dissenting:
In 1981, the West Virginia Legislature enacted West Virginia Code §§ 17D-2A-1 to -9 (1983 Supp.), the Security Upon Motor Vehicles Act, 1981 W.Va.Acts ch. 157. Its stated purpose is “to promote the public welfare by requiring every owner or registrant of a motor vehicle licensed in this State to maintain certain security during the registration period for such vehicle.”
As this Court stated in Dickey v. Smith, 42 W.Va. 805, 809, 26 S.E. 373, 375 (1896):
It is a fundamental principal of law that “whenever a statute is capable of two constructions, one of which would work manifest injustice, and the other would work no injustice, it is the duty of the court to adopt the latter, as it can scarcely be presumed that an injustice was in the legislative intent.” Am. & Eng.Enc. Law, 23, 361.
See also Meadows v. Lewis, 172 W.Va. 457, 307 S.E.2d 625, 642 (1983); State ex rel. Simpkins v. Harvey, 172 W.Va. 312, 305 S.E.2d 268, 277 (1983); Richardson v. State Compensation Commissioner, 137 W.Va. 819, 824, 74 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1953); State ex rel. McLaughlin v. Morris, 128 W.Va. 456, 461, 37 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1946); Syl. pt. 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350 (1939); Syl. pt. 2, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925); Syl. pt. 2, Parsons v. Roane County Court, 92 W.Va. 490, 115 S.E. 473 (1922); Syl. pt. 1, Rider v. Braxton County Court, 74 W.Va. 712, 82 S.E. 1083 (1914); Syl. pt. 2, Hasson v. City of Chester, 67 W.Va. 278, 67 S.E. 731 (1910).
Similarly, in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 61 W.Va. 367, 56 S.E. 518 (1907), this Court stated:
A statute is to be interpreted in the light of the nature of its subject matter, the purpose of the legislature in passing it, and the conditions and circumstances under which the law making body must have known it would operate; and, upon these conditions, it will not be so interpreted as to make it impose unreasonable burdens, greatly disproportionate to the resultant public benefit, unless its terms are so explicit and positive as to preclude any other construction.
See also Syl. pt. 5, Pond Creek Pocahontas Co. v. Alexander, 137 W.Va. 864, 74 S.E.2d 590 (1953).
The majority ignores both of these well settled rules of statutory construction, as well as the avowed intent of the Legislature, in holding that motorists who have their plates seized despite having insurance *132may not recover fees charged for the return of those plates.
The purpose of the statute in question is clear, it is to keep uninsured motorists off our State’s streets and highways. It is absurd to punish motorists who comply with this basic purpose simply because they erroneously believed that maintaining insurance on their motor vehicles prevented confiscation of their plates by the Department of Motor Vehicles. True, they failed to respond to notices received in the mail. This failure may have been attributable, however, to illiteracy; illness; lack of sophistication; uncertainty as to the effect of their failure to reply; or reliance upon the fact that they indeed continued to have insurance on their motor vehicles. The record reflects that each of the petitioners was earning only about four hundred dollars per month at the time their plates were seized, and had changed policies or companies out of economic necessity in order to take advantage of lower rates elsewhere. They relied upon their agent as the embodiment of their “insurance company” to insure that the authorities were properly notified of their new insurance status. Considering the socio-economic factors at work and the concomitant level of sophistication on the part of the petitioners, such reliance was not unreasonable.
Without question, this system of enforcement “imposes unreasonable burdens, greatly disproportionate to the resultant public benefit.” See Syl. pt. 2, State v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, supra; Syl. pt. 5, Pond Creek Pocahontas Co. v. Alexander, supra. Certainly, motorists may be charged fees if, in fact, they did not have insurance at the time their plates were seized. The statute is silent, however, as to whether motorists who had insurance at the time of confiscation are precluded from securing the return of their places without payment of the fees involved. Therefore, the Court should have acted to prevent the manifest injustice created by this draconian enforcement mechanism, “as it can scarcely be presumed that an injustice was in the legislative intent.” See Dickey v. Smith, 42 W.Va. at 809, 26 S.E. at 375.
In addition to the injustice caused by the majority’s disregard of well established rules of statutory construction, the opinion also ignores basic rules of agency by failing to impute notice given to law enforcement officials seizing motorists’ plates concerning the existence of insurance to the Department of Motor Vehicles. It is a well settled rule of agency in this jurisdiction that, “Notice to an agent in the course of his employment, in relation to a matter within the scope of his authority, is notice to his principal, whether he communicate[s] his knowledge to his principal or not.” Syl. pt. 1, The Buckeye Saw Mfg. Co. v. Rutherford, 65 W.Va. 395, 64 S.E. 444 (1909); see also Syl. pt. 1, Great Eastern Refining Corp. v. Shank, 99 W.Va. 101, 127 S.E. 922 (1925); Syl. pt. 8, Morgan-Gardner Elec. Co. v. Beelick Knob Coal Co., 91 W.Va. 347, 112 S.E. 587 (1922); Syl. pt. 1, George v. Stansbury, 90 W.Va. 593, 111 S.E. 598 (1922); Syl. pt. 3, Hains v. Parkersburg, M. & I. Ry. Co., 75 W.Va. 613, 84 S.E. 923 (1915); Syl. pt. 6, Cassiday Fork Boom & Lumber Co. v. Terry, 69 W.Va. 572, 73 S.E. 278 (1912); Syl. pt. 2, W.F. Black & Sons v. Johnson & Son, 65 W.Va. 518, 64 S.E. 626 (1909); Syl. pt. 5, Newlin v. Beard, 6 W.Va. 110 (1873).
Unquestionably, law enforcement officers who seize plates from motorists act under the direction and control of, and as agent for, the Department of Motor Vehicles. Notice to these officers of the existence of insurance on the motor vehicles involved is imputed under the law of agency to the Department of Motor Vehicles. The Commissioner should not be permitted to suspend vehicle registration when he or she has this knowledge, and law enforcement officers should not be permitted to plead the Nuremberg defense, “I was only following orders.” The seizure of plates when an officer, and therefore the Department of Motor Vehicles, has knowledge of the existence of insurance is both irrational and unjust.
Equally irrational and unjust is placing the burden on motorists to notify the Department of Motor Vehicles when changes in insurance companies or insurance poli-*133des are made. It makes no sense for West Virginia Code § 17D-2A-5(a) (1983 Supp.), to require insurance companies to notify the Commissioner of the effective date of cancellation or termination of old insurance policies without a corresponding requirement that they also notify the Commissioner of the effective date of initiation of new insurance policies. To place the burden of this hiatus in the legislative scheme on innocent motorists is both insensitive and unnecessary.
For the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent.