concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in valuing the Wachovia joint account or in awarding attorneys’ fees but did err by failing to distribute the Wachovia joint account, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in its distribution of the Aintree Capital Account. Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
On the date of separation between the parties in the instant case, the Aintree Capital Account had a balance of $424,950.23. Subsequent to the date of separation, the account experienced passive apprecia*400tion and depreciation. Neither party made any further contributions to the account subsequent to the date of separation. However, plaintiff withdrew from the account: (a) $15,903.00 to pay federal income taxes; (b) $167,634.00 to pay for the college tuition and expenses of the parties’ children; and (c) $15,467.00 to purchase a car for the parties’ son. Thus, on the date of distribution, the account had a balance of $180,724.84.
In its equitable distribution order, the trial court concluded that
because Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledged that the education of their children was a top priority and Plaintiff had planned to use the assets in [the Aintree Capital Account] and other assets acquired during the marriage for the education of the children, and because one of the post-date separation withdrawals was used to pay the 2000 income tax liability for their joint federal tax return, and one was for a car for the son’s use at college, the date of separation balance of the Aintree account should be reduced by the post-separation withdrawals made by the Plaintiff . . . and the distribution value is, therefore, One Hundred Eighty Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty-Four and 84/100 Dollars ($180,724.84).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21(b) (2003) requires that marital property be valued “as of the date of separation of the parties.” After the marital property is valued, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) (2003) requires that the trial court distribute the marital property equally unless the trial court determines that equal division is inequitable.
Unlike the majority, I believe the trial court in the instant case ignored the mandates of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-21(b) and 50-20(c) by distributing the Aintree Capital Account at its value on the date of distribution rather than the date of separation. Although the parties agreed prior to their separation that the Aintree Capital Account would be utilized to ensure payment of their children’s college expenses, defendant did not expressly consent to or ratify plaintiff’s withdrawals for this purpose subsequent to the date of separation, and plaintiff could not recall any specific conversations with defendant regarding the withdrawals prior to making them. As the majority correctly notes with respect to the Wachovia joint account, “[o]nce . . . the trial court classified the [Aintree Capital Account] as a marital asset and valued the account as of the date of separation, the trial court was required to distribute that account equitably.” However, by valuing the Aintree Capital Account at the date of sepa*401ration but then dividing the property of the account based upon its value at the date of distribution, the trial court effectively decreased the statutorily proscribed value of the marital estate.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the trial court erred in distributing the Aintree Capital Account at its value on the date of distribution rather than the date of separation.