This case concerns custody of a child after a divorce. Some time in the summer of 1975 respondent (Patricia) conceived Amber. A few months later appellant (Dan) and Patricia began dating. On April 4th of 1976 Amber was bom to Patricia. On June 4th of the same year Dan and Patricia were married. At Patricia’s direction, Dan’s name was placed on Amber’s birth certificate as her father. March 13,1978 marked the birth of Dan and Patricia’s daughter, Danielle.
On August 3, 1984, Patricia filed for divorce and in her pleading she stated that both children were children of the marriage (even though Amber was born before the marriage and was not Dan’s natural child). Prior to disposition of Patricia’s complaint for divorce, Patricia and Dan consented to Dan's parents' guardianship of both girls, both agreeing that such guardianship would be in the best interests of the girls. On June 7, 1985, Patricia’s divorce complaint was granted. The decree which was entered, however, did not provide for the care, custody or support of Amber and Danielle. Subsequent to the entry of the divorce decree both Patricia and Dan became remarried to other persons. Patricia married Rick Porter and they resided in Canyon County, Idaho. Dan married Rhonda Stockwell and they lived in Portland, Oregon.
On July 18, 1985, Patricia petitioned to terminate the guardianship which had been vested in Dan’s parents. On October 21, 1985, there was a hearing on the custody of the girls. The magistrate division entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc on March 14, 1986 to be effective as of October 21, 1985. The Findings and Conclusions included the resolution that the guardianship in the paternal grandparents be terminated. Further, the order entrusted care and custody of the girls to Patricia and granted rights of visitation with both Danielle and Amber to Dan. The judge declined to require Dan to pay support for Amber stating that “no legal basis to impose such” support payments could be found. Further, the Findings and Conclusions ordered that reasonable visitation rights with both children be granted to Dan’s parents. Finally, the court admonished all the parties not to reveal Amber’s parentage to her. In January of 1986, Dan returned to Canyon County from Portland, Oregon and he pressed for his visitation rights. In March of 1986 Patricia and Rick fled Idaho with both girls and went to Connecticut without leaving a forwarding address with Dan or with the girls’ school. Once in Connecticut, Patricia and Rick changed the girls’ names in the *299Connecticut schools. In the spring of 1986, Dan found the girls in Connecticut after searching for several months.
On July 1, 1986, a second set of Conclusions of Law was entered and in this document the magistrate stated that Patricia’s conduct, in leaving the state with the girls, was so pernicious to the parent/child relationship which Dan had established with Danielle that a substantial, material and permanent change of circumstances had occurred which warranted changing the custody of Danielle from Patricia to Dan. The magistrate declined to change Amber’s custody from Patricia to Dan but he did order that Patricia return Amber to Dan in Idaho as enforcement of his visitation order regarding an extended visit which was to have occurred from the 15th of June through the 15th of August.
In August of 1986, the Connecticut court entered an order enforcing the magistrate’s July 1, 1986 order and Dan brought both girls back to Idaho. On January 13 and 14 of 1987 the court held a hearing regarding a change of both girls’ custody from Patricia to Dan and it received evidence relevant to the best interests of Amber and Danielle. The court found that the best interests of Danielle would be served by changing her custody to Dan even though this would necessitate the first separation of the girls in their lives. The court found that this separation would be necessitated because it had no authority to place Amber in Dan’s custody since Dan was neither natural nor adoptive parent of Amber.
The court stated that the most compelling consideration motivating its decision was its belief that if Danielle were placed with Patricia, Dan would never be able to see her again. In February of 1987, the magistrate entered an order which placed Danielle in Dan’s custody and Amber in Patricia’s custody. On the 17th of December, 1987, the district court judge entered a decision affirming the magistrate’s ruling regarding custody of Amber. Despite the legal ruling regarding custody of Amber, she has remained in Dan’s custody since August of 1986, pursuant to a stay of the order giving Patricia custody. Danielle has been placed in Dan’s residential and physi cal care and custody pursuant to the February 24, 1987 decision of the magistrate. Thus, both girls have been in Dan’s custody since August of 1986 in addition to having been in his shared custody prior to Patricia and Dan’s separation (excluding, of course, the period during which the children were under Dan’s parents’ guardianship). Dan is appealing the rulings providing for placement of Amber in Patricia’s custody.
The paramount consideration in any dispute involving the custody and care of a minor child is the child’s best interests. I.C. § 32-717. In custody disputes between a “non-parent” (i.e., an individual who is neither legal nor natural parent) and a natural parent, Idaho courts apply a presumption that a natural parent should have custody as opposed to other lineal or collateral relatives or interested parties. This presumption operates to preclude consideration of the best interests of the child unless the nonparent demonstrates either that the natural parent has abandoned the child, that the natural parent is unfit or that the child has been in the nonparent’s custody for an appreciable period of time.
The long standing rule in Idaho is that the welfare of the child is of primary consideration in determining custody rights in children. In the implementation of this rule, this Court has consistently applied the presumption that a natural parent should have custody of his child as opposed to other lineal or collateral relatives or interested parties. The facts at bar, .through Ewing’s showing of natural parentage, establish in the appellant a prima facie case for custody. The burden therefore shifts to the respondent to prove that Terrence Ewing has forfeited his rights. Such proof requires a showing of clear, satisfactory, or convincing evidence that the parent is patently unfit or has abandoned his child, or as in the factual situation at bar, where an adverse party has custody of the child for an appreciable period of time (in excess of three years), the best interests of the child dictate custody being placed with *300the adverse party if the facts show he is better fitted to raise the child than the natural parent.
Where an adverse party has had custody of a child for an appreciable period of time, in this case over four years,' the custody of the child will be left with that party if the best interests of the child so dictate. Such a finding is proper if the adverse party is shown to be better fitted to raise the child than the natural parent. As such, we reject the appellant’s argument that only a mandatory showing of abandonment or patent unfitness will suffice to overcome a natural parent’s right.
In re Ewing, 96 Idaho 424, 425-27, 529 P.2d 1296, 1298 (1974). In McGregor v. Phillips, 96 Idaho 779, 782, 537 P.2d 59, 62 (1975) (Bakes, J., dissenting), Justice Bakes cited Ewing and reaffirmed the need for best interest analysis where a nonparent has had custody for an appreciable period.
I agree with the majority that there is a presumption that the natural parent should have custody of the child as opposed to other relatives or interested parties, but in cases such as this, in which the non-parental party has introduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, the trial court must weigh the evidence presented and decide the case, not on the basis of any presumption, but on whether or not a change in the actual custody is in the best interests of the child. As I read the conclusions of law of the trial court, it appears to me that the trial court may have concluded that if the mother has not “forfeited” her rights to the child by abandonment, or was not otherwise unfit by her conduct, then the parent was automatically entitled to custody. But where, as in this case, the parent has turned the child over to its grandparents when she was just an infant, and the grandparents are really the only parents which the child has ever known, and where the mother is a stranger to the child as the petitioner is in this case, to automatically change the custody of the child to the mother without an express finding that it is in the child’s best interests for the custody to be so changed, is to reduce the child to the status of a chattel. Children are not chattels, nor are they to be awarded to the least blameworthy of two litigants. The primary consideration in these cases should be what is in the best interests of the child, after considering all of the factors involved.
It is thus clearly established under Idaho precedent, that where a child has been in the custody of a third party for an appreciable period of time (and thereby developed a bond with that person), the custody of the child will be awarded to that party if the best interests of the child so dictate. In re Ewing, 96 Idaho at 425-26, 529 P.2d at 1297-98. In this circumstance, neither “a mandatory showing of abandonment nor of patent unfitness” is necessary to overcome a natural parent’s right. In re Ewing, 96 Idaho at 427, 529 P.2d at 1299.
In the present case, the magistrate division and district court essentially held that in order for Amber to have her best interests considered, Dan had the burden of showing that Patricia had forfeited her rights to custody by abandonment or was unfit or unable to properly care for the child. These rulings were in error.
Virtually from the time of Amber’s birth, Dan has been the only person she has known as her father. In fact, she did not know that Dan was not her natural father until Patricia informed her of that fact after the October 1985 proceeding and in contravention of the Magistrate’s specific order that the parties not reveal her parentage. Prior to their separation, Dan had custody equivalent to the custody rights Patricia enjoyed and Dan has essentially had sole custody for the past two and one-half years. In view of the longstanding, substantial custodial and parental relationship Dan has had with Amber, the lower courts were clearly obligated under settled Idaho law to consider Amber’s best interests in determining who should be entrusted with her custody. Therefore, the decisions of the lower courts regarding the custody of Amber are reversed and the *301case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Our remand is subject to the following directions. Our review of this record reveals that the proceedings to date in this file have been unusually acrimonious and expensive. It is obvious that the parties have expended thousands of dollars in attorney fees, travel expenses, and loss of time from employment, while pursuing interests other than those which might be expected to be in the best interests of the child as distinguished from the best interests of the parents and their respective families. It is a case where all might benefit if they were to cooperate in seeking a mutually satisfactory resolution through a mediation process wherein all concerned focus on seeking the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we direct that the trial court, prior to the conduct of further formal custody hearings, require the parties to undergo a mediation process under the auspices of the district court before a qualified mediator. (Cf. California Civil Code § 4607(a) (West Supp.1983) (providing for mandatory mediation between divorcing couples if custody issues are at stake); See Also L. Riskin, The Special Place of Mediation in Alternative Dispute Processing, 37 U.Fla.L.Rev. 19; ABA, Alternative Means of Family Dispute Resolution, and J. Pearson, How Child Custody Mediation Works in Practice, 20 Judge’s J. 11.) In the event the court-ordered mediation does not result in a mutually satisfactory resolution of the custody issues, the court will then, upon motion of either party, conduct further hearings consistent herewith.
Costs on appeal shall be divided equally between the parties, no attorney fees awarded.
BAKES, C.J., and JOHNSON, J., concur. SHEPARD, J., sat but did not participate in the opinion due to his untimely death.