concurring in the result.
I disagree with the majority that there was a registration in North Carolina of the Florida “Support Arrearages” order (Florida order). There was never any request by the petitioner, Sally Silvering (Silvering), pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 52A-29 to register the Florida order in North Carolina, the essential information required by N.C.G.S. § 52A-29 for registration of a foreign support order was not filed with the clerk of court, and the Florida order was never filed by the clerk in the “Registry of Foreign Support Orders.” Therefore, Edward H. Vito (Vito) never received from the clerk of court, as required by N.C.G.S. § 52A-29, “a notice of the registration with a copy of the registered support order. . . .” N.C.G.S. § 52A-29 (1984). Accordingly, the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 52A-29 and -30 were not met and the Florida order was not registered.
The failure to comply with N.C.G.S. § 52A-29 and -30, however, is not fatal to Silvering’s claim. The registration of the Florida order was an option, not a requirement. N.C.G.S. § 52A-25 (1984); N.C.G.S. § 52A-4 (1984) (remedies provided in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act are in addition to other remedies). She was not precluded from filing her petition for support, as she did, under the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 52A-10, and requesting that the trial court recognize the Florida order pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. See N.C.G.S. § 52A-10 (1984). The Florida order is entitled to full faith and credit if the Florida court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person of Vito, Vito was given notice and an opportunity to be heard in the Florida proceeding, and the order was final and not subject to modification. Boozer v. Wellman, 80 N.C. App. 673, 676, 343 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1986); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 54 L.Ed. 905 (1910) (sister states not bound to honor modifiable decrees); Lockman v. Lockman, 220 N.C. 95, 99, 16 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1941); Fleming v. Fleming, 49 N.C.App. 345, 350, 271 S.E.2d *277584, 587 (1980) (full faith and credit not required if order of support can be modified by state entering order). Vito makes no argument that the Florida order was entered without jurisdiction and it is therefore presumed that the court had jurisdiction. Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 266 N.C. 523, 526, 146 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1966) (jurisdiction is presumed unless contrary is shown). The record also reflects that Vito was present in the Florida courts and given an opportunity to present evidence prior to the entry of the order establishing the arrearages. Nor does Vito contend that the Florida order was subject to modification. Accordingly, the trial court correctly gave full faith and credit to the Florida decree.
I agree with the majority that the Florida order is entitled to full enforcement in North Carolina and that no portion of the Florida order is barred by the ten-year statute of limitations. When arrearages are judicially determined in another state and that order is entitled to full faith and credit, that order is entitled to full enforcement in North Carolina for a period of ten years after its entry in the other state. See Arrington v. Arrington, 127 N.C. 190, 197, 37 S.E. 212, 214 (1900) (N.C.G.S. § 1-47 applies to foreign judgments). The Florida order which determined the arrearages is, as discussed above, entitled to full faith and credit, and because the North Carolina action was filed within ten years of the date of the entry of the Florida order, plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the full amount of the arrearages as determined in the Florida order.
I also agree with the majority that the defendant’s failure to raise in the Florida courts the issue of entitlement to arrearages accruing after the children reached eighteen, bars defendant from raising that issue in this proceeding.