dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that employees of the Clayton County sheriff are subject to dismissal only for good cause. I believe the employees of the sheriff are not county employees and thus are not covered by the Clayton County Civil Service Act, Ga. L. 1994, p. 4399, which covers all county employees except elected officials.
Section 2 (c) of Clayton County’s Civil Service Act states: “All employees of Clayton County may be placed under the civil service system except elected officials. . . .” That language is similar to the language used by the General Assembly to authorize a merit service *282plan for employees of Gwinnett County (“ ‘any or all present and future employees of Gwinnett County other than elected officials’ ”) Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504, 505 (1) (a) (458 SE2d 791) (1995). In Gwinnett County v. Yates, this Court determined the employees of the county’s elected officials were not covered by the civil service system covering county employees other than elected officials because “the General Assembly observed a distinction between employees of a county and employees of the elected officials of the county.” Today, the majority, construing nearly identical language, ignores that distinction and concludes the employees of a county’s elected official are covered by the county merit system. Consistency is critical to appellate jurisprudence and should not be so easily disregarded.
The majority makes much of section 2 (b) of the 1994 legislation amending the Clayton County merit system, noting that it provided that all positions within the sheriffs office were subject to and covered by the civil service system. In light of section 2 (b)’s introductory phrase: “Except as provided in this Act...,” I submit that the provisions of section 2 (c) (“All employees of Clayton County may be placed under the civil service system except elected officials”), when construed as the same phrase was construed in Gwinnett County v. Yates, does not permit reliance on section 2 (b).
The majority attempts to distinguish the case at bar from Gwin-nett County v. Yates by focusing on the language of the constitutional amendment that defines the scope of legislation authorizing the enactment of a merit system for Clayton County (“a Civil Service System for all those persons, other than officials elected by the people, whose wages or salaries are paid in whole or in part out of the funds of Clayton County”). I submit that this definitional phrase is nothing more than a synonym for “employee” — one who is on a regular payroll maintained by the county and the county is the payor of the wages or salary one receives as compensation for one’s toil. Because the constitutional amendment uses a phrase that defines “employee” to set the parameters of the coverage of the Clayton County merit system, it should be construed to authorize the same coverage that use of the term “employee” would give — and this Court determined in Gwinnett County v. Yates that such coverage would not include the employees of elected officials.
To maintain the independence so essential to the performance of the duties of elective office, the authority of elected officials to run their offices without interference must be jealously guarded. This independence is especially vital for sheriffs because of the wide-ranging authority of their positions and broad discretion necessarily applied not only by the sheriff, but by the sheriff s deputies, for whose misconduct the sheriff is liable. OCGA § 15-16-24. Thus, of the four *283elected constitutional county officers (the other three are the clerk of the superior court, the judge of the probate court, and the tax official, 1983 Ga. Const., Art. IX, Sec. I, Par. Ill (a)), the sheriff has the greatest need for personal control of employees. Since the county cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a sheriffs deputies (Lowe v. Jones County, 231 Ga. App. 372 (2) (499 SE2d 348) (1998)), the sheriff must be permitted autonomy in personnel decisions. Even in a case in which it was ruled that a sheriffs employees were covered by a county merit system, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that it did “not lightly limit the ability of sheriffs to employ persons loyal to him....” Wayne County v. Herrin, 210 Ga. App. 747, 753 (437 SE2d 793) (1993). To maintain a system that permits elected constitutional county officers to exercise the full range of the discretion invested in them by the people, the courts must remain cognizant of the essential principle that “employees of constitutionally elected officers of a county are considered employees of the elected officer and not employees of the county... .” Boswell v. Bramlett, 274 Ga. 50, 51 (2) (549 SE2d 100) (2001). Applying that principle to the present case causes me to conclude that a merit system covering county employees does not cover employees of the sheriff. The majority’s contrary conclusion violates that principle and compels me to dissent.
Decided February 27, 2006. Epstein, Becker & Green, John C. Stivarius, Jr., Brenton S. Bean, for appellant. Miller, Billips, & Ates, Harlan S. Miller HI, Rolf A. Jones, Kaine & Jones, Evan L. Kaine, for appellees.