The appellant sued the appellee to recover for personal injuries and property damage allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle collision, and the appellee counterclaimed to recover his alleged damages resulting from the same collision. The jury returned a verdict for the appellant in the amount of $10,000, which was $3,784 less than the amount of special damages proved by him. This appeal is from the denial of his motion for new trial.
The collision occurred at a “blind” intersection which the appel-lee was approaching from the west, driving an automobile, and the appellant was approaching from the north, driving a motorcycle. The appellee was required to stop at a stop sign before entering the intersection, while the appellant was not. There was evidence that, due to an overgrowth of kudzu and grass at the northwest corner of the intersection, a vehicle stopped at the stop sign in the appellee’s lane of traffic would be hidden from the view of traffic approaching from the north in the appellant’s lane, and vice versa. The appellee’s automobile was struck by the appellant’s motorcycle on the driver’s side. Held:
1. The appellant contends that there was no evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that he had been negligent in any way and that the trial court consequently erred in charging the jury on the doctrine of comparative negligence. While it is undisputed that the appellant had the right-of-way and while there is no evidence to sug*629gest that he was exceeding the speed limit or otherwise violating any traffic laws, there was evidence from which it could be inferred that he was familiar with the lack of visibility at the intersection yet took no precautionary measures, such as significantly reducing his speed, to allow for such lack of visibility.
It does not follow from the fact that a driver has the right-of-way at an intersection that he is thereby entitled “to drive blindly or recklessly across [the] intersection, especially one which might be termed a ‘blind intersection,’ without regard to the conditions and consequences.” Eddleman v. Askew, 50 Ga. App. 540 (3) (179 SE 247) (1934). See also Kirkland v. Moore, 128 Ga. App. 34, 35-36 (195 SE2d 667) (1973). “[E]ven if the [other] driver ... is guilty of negligence per se or has otherwise failed to exercise ordinary care in approaching the intersection, this will not relieve the driver having the right-of-way of his own legal duty to exercise ordinary care under the facts and circumstances of the situation. It is his duty to exercise ordinary care, to remain alert in observing the vehicles approaching the crossing, and to exercise ordinary care ... to avoid a collision, after he sees or by ordinary diligence could have seen that one is threatened or imminent.” Currey v. Claxton, 123 Ga. App. 681, 682 (1) (182 SE2d 136) (1971). (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the circumstances of this case, we must conclude that the issue of whether or not the appellant exercised due care upon approaching the intersection was for the jury, not the court, to determine; and we accordingly hold that the court did not err in charging on comparative negligence. Accord Kirkland v. Moore, supra (upholding a verdict in favor of the defendant in a similar case in which the plaintiff’s motorcycle was struck by the front of the defendant’s car as the two were proceeding through the intersection). Compare Moore v. Price, 158 Ga. App. 566 (281 SE2d 269) (1981) (holding that no issue regarding the plaintiff’s negligence was raised where the undisputed evidence showed that the collision was the result of the defendant’s negligently losing control of his vehicle and crossing over the center-line of the road).
2. Similarly, the trial court did not err in charging the jury on the doctrine of avoidable consequences (see generally OCGA § 51-11-7), nor in charging that the driver of a motor vehicle is under a duty to maintain a diligent lookout for other traffic. See Leggett v. Brewton, 104 Ga. App. 580 (3) (122 SE2d 469) (1961). Both these charges stated correct abstract legal principles; and, as held in Division 1 of this opinion, supra, the issues of whether the appellant had, under the circumstances, maintained a diligent lookout for other vehicles upon approaching the intersection and otherwise exercised due care for his own safety were proper subjects for jury consideration.
3. Any error which may have been committed by the trial court *630in charging on the doctrine of legal accident was rendered moot by the jury’s verdict awarding damages to the appellant, such verdict being inconsistent with a determination that the collision was not the fault of either party. Accord Atlanta Recycled Fiber Co. v. Tri-Cities Steel Co., 152 Ga. App. 259, 267 (5) (262 SE2d 554) (1979). See generally Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 344 (312 SE2d 835) (1983).
4. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested charge that “[i]n arriving at the award for pain and suffering, you may also take into consideration the effect inflation has had on the purchasing power of the dollar. . . .’’In support of this enumeration of error, the appellant cites Leonard v. Kirkpatrick, 118 Ga. App. 277 (1) (163 SE2d 340) (1968). However, in that case this court sustained the trial court’s refusal to give such a charge, declining to interfere with the trial court’s discretion in the matter. We similarly find no abuse of discretion under the circumstances of the present case, particularly in the absence of any showing of the extent to which the purchasing power of the dollar had declined between the date of the accident and the time of trial. Moreover, we note that because the requested charge applied by its terms only to damages awarded for pain and suffering and because it is apparent any award of such damages by the jury was minimal, the failure to give the requested charge could not have resulted in substantial harm to the appellant.
5. The appellant contends that the verdict was inadequate in that the damages awarded were less than the amount of the special damages proved. This enumeration of error is also without merit. Generally speaking, where “comparative negligence [is] involved under the pleadings and the evidence ... , a verdict for damages for personal injuries cannot properly be set aside on the ground that the verdict is inadequate.” Cox v. Nix, 87 Ga. App. 837, 839-840 (75 SE2d 331) (1953). See also Jordan v. Ellis, 148 Ga. App. 286, 290 (250 SE2d 859) (1978).
6. It follows from the foregoing that the trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s motion for new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
Birdsong, C. J., Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Sognier and Beasley, JJ., concur. Carley, Pope, and Benham, JJ., dissent.