Mother appeals from a‘ judgment terminating her parental rights. ORS 419.523. She challenges the order on the grounds: (1) the state did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is unfit; (2) the term “emotional illness” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,1 (3) she was denied due process when the trial court denied her motion to make more definite and certain the allegation that she is suffering from an emotional illness and denied her funds with which to depose the state’s psychological expert, and (4) she was denied adequate trial counsel. We affirm.
Mother has three children from her marriage to Bill Geist, who has had a severe drug and alcohol problem and has repeatedly abused mother and the children. When mother left the family home sometime during the week of May 20, 1985, police investigated reports that she no longer wanted the children and that they had not been to school for two weeks. Finding mother gone, the father disoriented and the house dirty and without a sufficient food supply, the police took the children away. The father was indicted on October 16, 1985, for sexual abuse in the first degree and sodomy, and he relinquished his parental rights on April 2, 1987. The father’s conduct has left the children emotionally disturbed.
On May 21,1985, the court placed the children in the temporary custody of Children’s Services Division after mother indicated that she needed to get a divorce, a steady job and a new home before resuming their care. On July 31,1985, the court made the children wards of the court and continued temporary custody in CSD. Mother was ordered to participate in individual counseling, parenting classes and a battered women’s group, but she attended only some of the parenting classes. On December 10, 1986, the court again ordered mother to complete CSD’s plan and appointed counsel2 to represent her. Mother again failed to comply with the plan. The state filed an amended petition to terminate her parental *13rights on May 20,1987; and on July 17,1987, the court issued a termination judgment.
The state alleged that (1) mother suffers from an emotional illness that makes it impossible for her to care for the children; (2) she has a history of employment and residential instability; (3) the children have been subjected to sexual and physical abuse while in mother’s care; (4) they have suffered from medical and physical neglect while in mother’s care; (5) they are emotionally disturbed as a result of the abuse and instability; and (6) mother has failed to attempt to adjust her circumstances after reasonable efforts by social agencies for such a duration of time that it appears that no lasting adjustment will be effected.
Mother contends that the state proved none of the factors in ORS 419.523(2) indicating seriously detrimental conduct or conditions justifying termination.3 She first argues that, because the only psychotherapist to evaluate her testified that she has a personality disorder, as distinct from an emotional disorder, the state fell short of proving the allegation in the petition. Second, she contends that the only abuse to which the children were subjected came from their father. Because he no longer has contact with the children, she argues, abuse will not occur in the future, and so the children may be returned to her care. Third, she asserts that there was insufficient evidence of physical neglect to justify terminating *14her parental rights. Finally, she argues that, because she engaged in no overt conduct seriously detrimental to the children, the state cannot base termination of her parental rights on her failure to make “lasting adjustments.”
1. On de novo review, however, we conclude that the state established the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. First, the essence of the testimony of Dr. Hoffman-Wilde, a psychotherapist testifying for the state, is that mother has an anti-social personality, a condition that is particularly difficult to treat. The evidence also establishes that, as a result of her psychological problem, mother interacts generally with her children with anger, hostility and dependency. Expert testimony established that, having suffered emotional and behavioral disturbances as a result of their father’s abuse, the children need a safe, nourishing and stable environment, if they are to avoid further damage. Because mother is extremely resistant to seeking treatment for herself, it is impossible for her to care adequately for the children for extended periods of time.
Mother does not dispute that she has a history of employment and residential instability. As the trial court noted, that cannot alone be a basis for termination. Nevertheless, it bears on the issue of whether, given the children’s special need for stability, they can be returned to mother without a substantial risk of their suffering more emotional damage.
Mother’s argument that she did not abuse the children is not relevant to the state’s allegations. The state proved that, knowing that the father had physically abused the children, mother did nothing to protect them. At times, she left them with the father when she went to work. She also left them with him when she separated from him. Mother now has a boyfriend, and she admits that he, too, has been violent toward her. Mother has refused counseling, and there is no indication that she is any better able to ensure the safety of her children now than when she was with the father.
The evidence concerning mother’s physical and medical neglect is that the children have untreated dental cavities, that they are often ill, that she has not kept them in school regularly and that their nutritional needs may not be being met adequately. The evidence of physical neglect may not, by *15itself, be strong enough to support termination, but it does support the state’s contention that mother is not able to safeguard the interests of the children.
Mother does not dispute that the children are emotionally disturbed or that they have special needs as a result. Moreover, the evidence of her mental condition and her neglect of the children’s welfare leads us to conclude that returning the children to her would likely result in further physical and emotional harm. Because she has rejected counseling and other efforts of state agencies to help her be an adequate parent, there appears no realistic chance that the children can be returned to her care without serious danger to them. Consequently, we conclude that the evidence, taken as a whole, justifies terminating her parental rights.
2. Mother also claims that the trial court’s failure to grant two pretrial motions kept her ignorant of precisely what emotional illness the state claimed that she suffers. According to mother, had the state been required to make its allegation more definite and certain or had she been granted funds with which to depose the state’s expert, she could have rebutted the state’s expert through cross-examination or by calling an expert of her own. She argues that the failure to provide her with those avenues of discovery was so damaging as to amount to a denial of due process.
The record discloses, however, that the trial court ordered the state to give mother a witness list and granted her request for an investigator to contact, among others, Hoffman-Wilde. Mother also apparently received copies of all of the psychological reports relating to her. Because she could have obtained specific information about her alleged illness through interviews with the state’s expert or review of the records, her contention that she was prevented from presenting an effective defense is without merit.
3. Mother raises on appeal for the first time the contention that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel that she claims is guaranteed as a matter of due process and by *16ORS 419.525(2).4 We have not had occasion to consider such a claim in the context of termination of parental rights, and we face the critical preliminary question of whether it can be decided on direct appeal.5
In State v. Jamison, 251 Or 114, 117-18, 444 P2d 15, 444 P2d 1005 (1968), an indigent mother challenged an order terminating her parental rights on the ground that the juvenile court had failed to advise her of her right to a court-appointed attorney. In considering the nature of the mother’s right to counsel, the Supreme Court noted:
“The permanent termination of parental rights is one of the most drastic actions the state can take against its inhabitants. It would be unconscionable for the state forever to terminate the parental rights of the poor without allowing such parents to be assisted by counsel. Counsel in juvenile court must be made available for parents and children alike when the relationship of parent and child is threatened by the state.”
The court also observed: “While the case at bar is not a criminal matter, the consequences of the denial of counsel are as serious as they are in most criminal prosecutions.” It held that, as in criminal cases, “waiver of counsel must be shown to have been a knowing waiver.” 251 Or at 118. When Jamison was decided, former ORS 419.498(2) required the appointment of counsel in termination cases if the parent was indigent. The thrust of the decision is that, to establish a waiver of that right, the standards applicable in criminal cases are appropriate in termination cases, involving indigent parents. The case *17said nothing about determination of competence of counsel who is appointed.
Presently, ORS 419.525(2) requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination cases, and we may assume that the legislature intended that competent and effective counsel be appointed. However, it has not provided a specific procedure or forum for determining whether a parent has been afforded effective assistance of counsel. We have neither had cited to us nor found any United States Supreme Court authority saying, or even suggesting, that a statutory right to counsel, as in this case, implicates a federal due process requirement that the state must provide a procedure and a forum for resolving that issue. Certainly, there is nothing in the words of the statute itself that suggests that failure to provide competent and effective counsel by appointment is the kind of error that can lead to reversal of a judgment.
4. However, mother’s argument goes beyond the statutory right to counsel. If, she asserts, she is entitled to appointed counsel as a matter of due process, failure to provide her with effective counsel would deny her due process trial rights, and so she must be able to have the issue decided on direct appeal. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 27, 101 S Ct 2153, 68 L Ed 2d 640 (1981), the Supreme Court held that, in determining whether due process requires that a parent receive appointed counsel, a court must weigh “the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.” After listing several factors to be weighed, the Court stated that, although Lassiter’s interest in retaining her rights as a parent was great, none of the factors was present in her case; therefore, it held that she did not have a due process right to appointed counsel. No Lassiter issue is presented in this case, because that case involves only the right to counsel. Here, mother was furnished counsel pursuant to state law.
The special concurrence by Rossman, J., after a bit of hyperbole about locking courtroom doors, expresses a feeling of being “at a loss as to how the majority reaches its result.” 97 Or App at 21. Most of the misdirection flows from an apparent belief that there is some question about whether mother was entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel. Under ORS *18419.525(2), that is hardly an open question, let alone a question presented in this case. Moreover, no Lassiter-type issue is presented, as explained above. The only question that can fairly be discussed in this case is whether this court, on direct appeal, should determine whether mother’s appointed counsel rendered her effective assistance. Discussion of anything else only confuses the issue.6
The trial that produced the record before us was not for the purpose of determining anything about the conduct of mother’s counsel. No facts about counsel were developed in the adversarial way that lies at the heart of judicial factfinding. The record does not disclose, and could not be expected to disclose, anything about counsel’s conduct except what it shows about the issue raised in mother’s defense. In her brief on appeal, mother assaults the sense and the conduct of her trial counsel rather freely; it is notable that that counsel has never been given (and would never, if the specially concurring views were adopted, be given) a forum in which to respond. Much could be said about the consequences that would follow if we were to accept mother’s assignment of error. We will not do that. Instead, even though we can accept mother’s assertion of a right to competent and effective counsel under the statute, direct appeal on the trial court record is not the appropriate forum.7 The legislature has not created a special forum, as it has in criminal law matters (ORS 138.510 - ORS 138.680), and there is no source from which we may derive the authority to create one. We hold that the question of the effectiveness of counsel may not be reviewed on direct appeal.
*19Affirmed.
Because mother did not raise this constitutional issue at the trial level, we decline to consider it on appeal. State ex rel-Juv. Dept. v. Akins, 64 Or App 624, 625, 669 P2d 339 (1983); State v. Easton, 35 Or App 603, 607, 582 P2d 37, rev den 284 Or 521 (1978).
Mother is represented by other counsel on appeal.
ORS 419.523(2) provides:
“The rights of the parent or parents may be terminated as provided in subsection (1) of this section if the court finds that the parent or parents are unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child and integration of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable in the foreseeable future due to conduct or conditions not likely to change. In determining such conduct and conditions, the court shall consider but is not limited to the following:
“(a) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental deficiency of the parent of such duration as to render it impossible to care for the child for extended periods of time.
“(b) Conduct toward any child of an abusive, cruel or sexual nature.
“(c) Addictive use of intoxicating liquors or controlled substances.
“(d) Physical neglect of the child.
“(e) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the circumstances of the parent, conduct, or conditions to make the return of the child possible or failure of the parent to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social agencies for such extended duration of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting adjustment can be effected.”
ORS 419.525(2) provides:
“If the parents are determined to be indigent by the court, and request the assistance of appointed counsel, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent them at state expense. Appointment of counsel under this section is subject to ORS 135.055 and 151.410 to 151.480 and to applicable contracts entered into under ORS 151.460.”
Mother argues that this section and ORS 151.410 to ORS 151.480 require a trial court to appoint counsel qualified under the Supreme Court’s Attorney Eligibility Standards to represent indigent clients in termination cases. She contends that, because her counsel was not on the appointment panel for termination cases and had been removed from another panel, denial of that counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw denied mother effective counsel. However, whether she received effective assistance of counsel is not dependent on whether the attorney was on an approved panel.
It is clear that ineffectiveness of counsel cannot be reviewed on direct appeal in a criminal case. ORS 138.220; State v. Rutledge, 2 Or App 374, 377, 468 P2d 913 (1970).
Before deciding mother’s federal constitutional claim, we would consider any state constitutional questions raised. State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157, 162, 759 P2d 1040 (1988). However, no such questions arise. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution gives an accused the right “to be heard by himself and counsel” only in a criminal prosecution. Moreover, Oregon’s constitution has no Due Process Clause. See Linde, “Without ‘Due Process’: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon,” 49 Or L Rev 125 (1970). We are aware of no provision in Oregon’s constitution that would support mother’s right to counsel, and we deal only with her federal claim.
It is more than a little ironic that the result under the specially concurring opinion of Rossman, J., would be that mother was not deprived of the right to effective counsel. There is something of the same irony in Lassiter. Rather than getting seriously involved in misleading, special pleading analysis, as it does, the concurring opinion ought not to decide the procedural issue but, instead, ought simply to assume that the issue can be decided on direct appeal and then go ahead and decide it against mother, because she loses anyway. If one looks beyond that concurrence’s procedural views, it is intriguing to consider its res judicata or collateral estoppel implications.