Leslie v. Williams

Ruffin, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. Leslie failed to file a separate enumeration of errors as required by Court of Appeals Rule 22 (a). In so doing, Leslie has not made her enumerations of error part of the record on appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-40. Because this Court does not have the authority to consider any enumerations of error not properly in the record before it, I would dismiss this appeal.

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-30, the Appellate Practice Act “shall be liberally construed so as to bring about a decision on the merits of every case appealed and to avoid dismissal of any case or refusal to consider any points raised therein, except as may be specifically referred to in this article.” (Emphasis supplied.) In that regard, the Appellate Practice Act demands that an appellant “shall file with the clerk of the appellate court... an enumeration of the errors which shall set out separately each error relied upon . . . and when filed shall become a part of the record on appeal.” OCGA § 5-6-40. Although OCGA § 5-6-40 provides that “[t]he appellate court, by rule, may permit the enumeration to be made a part of the brief,” this Court has not done so. Instead, Court of Appeals Rule 22 (a) clearly mandates that an appellant file a separate enumeration of errors, and Rule 27 (a) (2) further provides that the enumeration of errors required as Part Two of an appellant’s brief “is in addition to the original enumeration of errors required by Rule 22 (a).” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Lewis v. State, 226 Ga. App. 344, 345 (487 SE2d 533) (1997) (Beasley, J., concurring specially).

In reaching the merits of the present case, the majority relies on OCGA § 5-6-48 (f), which provides that “[w]here it is apparent from the notice of appeal, the record, the enumeration of errors, or any combination of the foregoing, what judgment or judgments were appealed from or what errors are sought to be asserted upon appeal, the appeal shall be considered in accordance therewith notwithstanding that the notice of appeal fails to specify definitely the judgment appealed from or that the enumeration of errors fails to enumerate clearly the errors sought to be reviewed.” However, such reliance would render meaningless the exception in OCGA § 5-6-30 which, as stated above, allows this Court to refuse to reach the merits and dismiss an appeal when the appellant has not complied with the clear dictates of the Appellate Practice Act. See OCGA § 5-6-30. Although OCGA § 5-6-40 allows us, by rule, to permit appellants to incorporate their enumeration of errors as part of their brief, we have not done so. By using OCGA § 5-6-48 (f) to reach the merits of this *664case, we render OCGA § 5-6-40 a nullity.

Similarly, Judge Beasley would reach the merits of the case through the vehicle of OCGA § 5-6-48 (d), which provides that “[a]t any stage of the proceedings, either before or after argument, the court shall by order, either with or without motion, provide for all necessary amendments, require the trial court to make corrections in the record or transcript or certify what transpired below which, does not appear from the record on appeal, require that additional portions of the record or transcript of proceedings be sent up, or require that a complete transcript of evidence and proceedings be prepared and sent up, or take any other action to perfect the appeal and record so that the appellate court can and will pass upon the appeal and not dismiss it. If an error appears in the notice of appeal, the court shall allow the notice of appeal to be amended at any time prior to the judgment to perfect the appeal so that the appellate court can and will pass upon the appeal and not dismiss it.” However, the first sentence of this statute, on its face, only applies to this Court’s authority to order the trial court to perfect a record for appeal. In like manner, the second sentence clearly allows errors in the notice of appeal to be amended at any time before judgment. Nothing in the statute grants this Court the authority to order an appellant to file a separate enumeration of errors as the majority maintains. In addition, this Court, unlike the Supreme Court, has no rule which would allow us to order an appellant to perfect her appeal based upon a violation of one of our rules. See, e.g., Benfield v. State, 224 Ga. 139 (160 SE2d 398) (1968); Napier v. Napier, 222 Ga. 681 (151 SE2d 712) (1966).

In Windsor v. Southeastern Adjusters, 221 Ga. 329 (144 SE2d 739) (1965), the Supreme Court held that where no separate enumeration of errors was filed, the Court could not “adopt the questions allegedly preserved for review in the appellant’s brief as being such specifications of error since the brief is not part of the record but a requirement of this Court under its authority to make rules for the determination of cases.” Thus, the effect of such binding precedent is that we have no jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal.

I stress that I do not wish to exalt form over substance. Rather, I simply recognize that we are bound by Supreme Court precedent, regardless of how much we may wish to liberally construe the rules of this Court. We have the appellant’s enumeration of errors before us; however, since they are only contained in the brief and are thus not a part of the record, we have no authority to rule on them. See Windsor, supra; OCGA § 5-6-40.

The answer in a case such as this, where our rules are clear, is to demand that the appellant accept the consequences of failing to comply with our rules. We should not further dichotomize the distinctions between those lawyers who read and follow the rules, and those *665lawyers who do not. We should not have a rule which is adhered to by some, but not by others. If the rule is not one which facilitates the appellate process, then pursuant to the authority granted us by OCGA § 5-6-40, we should allow appellants to incorporate their enumeration of errors as part of the record in their briefs. It would be better to abolish the rule than to have a rule that is adhered to at the whim of the bench and bar. Until then, or until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, we should not reach the merits of a case where the enumeration of errors are not properly part of the record on appeal.

Decided December 4, 1998. Loewenthal & Jackson, Glenn A. Loewenthal, for appellant. Clifton Lee & Associates, Shoran N Reid, for appellee.

Since Leslie failed to file a separate enumeration of errors as required by Court of Appeals Rule 22 (a), I would dismiss her appeal. Court of Appeals Rule 7; see also Wordu v. State, 216 Ga. App. 552, 553 (1) (455 SE2d 101) (1995); Miles v. Emmons, 234 Ga. App. 487 (507 SE2d 762) (1998) (physical precedent only).

I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.