dissenting.
The uncontested initial stop was valid; the valid stop was ongoing and was not prolonged in order to conduct the free-air K-9 search; and the free-air K-9 search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. So, I respectfully dissent.
1. The propriety of the initial stop based on an invalid license tag is not before us, because the issue went undisputed in the court below.32 The trial court’s finding that “the officer lawfully stopped the vehicle driven by the defendant because the vehicle did not have a state-issued tag” provides nothing for this Court to review when no one ever claimed below that such stop was not lawful. There is no issue when nobody argues one. Thus, the State did not get to put forward any grounds to uphold a stop based on the failure to display a valid tag, and the trial court did not get to rule on such issue. To base a reversal on a trial court’s specific ruling that was neither challenged below nor enumerated as error before this Court is, in my view, to violate a basic principle of appellate review. I continue to maintain that resolution of our cases based upon issues that were not in dispute below and thus not addressed by the State or the trial court is fundamentally unfair.33 While we have under certain circumstances reached issues unaddressed by either party in order to affirm a judgment as right for any reason, it does not follow that undisputed issues should be reached in order to find a trial court wrong for any reason.
(a) The trial court found that the uncontested initial stop was valid. As such finding is supported by the facts and the law, it is entitled to our deference.
The officer in this case testified that he stopped Berry’s car because “[t]he vehicle did not have a valid tag on it.” The officer testified that he could not determine from the face of the South Carolina drive-out tag whether it had expired or not:
[Defense Counsel:] Drive-out tags are valid in Georgia, correct?
[Officer:] Up to a certain point.
*891[Defense Counsel:] And at that time you didn’t know whether he was within that period of time or not?
[Officer:] Exactly.
The videotape supports this testimony, and it is undisputed the South Carolina paper drive-out tag did not display any dates. Thus, this is a proper basis for a stop in Georgia because here we have a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the registration of vehicles, making it a misdemeanor to operate a newly acquired vehicle without a valid license plate, and providing specific statutory authority for enforcement of these laws.
OCGA § 40-2-20 (a) (l)34 states that every person must register and obtain a license plate for a new or used vehicle within 30 days of its purchase, and “[a]ny person who fails to register a new or used motor vehicle within 30 days of its purchase as required in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $100.”35 And OCGA § 40-2-8 (b) (2) (A)36 states that
[i]t shall be a misdemeanor to operate any vehicle required to be registered in the State of Georgia without a valid numbered license plate properly validated[;] provided, [however], that the purchaser of a new vehicle or a used vehicle may operate such vehicle on the public highways and streets of this state without a current valid license plate during the period within which the purchaser is required ... to register such vehicle.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In order to enforce such laws, our statutory scheme specifically provides that the operation of a newly acquired vehicle not bearing a valid Georgia plate is a misdemeanor, and the operator must prove upon request that the vehicle falls within the 30-day registration period, in which case the operator is exempt from the penalties for such misdemeanor:
The purchaser and operator of a vehicle shall not be subject to the penalties set forth in this Code section during the period allowed for the registration. If the owner of such vehicle presents evidence that such owner has properly applied *892for the registration of such vehicle, but that the license plate or revalidation decal has not been delivered to such owner, then the owner shall not be subject to the above penalties.37
Thus, to enforce our registration laws, this Code section gives an officer the specific authority to check whether a paper temporary tag without an expiration date — or a vehicle driven with no tag at all — is in compliance with our laws, and it puts the burden on the driver of such newly acquired vehicle to “present evidence” of compliance in order to avoid the penalty.
In this case, it was impossible for the officer to know if Berry’s vehicle was in compliance with OCGA §§ 40-2-20 and 40-2-8 without effectuating a stop. The South Carolina paper temporary tag bore no markings so as to show compliance with registration laws. The officer had specific statutory authority to inquire and ask Berry to demonstrate compliance with registration laws. Clearly, it cannot be argued that the fact the tag was out-of-state somehow exempted it from Georgia law. If that was the case, the convenient attachment to any vehicle of an out-of-state drive-out tag could frustrate enforcement of OCGA §§ 40-2-20 and 40-2-8.38
Reliance on State v. Butler39 is misplaced because South Carolina (as well as the two other states whose cases are cited by the special concurrence) does not have Georgia’s statutory scheme which specifically permits an officer to inquire into the validity of temporary tags and to ask an operator to “present evidence” that the operator has properly applied for a license plate.
Simply as a matter of common sense, the Georgia General Assembly would not have enacted our detailed laws, with (1) criminal penalties attached for failure to comply, and (2) the provision that upon inquiry the operator of a newly acquired vehicle must present evidence of compliance, if that body had not intended to have the laws enforced.40
It must be recognized that whether the above law is applied uniformly or not is not before us. Likewise, the constitutionality of this statutory scheme is not before us. What is before us is the fact that the statute authorizes the steps that occurred in the instant case. Here, the trial court found that the initial stop was proper because Berry did not have a valid license tag. Berry’s South Carolina temporary dealer’s drive-out paper tag did not display any markings to *893demonstrate it was a “valid tag” in compliance with Georgia law, and the officer had specific statutory authority to ask the operator to “present evidence” that such newly acquired vehicle was in compliance with Georgia law. Thus, the initial stop was proper, and reversal on this ground is not warranted.41
(b) State v. Butler and the two states whose cases have been cited by the special concurrence have completely different statutory provisions which do not provide specific statutory authority for an officer’s enforcement of state registration laws. Thus, these foreign cases have no application to the instant case and provide no basis for overruling our prior decision in Burtts v. State, as urged by the special concurrence.
(c) Likewise, Watson v. State42 has no application to this case and should not be overruled herein, as urged by the majority. Berry’s car was not stopped because drive-out tags are often used to conceal stolen vehicles. The officer developed such suspicions after the proper stop, when he saw that Berry’s rental contract and the drive-out tag were issued by different companies. The instant case provides the wrong venue to overrule Watson, and Watson provides the wrong vehicle to reverse the instant case.
2. The trial court found that the valid stop was ongoing during the free-air K-9 search and the valid stop was not prolonged in order to conduct the search. Such finding, supported by evidence, should be upheld.
Georgia State Patrol Officer Morgan testified that in order to determine if the paper tag was valid, he checked Berry’s rental contract. He called in the vehicle identification number (VIN) on Berry’s car when the rental contract stated that the vehicle was from “Robert’s Rental,” but the paper drive-out tag stated that the vehicle was from “Hartsog’s Rental.” Such conflict, coupled with the officer’s knowledge that drive-out tags are commonly used to conceal auto theft, provided reasonable articulable suspicion to briefly detain Berry for a VIN check of his rented vehicle.43
Thereafter, while the officer and Berry were waiting for information on the VIN check, the on-the-scene K-9 performed the free air search of the car. Berry did not testify or offer any evidence to contradict this fact.
Contrary to the cases cited by the majority wherein the traffic stop investigation at issue had clearly been completed and the defendant was unlawfully detained further,44 the traffic investigation *894in this case was clearly ongoing; only two minutes had elapsed between the call-in of the rental car’s VIN at 10:10 a.m. and the free air search by the drug dog at 10:12 a.m.; and the free air search did not prolong the lawful detention.
The majority claims reversal is warranted because of a comment on the videotape by Officer Morgan to Berry that if the drug dog did not “hit” on anything, the officer would “send you on your way.” From this “send you on your way” comment — made in order to placate what the videotape shows and the trial court found was an obviously unnerved Berry — the majority infers that the officer “abandoned” the VIN check.
However, Berry did not offer evidence or ever contend that the officer abandoned the VIN check. And Officer Morgan testified at both the preliminary hearing and at the hearing on the motion to suppress that Berry was not free to leave until the VIN information came back on the radio:
[Defense Counsel:] Now, Officer Morgan, do you remember appearing at a committal hearing on October 6th here in Rockdale County Magistrate Court with me and Mr. Berry? . . . Do you remember telling me that you were not going to let Mr. Berry go until you got the information back over the VIN check?
[Officer:] Yes.
Moreover, in the videotape the officer specifically told Berry that he needed to check the VIN because it is so easy to remove a paper drive-out tag like the one on Berry’s vehicle, go to an auto lot, put the paper tag on another vehicle, and drive the car away.
From this evidence, it would seem unreasonable to infer that Officer Morgan no longer cared what the VIN check would show and had abandoned his investigation of whether the rental car was stolen. While the majority finds that *895this Court has repeatedly held,
*894[a] significant discrepancy exists between the officer’s testimony that he had not completed his investigation of the drive-out tag when he conducted the search with his dog and his statement on the videotape that Berry would be free to go after the dog checked his car,45
*895[i]t was the duty of the trial court to resolve all of these discrepancies in evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, the evidence is to be construed most favorably to the upholding of the findings and judgments made.46
And it may be true, as the majority posits, that findings of fact which specifically conflict with facts recorded on videotape should give way to the videotape. But to me, it would be a true mistake to extend this objective principle by holding — as the majority opinion suggests — that an officer’s subjective thought processes later testified to at a suppression hearing must be articulated on the videotape or a “conflict” between tape and testimony ensues, and the tape prevails. Instead,
on these issues, the trial court’s ruling was in part dependent upon [the officer’s] credibility and the weight the trial court put upon the evidence. We must therefore defer to the findings of the trial court, as issues of disputed fact, the veracity of a witness, and the weight of the evidence are within its province.47
In this case, the trial court resolved any discrepancies and specifically found that at the time of the search the “traffic stop was ongoing in the matter and the Defendant had not been given permission to leave.” The free air search by the K-9 was conducted and completed within two minutes of the officer’s VIN call-in and while both the officer and Berry were clearly waiting for a reply thereto. As such, the valid traffic stop was not prolonged, and there was no detention other than that which encompassed the proper stop.48
3. The free air K-9 search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment is not offended by requesting consent to search a vehicle for drugs during the course of a valid traffic stop, as was done in this case.49 “Having already effected a valid stop of the vehicle, the trooper certainly did not violate the appellant’s] Fourth Amendment rights merely by requesting such consent. Accord Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1972).”50 Likewise, a drug enforcement K-9 has a right to be on the *896public roadway, and a driver has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the airspace surrounding his car: “exposure . . . in a public place, to a trained canine [does] not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”51 Thus, during the course of a valid traffic stop, a free air search, which does not prolong a legitimate detention, does not violate the Fourth Amendment: “police could have conducted the free-air search while the officer was issuing warnings for the traffic offenses.”52
Further, this Court’s holding in Smith v. State53 is not applicable in this case, since the brief traffic stop was ongoing and was in no way prolonged in order to conduct the free air K-9 search.54
Moreover, with regard to Smith v. State, such case was wrongly decided to the extent that it holds — as the special concurrence urges — mere questioning on an unrelated topic constitutes a violation of Terry. As the Eleventh Circuit held this year:
a police officer’s questioning, even on a subject unrelated to the purpose of the stop, is not itself a Fourth Amendment violation. Mere questioning is neither a search nor a seizure. . . . [T]he issue regarding unrelated questions concerns not the content of the questions, but their impact on the duration of the stop. . . . Therefore, only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful; detention, not questioning, is the evil at which Terry’s prohibition is aimed. Questions which do not extend the duration of the initial seizure do not exceed the scope of an otherwise constitutional. . . stop.55
In this case, Berry’s motion to suppress was properly denied, and the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Mikell joins in this dissent.
*897Decided March 30, 2001. James S. Purvis, for appellant. Richard R. Read, District Attorney, Heather C. Waters, Dabney Y. Kentner, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.Barber v. State, 236 Ga. App. 294, 297, fn. 1 (512 SE2d 48) (1999) (defendant waived issue raised in written motion by not addressing it at hearing); Roberson v. State, 228 Ga. App. 416, 420 (3) (491 SE2d 864) (1997).
State v. Blackwell, 245 Ga. App. 135, 148 (2) (b) (iii) (537 SE2d 457) (2000) (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
As reflected in Ga. L. 1998, p. 1182, § 4, applicable to the instant case.
OCGA § 40-2-20 (c).
OCGA § 40-2-8 as reflected in Ga. L. 1998, p. 1181, § 3, as applicable to the instant case, was significantly amended in Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1, to provide for mandatory temporary licensing which displays the expiration date of the temporary licensing period.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 40-2-8 (b) (3).
Jordan v. State, 223 Ga. App. 176, 177 (1) (477 SE2d 583) (1996).
343 S.C. 198 (539 SE2d 414) (App. 2000).
Compare Ga. L. 1980, p. 746, and Ga. L. 1981, p. 716, § 4. See also Ga. L. 1993, p. 1260, amending OCGA § 40-2-8 “so as to require Georgia residents to maintain proof of vehicle registration in such motor vehicle at all times.”
Burtts v. State, 211 Ga. App. 840 (440 SE2d 727) (1994).
190 Ga. App. 696 (379 SE2d 817) (1989).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968).
Compare State v. Blair, 239 Ga. App. 340, 341 (521 SE2d 380) (1999); Migliore v. *894State of Ga., 240 Ga. App. 783, 786 (525 SE2d 166) (1999); Simmons v. State, 223 Ga. App. 781-782 (479 SE2d 123) (1996); see also State v. Kwiatkowski, 238 Ga. App. 390 (519 SE2d 43) (1999).
The officer never told Berry that he “would be free to go after the dog checked his car.”
Moon v. State, 194 Ga. App. 777 (1) (392 SE2d 19) (1990).
Lyons v. State, 244 Ga. App. 658, 661 (535 SE2d 841) (2000).
Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) (440 SE2d 646) (1994).
Kan v. State, 199 Ga. App. 170, 171 (1), (2) (404 SE2d 281) (1991).
Pupo v. State, 187 Ga. App. 765, 766 (2) (371 SE2d 219) (1988); accord Taylor v. State, *896230 Ga. App. 749, 751 (1) (c) (498 SE2d 113) (1998).
United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 706-707 (103 SC 2637, 77 LE2d 110) (1983); O’Keefe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 519, 526 (376 SE2d 406) (1988); Boggs v. State, 194 Ga. App. 264-265 (390 SE2d 423) (1990); State v. Hall, 235 Ga. App. 412, 415 (509 SE2d 701) (1998).
State v. Jones, 245 Ga. App. 763, 767 (538 SE2d 819) (2000).
216 Ga. App. 453, 454 (454 SE2d 635) (1995).
Notably, the officer’s questions relating to “personal matters” that concern the special concurrence were asked while the officer was “killing time” waiting for the driver’s license information to come back over the radio and did not prolong the detention. Berry answered willingly, and the video shows the exchange was agreeable to both parties.
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) United States v. Purcell, 236 F3d 1274, 1279-1280 (11th Cir. 2001).