State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Samara

DOOLIN, Justice,

dissenting.

I believe it is clear from the evidence introduced in this matter that the respondent, Carroll Samara, has continued to practice law in the face of his suspensions. In accordance with the Oklahoma cases set out by the majority, I would therefore continue his suspension and would not reinstate him to the Roll of Attorneys.

LISTING AS AN ATTORNEY

At the time of his original citation and suspension respondent affirmatively swore that he would completely refrain from the appearance of practicing law. The evidence in the instant case and in the previous disciplinary proceedings is to the contrary. Not only was a second citation necessary, but and not until after the effective date of the second citation did he discontinue listing himself in the telephone book as an attorney at law. Respondent does not challenge the fact that the Oklahoma Bar Association itself found it necessary to admonish the publisher to cease listing him as an attorney at law. The act of the publisher also, we note, came after the second denial of reinstatement and at the intervention of the Oklahoma Bar Association.

USE OF LETTERHEAD

An element in our denial of respondent’s first and second reinstatement applications was his use of stationary bearing the letterhead “Carroll Samara, Attorney at Law.”

Respondent’s direct response to his use of the letterhead — as late as August 1, 1986, after the second denial of reinstatement — follows:

“Q. Mr. Samara, in your opinion do these letters written on your Attorney at Law letterhead show that your actions have complied with the promise that you made at that time at that hearing?
A. Sure. That is not practicing law to write a letter to someone on a letterhead. I’m not practicing law. I am not representing someone. That is practicing law. I can represent myself.”

The evidence presented during the current application for reinstatement shows that the respondent’s name had been blacked out but the stationary still carried the designation of “Attorney at Law”. This hardly conforms to this original promise to “refrain from the appearance of any practice”. Further when asked, “Do you still use that stationary?” respondent replied, “If I had any left I might.”

Other evidence in his third application is unconvincing that he has severed all ties with a nephew lawyer. The evidence is subject to the interpretation that respondent still continues to practice law.

CHARACTER WITNESSES

It is true that a great number of practicing lawyers, judges and clergymen gave evidence of respondent’s character and proffered that the best interests of the Bar would be served by his reinstatement. None of these character witnesses dealt with the evidence, none testified as to the *810public’s interests in a regulated, ethical Bar.

While several witnesses go so far as to say he did a great deal of pro bono work, and one said that he was a one-man extension of legal aid, none expressed an opinion on the evidence.

At best the character witnesses advance an argument of argumentum ab miseri-cordia (appeal to mercy) nothing else. All stated the respondent was a good man, which is not an issue. The thrust of the character witnesses is that because of his pro bono work respondent should be reinstated. I would summarize the character witnesses’ evidence as being of no help in weighing whether respondent has been guilty of practicing law during his suspension.

I am authorized to state that HAR-GRAVE, C.J., SIMMS, J., and MEANS, S.J., concur in these views.