On October 22, 1947, defendant executed and delivered to plaintiff his bond in the penal sum of $1,350.00 conditioned for the payment to plaintiff on Oct. 1, 1948, of the sum of $675.00 with interest and attorney’s fees. At the same time, to secure payment, he gave plaintiff a mortgage of real estate, a Chevrolet car, a Ford truck and a Ford skidder. Upon default plaintiff commenced two actions in claim and delivery in a magistrate’s court for the possession, respectively, of the Chevrolet car and the Ford truck, alleging the value of each to be less than $100.00. At the same time this action was commenced in equity in the usual form for foreclosure of the mortgage lien upon the real estate.
Apparently the action relating to the Chevrolet car was first tried in the magistrate’s court and it was found that *235its value was $75.00 but the magistrate erroneously undertook to render judgment against the defendant for the sum of $100.00 and costs which defendant paid to plaintiff and retained possession of the car.
Upon later trial of the other claim and delivery action, that for possession of the Ford truck, defendant contended that plaintiff had split a single cause of action and was concluded by the former judgment of the magistrate. The contention was overruled and possession of the truck was awarded plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the county court where the matter rests.
Upon reference of the case in hand, the county judge as special referee overruled the defense that plaintiff was barred by his actions in claim and delivery which course it was contended improperly split a single cause of action and that as a result the plaintiff could not pursue his action for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.
The Circuit Court reversed the referee and held that the present action is barred by the claim and delivery proceeding which first came to trial and in which the magistrate rendered judgment which was paid by defendant. The appeal from this judgment will have to be sustained.
Upon breach of the condition of defendant’s bond there accrued to plaintiff a right of action for the possession of the personal property which was mortgaged by the defendant to secure his compliance with the condition of the bond and also a right of action for foreclosure of the mortgage lien upon the real estate. These were separate and concurrent remedies and the pursuit of one should not have been held to interfere with the other. Of course, plaintiff can have but one satisfaction of his debt. Whether the institution of two actions in claim and delivery was an unwarranted “splitting” of that cause of action and the first tried should be held to be a bar to the other is not directly presented by the appeal and need not be decided. It is unimportant, here, anyway. Enforcement of the remedy for possession of the personal *236property did not bar the instant action in equity for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The authorities do not require so harsh a result.
The only case cited by the lower court to sustain its conclusion was Floyd v. American Employers’ Ins. Co., 187 S. C. 344, 197 S. E. 385. But it is of little or no similarity. There a single insurance policy was sued upon and recovery had for a part of a loss and thereafter it was attempted by a subsequent similar action to recover an additional sum arising out of the same loss which the court properly held was a fatal splitting of a cause of action, and the right to additional recovery was denied.
The case of Anderson v. Pilgram, 30 S. C. 499, 9 S. E. 587, 589, 4 L. R. A. 205, 14 Am. St. Rep. 917, opinion by Mr. Justice Mclver, arose from a mortgagee’s effort to foreclose his security upon default in the first due of several notes of serial maturities, and maintain a contemporaneous but later commenced action at law upon a subsequently maturing note, the payment of which was also secured by the mortgage. Judgment at law upon the second note was sustained upon the ground that it was upon a separate and distinct cause of action from that set up in the action of foreclosure. The court said: “We agree * * * that the note sued on in the present action (at law) was not included in the former action (in equity) to foreclose the mortgage. While it may be true that two or more notes given by the defendant to the plaintiff may be regarded as constituting but a single cause of action * * * it does not follow that they must necessarily be so regarded in every case. When the notes are payable at different times and the holder desires to sue as soon as the first one matures, and before the others become payable, they must necessarily be treated as separate causes of action * * * .”
Instead of separately maturing obligations, as in that case, here there were separate securities, the one of personal property for which action at law for possession lay after ma*237turity, and the other of real estate which was forecloseable only in equity. Code sec. 487. Cir. Court rules 51, 52, 53. Ex parte Floyd, 145 S. C. 364, 142 S. E. 805. There is similarity in the situations and both result in inapplicability of the doctrine of splitting of causes of action because both give rise to more than one right of action. “On the other hand, distinct and separate demands, arising out of a contract, give rise to separate causes of action upon which separate actions may be maintained notwithstanding they are of such a character that it would be proper to join them in one action, and so separate actions may be maintained on separate demands arising from a severable contract.” 1 C. J. S., Actions, § 103, pp. 1316, 1317. “Where several articles are included in a chattel mortgage, the mortgagee may bring an action against the mortgagor for the possession of a part only thereof.” 1 C. J. S., Actions, § 103, p. 1326. See also our kindred case of Gibbes Machinery Co. v. Rivers, 94 S. C. 342, 78 S. E. 21, where suit on the mortgage notes was sustained after foreclosure of the chattel security by claim and delivery.
There are many approving citations of Anderson v. Pilgram in our reports, particularly McConnell v. Barnes, 142 S. C. 112, 140 S. E. 310, 57 A. L. R. 483, so that it may be properly said to be a leading case, here and elsewhere perforce its several reportings. The substance of it is stated as settled law in 1 C. J. S., Actions, § 103, p. 1324, 1325. There are numerous decisions in other jurisdictions which countenance the practice of proceeding at law to judgment on a mortgage debt and thereafter foreclosing the mortgage by action. Annotations, 24 L. R. A., N. S., 1095, 121 A. L. R. 917. This procedure is not deemed to be a splitting of a cause. There exist in a few States statutes to the effect that there can be but one action for the recovery of a debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage, with which we are not concerned in the absence of statute here. 1 C. J. S., Actions, § 103, p. 1326; Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 138 P. 2d 7, 146 A. L. R. 1348.
*238There are a number of decisions from many jurisdictions digested in 39 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., and cumulative pocket part, in which “splitting a cause of action” was defined and applied or rejected, and in the majority of them it was rejected. In none at all similar to this case was it applied.
Here it is clear that simultaneous pursuit of the remedies of claim and delivery at law for possession of the personal property and action in equity for foreclosure of the realty was not an objectionable splitting of a cause of action but was the adoption of separate but coexisting remedies which were appropriate by reason of the diverse nature of the mortgage securities. All might have been foreclosed in one action in equity but that course was not exclusive.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for confirmation of the referee’s report which allows credit for the sum of $100.00 paid by defendant in one of the claim and delivery proceedings and provides for foreclosure and sale of the Ford truck (involved in the second claim and delivery action) and the real estate, and application of the proceeds of the sales upon the money judgment, after payment of costs and taxes.
Fishburne and Oxner, JJ., and L. D. LidE, Acting Associate Justice, concur. Taylor, J., dissents. Baker, C. J., did not participate.