Facts of Case
This case comes before us on discretionary review of a pretrial discovery order requiring The Herald (formerly The Everett Herald) to produce certain of its files for an in camera inspection by the trial court. The issue arose during the course of pretrial discovery by Theodore Rinaldo with respect to criminal proceedings pending against him.
During the spring and summer of 1979, Gary Larson, a reporter for The Herald, authored a series of six articles concerning alleged cult activities at Eden Farms, a 60- to 80-acre farm operated by Rinaldo. In order to obtain information for the articles, Larson pledged to keep his sources confidential. Later that summer, the Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney charged Rinaldo with statutory rape, indecent liberties, assault, coercion and intimidating a witness. He was tried and found guilty of some of these offenses by a jury. Approximately a year later, several witnesses *88who had testified on behalf of Rinaldo contacted the county sheriff's office and said that they had committed perjury at the trial because of threats by Rinaldo. As a result of these recantations, Rinaldo was charged with perjury, intimidating witnesses, tampering with witnesses and statutory rape.
With respect to these new charges, counsel for Rinaldo filed a motion for a subpoena duces tecum directed to The Herald to disclose to the defense all written or recorded material in its possession compiled after January 1, 1978 which related to Rinaldo, Eden Farms, Ellogos (a nonprofit corporation operated by Rinaldo and the part owner of Eden Farms) and 38 past or current members of those two organizations. In the alternative, the motion asked that The Herald be required to first deliver such material to the court for an in camera inspection.
The Herald moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the information was privileged and not subject to disclosure. The subpoena was subsequently amended to require The Herald to produce any information in its possession potentially favorable to Rinaldo on the issue of guilt or mitigation of degree and all written or recorded statements in The Herald's files given by any of the 21 persons listed by the State as witnesses to be called in Rinaldo's forthcoming trial.
Counsel for Rinaldo argued that there was no privilege, either absolute or qualified, afforded to news gatherers as far as revealing confidential sources in the context of criminal proceedings. He urged the trial court to review the material in camera in order to decide whether production should be required by the court.
The trial court held that the newspaper had a qualified privilege of nondisclosure which would have to be balanced by the court against Rinaldo's constitutional right to a fair trial and ordered that the material be produced for an in camera review by the court. On petition by The Herald, we granted discretionary review. We then later stayed proceedings in this court pending the Supreme Court's anticipated decision in Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 *89Wn.2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982), a decision which has now been filed.
One ultimate issue is presented in the case before us.
Issue
Did the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Snohomish County err in ordering The Herald and its reporter to reveal their confidential news sources, and to turn over the confidential information obtained from such sources for review by the court at an in camera hearing— and at which hearing the court would determine what part of such information, if any, would be provided to the defendant in this criminal prosecution?
Decision
Conclusion. In this criminal case, under article 1, section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Washington, The Herald and its reporter had an absolute privilege of nondisclosure of confidences and confidential news sources, and since there was no abuse of that privilege the trial court erred in entering its discovery order.
The United States Supreme Court has considered the question of a news reporter's privilege against disclosure in one case, as has the Supreme Court of this state in another. In order to put the holding in this case and the views expressed herein into perspective, those two decisions will first be referred to.
The leading case nationally on this subject is Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626, 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972) decided by the United States Supreme Court. There, in an opinion expressing the views of five members of the Court, it was held that the first amendment to the United States Constitution1 does not give reporters a privilege against appearing before a federal grand jury and answering questions about the identity of news sources or infor*90mation received in confidence. Two things about that decision are of particular legal significance in the case at bench. One is that in Branzburg, The New York Times (whose reporting functions were there in issue) did not seek a declaration of absolute privilege (as The Herald does in this case). The other is that the majority specifically observed:
It goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.
(Italics ours.) Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
The leading case in this state is now the State Supreme Court's recent holding in Senear, a civil case,2 in which the majority held that a reporter has a common law privilege, but that the privilege is only a "qualified" one. As the majority also made clear in that case, "we confine the qualified privilege to civil cases. We do not here decide whether it applies in criminal prosecutions." Senear, at 151. The State Supreme Court in Senear, as well as a different panel of this court when Senear was earlier before us,3 stated that it would not find that the first amendment to the United States Constitution afforded a reporter an absolute privilege of nondisclosure of confidential news sources in either criminal or civil actions. Senear, at 151.
The right of the courts of this state to recognize an absolute reporter's privilege of nondisclosure of confidential news sources and information in criminal cases under our state constitution (the issue before us in this case) has thus been specifically left open to us by the United States Supreme Court in Branzburg, and has not as yet been addressed by any appellate court of this state.
*91To then turn to our state constitution's free speech and press clause.4 First of all, in interpreting that clause "we must credit the people with knowing their own purposes and with knowing how to express them."5 Furthermore, "in determining the meaning of a state constitution it is also proper to consider the fact that the convention considered a particular proposed provision and then determined to reject and omit it. Comparably, words left out of the final version because voted down in the constitutional convention are to be noticed as giving meaning to the intent of the framers."6 (Footnotes omitted.)
Unfortunately, only a summary abstract of motions and votes of the constitutional convention which adopted our state constitution has survived, and the verbatim shorthand report made of the convention proceedings was destroyed without ever being transcribed.7 However, it is the law of this state that contemporary newspaper accounts may be consulted in construing a constitutional provision.8 Fortunately, such accounts have been documented in the course of historical research and have recently been made available for our use.9
As this historical research now makes clear, three separate freedom of speech and press clauses were considered by the Washington State Constitutional Convention of 1889 *92which assembled in Olympia, Washington, and wrote our state constitution. The evolution of that clause is both informative and interesting.
The first version of the free speech and press clause considered by our state's constitutional convention was that contained in the so-called Hill Proposed Constitution for the State of Washington. That proposal was commissioned by The Morning Oregonian and was drafted by W. Lair Hill, a lawyer and former editor of that Portland, Oregon, newspaper. At the time of the constitutional convention, Mr. Hill lived in Seattle. The Hill Proposed Constitution for the State of Washington was printed in The Morning Oregonian on July 4, 1889, the opening day of the convention, and a copy was placed on the desk of each delegate. That the Hill proposal was given serious consideration by the delegates throughout the convention is evinced by the fact that some 51 of its provisions were subsequently adopted without change. As drafted by W. Lair Hill, the proposed free speech and press clause was contained in the Bill of Rights section of his proposed constitution as article 1, section 5 thereof. It read as follows:
No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever, but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.
(Italics ours.)10
The second version of the clause was that submitted to the convention by delegate Allen Weir (later elected Secretary of State of the State of Washington). On July 11, 1889, he proposed a somewhat different Bill of Rights, and article 1, section 4 of the Weir proposal read as follows:
The right of free speech written, printed or spoken, when not infringing the rights of others, shall forever remain inviolate, and shall be secured to every citizen.
(Italics ours.) This version was referred to the convention's *93standing Committee on Preamble and Declaration of Rights.11
The third and final version of the clause was that ultimately recommended by the Committee on Preamble and Declaration of Rights, as article 1, section 5 of that committee's proposed Bill of Rights. The committee reported it out to the floor of the convention on July 25, 1889. It read as follows:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
(Italics ours.) It is this third version of the free speech and press clause which was ultimately adopted by the convention, ratified by the people and has ever since been an integral part of this State's Bill of Rights and Constitution. Const, art. 1, § 5.12
Thus from a historical standpoint, it can readily be seen that the free speech and press clause of our constitution became progressively more liberal during the course of convention consideration. The first version considered by the convention (the Hill proposal) was a prohibition against the enactment of laws that would abridge freedom of speech and press. The second version (the Weir proposal) was the declaration of a general constitutional policy. The third and final version (the proposal written by the convention's standing Committee on Preamble and Declaration of Rights) went all the way, and was an affirmative grant of a guaranteed right to every person. The free speech and press clause in its final form is thus not a mere guide to the formulation of state policy, but is a command, the breach of which cannot be tolerated.
Those hardy frontier lawyers, newspaper people and their colleagues at the 1889 constitutional convention said it as clearly as they possibly could — the right to free speech *94and press in the State of Washington is a privilege guaranteed to all, and so long as it is not abused is absolute. Then to insure that this right would not be tampered with by future legislatures or courts, they wrote the privilege into our state constitution.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment (see footnote 1) in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626, 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972), as requiring a "balancing" and "weighing" of the respective rights of the parties, our state constitution in article 1, section 5 speaks in absolutes when it unequivocally declares that " [e]very person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." (Italics ours.) It is important to note that here, unlike Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wn.2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982) and Clampitt v. Thurston Cy., 98 Wn.2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (1983), where claims were made to the contrary, there is not so much as a suggestion that The Herald or its reporter, Gary Larson, abused their press freedoms in any way. Simply stated, there was a story to get and the reporter went out and got it.
The press freedoms contemplated by the words "press" in the federal constitution (see footnote 1), "publish" in the state constitution (see footnote 4) and "gather news" in connection with both, have historically and in law always been considered as part and parcel of the same thing;13 and *95are so considered here.
There is an obvious and substantial difference between the wording of the federal and state constitutions with respect to protections afforded the press. Since the seven members of this state's constitutional convention committee which wrote the final version of the free speech and press clause included two lawyers, two newspaper people, a former clerk of the Supreme Court, a former mayor of Vancouver and a territorial legislator, and since the 75 delegates to the Washington State Constitutional Convention included in their number a total of 27 lawyers and 4 newspaper reporters or publishers,14 we can safely assume two things. First, the delegates were at least as familiar with the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights as we are today. Second, the difference between the First Amendment and article 1, section 5 of our state constitution, which these delegates drafted and adopted, was earnestly intended. See footnotes 1 and 4. It follows that the courts of this state have the power to interpret our state constitution as being more protective of press freedoms than the parallel provision of the United States Constitution.15
With regard to the "weighing" and "balancing" of the rights of the news media against other rights in deter*96mining whether disclosure will be required, a methodology which Rinaldo argues should be followed in this case, it need only be said that all necessary "weighing" and "balancing" was done in 1889 when this State's constitutional convention adopted our constitution and the people thereafter ratified it.
The record in this case being devoid of any showing of abuse by The Herald or its reporter of the press freedoms accorded them, they have an absolute constitutional privilege under article 1, section 5 of the Washington State Constitution against disclosing any confidences or confidential news sources.
For the foregoing reasons, this view of the meaning of our state constitution's free speech and press clause is sound based on the plain language of the clause itself, as well as on the basis of historical interpretation. This view also comports with reason and sound public policy for the following additional reasons.
A news reporter is no better than his or her sources of information. It seems to be conceded in all quarters, and is not denied here, that in order to gather news it is often necessary for a reporter to agree not to identify the source of information published or to publish only a part of the facts obtained. It is hard to perceive anything that would be more invidiously destructive of a reporter's ability to gather and report the news (particularly in an investigative reporting context as here), than for the reporter's potential informants to know that despite a sincere pledge of confidentiality the reporter may still be forced by a court to divulge the informant's statements and identity to the person under investigation.
It should be fairly obvious that without some meaningful assurance of complete confidentiality, only a very naive person would be apt to come to the news media with information which some potentially dangerous or powerful person wants to keep concealed.16
*97The case before us is a prime example of this. The only practical way in which the witnesses' statements to The Herald which are sought by the defendant could be used by the defendant would be for him to ultimately obtain the complete statements, including names and addresses of informants. The defendant in this case already stands convicted of serious crimes. The record of the trial resulting in those convictions, which was previously before this court on appeal, is replete with evidence concerning his exploitation of young girls through means of intimidation.17 He now stands additionally charged with intimidating witnesses, tampering with witnesses, perjury and yet more sex offenses. Against this factual backdrop, it would be a denial of reality to believe that the reporter's sources, who insisted on a pledge of confidentiality before they would talk to him, would have given the reporter any information had they known he could not provide them the confidentiality promised.
It follows, in turn, that the public would have been deprived of what appears to be a significant and perceptive investigative journalism series on political and other events of public interest in Snohomish County.
The reason it is absolutely essential for a reporter to have a privilege against disclosure of confidential sources and information in a case of this kind is not because of the rights of the press as such, but because of the public interest — the right of the people to know, which is a predicate to *98the effective functioning of the Republic. This was eloquently expressed over a century ago by one of our founding fathers, James Madison:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.
9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822).
In more recent times, Justice William O. Douglas in arguing (unsuccessfully) for an absolute reporter's privilege under the First Amendment, expressed it this way in Branzburg:
The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting). And further:
The function of the press is to explore and investigate events, inform the people what is going on, and to expose the harmful as well as the good influences at work. There is no higher function performed under our constitutional regime.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 722 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The framers of this state's constitution doubtless had these principles firmly in mind when they adopted article 1, section 5 of the Washington State Constitution.
The defendant's right to a fair trial is, of course, a right guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. 6; Const, art. 1, § 22. The defendant's right thereunder to compel testimony is not absolute, however. A defendant's constitutional right to compel testimony does not override testimonial privileges such as the husband-wife, priest-penitent, self-incrimination, attorney-client and other such privileges. There is no justification for holding, as Rinaldo seems to suggest, that a defendant's right to *99compel testimony should somehow be deemed to override a testimonial privilege because it is a reporter's testimonial privilege that is involved. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976). That is precisely what the result in this case would be if we presumed to "weigh" and "balance" the reporter's privilege against the defendant's right to compel testimony. A privilege is a privilege. If the trial court cannot review matters coming within the foregoing listed category of privileges in camera, as it ordinarily cannot, then it should not be able to do so in matters relating to a reporter's privilege, particularly since in this state the latter is a constitutional privilege.
Considering the repeated confrontations on the disclosure issue between the news media and the courts since Branzburg, the question also arises as to just how effective disclosure orders really are. The available empirical data strongly suggests that at best their effect is minimal. For example, it has been reported that none of the three reporters involved in Branzburg ever appeared before a grand jury after that decision and that two of them were not even asked to appear again. As a consequence of the highly questionable efficacy of such orders and their proven difficulty of enforcement, disclosure orders directed to the news media in criminal cases would seem to be little more than judicially fashioned Volstead acts. The only thing disclosure orders have unquestionably demonstrated their capacity to do is to pit the news media against the courts, and vice versa, while the case against the defendant ages.
Providing for the review of news media files at an in camera hearing, as the trial court ordered here, is not a solution to the problem at all. Such a loss of confidentiality, even to the eyes of a judge alone, by itself impinges on constitutionally guaranteed press freedoms. News media files are private files, and when they are privileged an in camera inspection by a judge necessarily destroys that privileged status in at least some part. This is not to mention, of course, that the judge who reviews the press files *100can summarily hand them over in whole or in part to a defendant. Whether the judge does or does not turn confidential files over to a defendant, the privilege against nondisclosure has been partially destroyed since the reporter's solemn pledge of confidentiality has been violated and the reporter's news gathering ability damaged thereby.
Finally, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981). The reporter and the reporter's source should both be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether confidential information furnished to the reporter can be protected, and if it cannot be protected, then as a practical matter the privilege is not really a privilege at all.
This being a case of first impression, a footnote is appended employing the socratic method whereby the four principal questions which immediately come to mind about the viability of a reporter's absolute privilege of nondisclosure of confidential information in a criminal case are set out along with what, based on the foregoing analysis, is considered the logical answer to each.18
*101The trial court's order compelling disclosure of the files of The Herald and its reporter is hereby quashed and the *102case is remanded to the Superior Court for Snohomish County for further proceedings against the defendant, Rinaldo.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const, amend. 1.
See also Clampitt v. Thurston Cy., 98 Wn.2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (1983), which follows the holding in Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wn.2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982). Clampitt, like Senear, is also a civil case and also applies the reporter's "qualified" common law privilege fashioned in Senear.
Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 27 Wn. App. 454, 459-60, 618 P.2d 536 (1980).
"Freedom of speech. Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." Const, art. 1, § 5.
State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 270, 148 P. 28 (1915).
16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 129, at 498 (1979).
Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889, at vi, vii (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wn.2d 286, 291-92, 347 P.2d 1081 (1959); In re Borchert, 57 Wn.2d 719, 727, 359 P.2d 789 (1961) (Weaver, J., concurring). See Public Hosp. Dist. 1 v. State, 24 Wn. App. 363, 368, 601 P.2d 958 (1979).
Washington/Northwest Room, Washington State Library, Olympia, Washington.
The Morning Oregonian, July 4, 1889; J. Fitts, Washington Constitutional Convention of 1889, at 21-22 (1951) (a master's thesis); Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889, at v-vii (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889, at 50-53 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889, at 154, 496-97 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962). See footnote 4.
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion. What we have had recent occasion to say with respect to the vital importance of protecting this essential liberty from every sort of infringement need not be repeated.
The ordinance cannot be saved because it relates to distribution and not to publication. "Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value."
(Footnotes and citations omitted.) Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 82 L. Ed. 949, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938).
*95The following excerpt from the dissent in Branzburg uses language with which the majority and the other opinions in that case from their tenor obviously do not disagree:
In keeping with this tradition, we have held that the right to publish is central to the First Amendment and basic to the existence of constitutional democracy. . . .
A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. The full flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee would be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the process by which news is assembled and disseminated.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889, at 157, 465-90 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
See State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 177-78, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
It should be observed parenthetically that the situation involved in an infor*97mant giving information to the news media in a criminal case is unlike that involved in an informant giving such information to the police. There are at least three major differences between these two situations: (1) the police informant's information is given to the State, which is one of the parties to the litigation; (2) even if the police informant's identity is ordered disclosed by a court, the informant may be afforded protection with the full power of the State behind it; and (3) the police informant's privilege against disclosure is not founded in our state constitution as is the reporter's privilege, as here perceived.
State v. Rinaldo, 29 Wn. App. 1004, review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1004 (1981). Pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the defendant's conviction was ordered filed for record but not printed in the Washington Appellate Reports.
Question 1. Could not a case arise where a reporter's privilege of nondisclosure of confidential information and informants might be used to cover up the reporter's own criminal conduct?
Answer. No. Article 1, section 5 of the Washington State Constitution relating to press freedoms requires responsibility for "the abuse of that right." Upon crossing the pale to become a participant in a criminal act, a reporter would waive the constitutional protection afforded reporters and stand in the same position as any other violator of the criminal code. For example, a reporter has no right to steal information or to use blackmail to obtain it. No one is above the law.
Question 2. Since this State has never enacted a news media shield law, does that not indicate that no reporter's privilege is intended?
Answer. No. So far as can be ascertained, there has been no strong concerted effort by the news media directed at either the executive or legislative branches of this State's government to get a shield law enacted. In fact, the contrary is indicated; the portions of the news media interested in such matters apparently prefer to rest their case on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. Logically this is so, since statutory news media shield laws, however broad, can be set aside by courts which are so inclined. See, e.g., In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, *101cert. denied sub nom. New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997, 58 L. Ed. 2d 670, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978). Since an absolute constitutional privilege exists, as here perceived, then a statutory privilege would be redundant in any event.
Question 3. Does not an absolute reporter's privilege of this kind derogate from the constitutional rights every defendant is entitled to, including the right to compulsory process guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution?
Answer. No. In the first place, such a privilege is obviously not one sided. It protects the news media against disclosure of confidential informants from incursions by either side, prosecutor or defendant. The time when discovery was denied to defendants in criminal cases in this state is long past. Both sides are now afforded liberal legal discovery rights. See CrR 4.5-4.8. Defendants are now routinely furnished with a complete copy of the entire police investigative file in a case, including statements and names of witnesses, as was done in the present case. Defendants can also, when needed, obtain the assistance of professional investigators and expert witnesses of their own as well as take depositions under oath of witnesses and suspected witnesses alike, to mention just a few of the many sources of available assistance. This is not to mention that if a person is indigent the foregoing can be furnished at public expense along with an attorney or attorneys to represent the defendant. In this state a defendant on a proper showing may even obtain copies of testimony and evidence presented before a state grand jury or special inquiry judge. RCW 10.27.090(5).
Question 4. But what happens if a case comes along where a defendant satisfactorily proves that "but for" the defendant getting access to information furnished to a reporter by a confidential informant, or the informant's name, an injustice will occur?
Answer. It has been suggested by at least one legal commentator that if that should occur, then the prosecution should be dismissed. If it came to that, however, no good reason appears why such a situation should be treated any differently than any other case where a defense witness is unavailable because a witness cannot be located or claims a privilege against testifying. See, e.g., State v. Burleson, 18 Wn. App. 233, 239-40, 566 P.2d 1277 (1977); Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1099, 21 L. Ed. 2d 792, 89 S. Ct. 897 (1969); Sigard v. State, 537 S.W.2d 736, 739-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
It should be emphasized, however, that the problem would probably never arise or need to be dealt with. Most if not all of the reported decisions on the subject have been read and no such case as this question poses has yet been found. It is questionable that such a case will come along — at least in a state with our broad legal discovery rules in criminal cases. It is highly unlikely hard dedicated effort by competent counsel, using necessary assistance and aided by our liberal legal discovery rules, could not duplicate the substance of anything provided to the news media by a confidential informant. The practical problem is that in almost any such case, it is both tempting and easy for counsel to simply dictate an affidavit based on assumptions, liberally laced with "ifs", "maybes”, "possiblys" and other speculation, and quite possibly convince a judge to order *102the disclosure of information furnished on a confidential basis to the news media. The judge will after all bend over backwards to be fair to the defendant, and be concerned with that one defendant's case, rather than with the broad policy of the law as it affects the entire news media. No one can quarrel with counsel doing anything and everything he or she, can ethically do in order to assist a client charged with a crime, but practices such as those just referred to are, as a practical matter, destructive of this State's constitutional press privilege and can well reduce it to little more than words and form without substance. That, in a nutshell, is why public policywise the only privilege which will protect the freedom of the press in confidential informant cases is an absolute privilege based on our state constitution.
At the risk of undue prolixity, it should be added that an instructive case on this point is McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 87 L. Ed. 819, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943). There the defendant's conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court because the defendant's confession had been obtained in violation of his rights. In support of the policy excluding the use of such evidence, Mr. Justice Frankfurter writing for the majority of the Court cited an example drawn from human experience during the British occupation of India. It is this:
"During the discussions which took place on the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure in 1872 some observations were made on the reasons which occasionally lead native police officers to apply torture to prisoners. An experienced civil officer observed, 'There is a great deal of laziness in it. It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.'. . ."
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 344 n.8. So, too, is it easy to seek disclosure orders or issue subpoenas to the news media asking for the names of confidential informants and other confidential information; but that practice, which is unfortunately being seen with increasing frequency, can in its own way be destructive of the very freedoms that we all cherish.