA § 16-8-14 (a) (2), dealing with altering price tags, was suitable. Walker v. State, 146 Ga. App. 237 (246 SE2d 206) (1978), is not controlling here, since in Walker the two Code subsections did not prohibit the same conduct.
*533Decided July 2, 1987. Alex L. Zipperer III, for appellant. Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Jon Hope, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.In summary, no sound reason exists for finding a fatal variance between the accusation and the proof in this case. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Banke join in this dissent.