dissenting.
For the reasons stated below, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Initially, Petitioner argues that it was legal error for the Administrative Law Judge (“ALT’) to allow the North Carolina Shellfish Growers Association (“Shellfish Growers”) and the North Carolina Coastal Federation (“Coastal Federation”) to intervene in this matter. The majority has determined that this case must be analyzed pursuant to the legislature’s explicit statutory provisions governing intervention in a contested case petition. See supra. Although I agree with the majority that it is appropriate to analyze this matter within the framework of a contested case petition, I believe that we must frame the issue even more narrowly, i.e., whether it is appropriate to allow intervention in a contested case petition involving the imposition of a civil penalty.
*612Within the body of case law regarding contested case petitions, there is a wide array of actions by the State which might give right to such a petition. Mooresville Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 360 N.C. 156, 622 S.E.2d 621 (2005) (issuance of certificate of need); Hilliard v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 594, 620 S.E.2d 14 (2005) (state employment dispute); Godfrey Lumber Co. v. Howard, 151 N.C. App. 738, 566 S.E.2d 825 (2002) (revocation of stormwater permit); Beaufort County Schools v. Roach, 114 N.C. App. 330, 443 S.E.2d 339 (1994) (special education). In some instances, intervention by a third party may be appropriate and properly within the discretion of the ALJ. See Empire Power Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of E.H.N.R., 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768 (1994) (allowing air quality permit holder to intervene in contested case challenging state agency’s issuance of permit); Albemarle Mental Health Ctr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 159 N.C. App. 66, 582 S.E.2d 651 (2003) (Medicaid reimbursement appeal); Mt. Olive Home Health Care Agency, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Resources, 78 N.C. App. 224, 336 S.E.2d 625 (1985) (unsuccessful applicant for Certificate of Need permitted to intervene in contested case hearing). In the case of a state agency’s imposition of a civil penalty, I believe that it is not. Further, my research has disclosed no case law in this State nor in any other state jurisdiction allowing intervention by a private individual or entity in a matter involving imposition of a civil penalty by a state. But see Sanders et al. v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 53 Cal App. 3d 661 (1975) (allowing the State to intervene to pursue civil penalties in a superior court suit filed by private property owners). Moreover, in federal cases allowing for intervention by private entities, in most instances, the intervenors either have been precluded or voluntarily have chosen not to involve themselves in the claims involving the assessment of civil penalties. U.S. v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 883 F.2d 54, 55 (8th Cir. 1989) (intervenors complaint incorporated “all of the allegations set forth in the complaint filed by the United States, except those relating to the payment of civil penalties”); U.S. v. City of Toledo, 867 F. Supp. 595, 597 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (“a citizen-intervenor . . . can only seek remedies for ongoing violations of federal law and not civil penalties for past violations”); but see U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 649 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (allowing intervenors to participate in action for civil penalty without challenge by defendant).
The legislature has delegated to the several executive branch agencies the authority to impose civil penalties for a variety of purposes. Meads v. N.C. Dep’t of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 509 S.E.2d 165 *613(1998) (violation of various pesticide regulations by aerial pesticide applicator); O.S. Steel Erectors v. Brooks, Com’r of Labor, 84 N.C. App. 630, 353 S.E.2d 869 (1987) (violation of Occupational Safety and Health regulations); N.C. Private Protective Services Bd. v. Gray, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 135 (1987) (failure to register unarmed guards and armed guards in accordance with Private Protective Services statutes and regulations). That delegation properly rests with an agency of the State, not with a private citizen or association. By allowing the Shellfish Growers and the Coastal Federation to intervene in this matter, the ALJ effectively deputized both entities with the authority of the State and enabled both of them to act as private prosecutors. See In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 379, 379 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1989) (“Article IV, section 3 of the Constitution contemplates that discretionary judicial authority may be granted to an agency when reasonably necessary to accomplish the agency’s purpose.”); State of North Carolina ex rel. Cobey v. Cook, 118 N.C. App. 70, 74, 453 S.E.2d 553, 556 (1995) (State agency’s “authority to issue a penalty is . . . reasonably necessary to the enforcement of’ its statutes). I cannot believe that this was the legislature’s intention in creating the various schemes for assessment of civil money penalties that flow throughout State government, more particularly, the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, under which Petitioner was assessed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-50 et seq. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court. As I believe that Intervenors should not have been permitted to intervene in the first place, I do not address the remaining issues raised by Petitioner on appeal.