dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In interpreting the statutes enacted by our Legislature, it places form above substance, erroneously construes the dispositional provisions of our juvenile code, and produces a result which seriously curtails the ability of court officials to deal with emotionally disturbed children.
I disagree with the majority’s repeated emphasis on and interpretation of the provisions of G.S. 7A-649 for two reasons.
First, it is obvious from the record that Judge Bason intended to commit the child under the authority of G.S. 7A-647(3), not G.S. 7A-649(6) as assumed by the majority. As developed more fully below, the former clearly authorizes Judge Bason’s action. While the final order did recite that Scott was being sent to the Brown School pursuant to G.S. 7A-649(6), it also expressly stated that Wake Coun*556ty’s responsibility to provide for the care was pursuant to G.S. 7A-647(3). Moreover, various findings and conclusions by the trial judge compel the conclusion that he was proceeding under the authority of G.S. 7A-647(3). For example, conclusion of law E. in the final order provided, “This court has the authority to order the treatment Scott needs and to charge that cost to Wake County pursuant to G.S. 7A-6b7(3)” (emphases added). For the majority to ignore all of this and simply conclude that the judge was proceeding solely under G.S. 7A-649(6) is, in my opinion, placing form above substance.
Secondly, assuming arguendo that Judge Bason was proceeding under the authority of G.S. 7A-646(6), I strongly disagree that this statute is presently limited to programs within the State of North Carolina. The statute provides that a judge may “[ojrder the juvenile to a community-based program of academic or vocational education or to a professional residential or non-residential treatment program.” G.S. 7A-649(6) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). The “community-based” limitation is clearly intended to apply only to the academic or vocational education programs — programs normally available in many communities. The remainder of the sentence referring to professional programs is pointedly separated by the words “or to” and there is not even a hint that such programs must be located within the child’s home community or the state. Indeed, such programs are available in relatively few communities in North Carolina and no community in the state has available the program prescribed for Scott. This was the finding of the trial court and is binding on this Court on appeal.
G.S. 7A-647(3), quoted in the majority opinion, clearly allows the trial judge to order psychiatric, psychological or other appropriate care for a child when he finds the child needs such care and to charge the costs to the county. This is what the statute provides, plainly and simply. There is absolutely nothing in the statute limiting the trial court to in-state placement for treatment of a disturbed child.
The majority has strained mightily to find some language in our juvenile code to support its result. In my opinion, it has failed to do so. After quoting, disjointedly, various sections of the code emphasizing the laudable goal of serving troubled children in surroundings most similar to their own communities when appropriate programs are available, the majority then concludes that, *557“we find it inconceivable that the General Assembly intended to vest the court with the authority to order a child committed to an out-of-state facility and charge the cost ... to the county.” The majority cites no authority for such a conclusion, for there is none.
I find the reasoning of the majority both strained and inconsistent. For example:
(1) It speaks of the lack of flexibility provided by the former juvenile code in dispositional alternatives and interprets the present code to provide a more “flexible manner” for courts to fashion responses to the problems of juveniles, yet it denies that very flexibility in the matter before us.
(2) It acknowledges the clear intent of the code that juveniles be committed to training school only when no other “reasonable alternative” is available, yet it denies Scott Brownlee the only “reasonable alternative” the trial court could find for him after weeks of pleading with local and state agencies for help they were unable to provide.
(3) In holding that one of the clear purposes of the juvenile justice system is to serve the child’s best interests, the majority holds that a dispositional “determination cannot be made in a vacuum.” The majority states, “a court exercising its juvenile jurisdiction must also weigh the best interests of the state,” yet the majority fails to point to any step in these proceedings at which the trial court was acting in a “vacuum” or at which the judge failed to consider the “best interests of the state.” Indeed, the majority could make such statements only in the abstract because the record before us discloses that the trial court gave Wake County every conceivable opportunity to present an alternative solution and invited the county to fully participate in the proceedings. The assistant county attorney, at one stage of the proceedings, walked out of the courtroom. If any “vacuum” resulted, it was the fault of Wake County, not that of the trial court or of the child.
(4) The majority states that “[i]t is conceivable that an appropriate disposition... would require that resources other than those provided by governmental units be employed by the court. No doubt exists in our minds that the General Assembly envisioned such a situation emerging.” The majority here denies such a resource to Scott Brownlee.
*558(5) The majority holds that G.S. 7A-649 must be read “in tandem” with G. S. 7 A-647, yet it fails to apply the clear language of G.S. 7A-647(3) to the matter before us.
(6) The majority holds that when a juvenile judge invokes the authority to charge the cost of care to a county, the judge must be sensitive both to the proper placement for the child and consider the best interests of the state “in the utilization of its resources and those of its inferior components,” yet it fails to note any failure of the trial court to consider the utilization of Wake County’s resources. If the implication is that the approximate annual cost in excess of $40,000 for treatment at the Brown School is excessive, how does the majority rationalize such a conclusion with the finding quoted in the opinion that the average annual cost of treatment for an adolescent at Dorothea Dix Hospital in Raleigh is $65,000?
(7) The majority states that,“Our decision today ought not to be taken to mean that judges may not remove a child from his neighborhood and hometown or county. That would not be a reasonable interpretation of the statute and the legislative intent,” yet it denies such removal of this child. Its only explanation for such a result is that the majority finds “inconceivable” a legislative intent to vest the trial court with authority for out-of-state placement at county expense.
The majority, in effect, has held that the juvenile code permits treatment of a child only in “community-based” facilities and that “community” is intended by the Legislature to encompass the entire state. That this could not have been the legislative intent is clear from the code itself. Throughout the code are references to treatment of the child within his own community, and full utilization of “community-level resources” is required before a juvenile can be committed to a state training school. Additionally, a “community-based program” is defined as “[a] program providing nonresidential or residential treatment to a juvenile in the community where his family lives.” G.S. § 7A-517(8) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). “Community” was obviously intended by our Legislature to mean a much smaller geographic area than the entire state. And it is also obvious that the Legislature, although it intended that resources within the child’s community be utilized first, did not intend district court judges to be limited to resources available within the child’s community when fashioning the appropriate disposition for each child. Likewise, there is nowhere manifested in the juvenile code an intent that the available dispositional alterna*559tives be limited to facilities within the state.
This Court announces today that juvenile judges must exercise “sound discretion” in determining appropriate dispositions for juvenile delinquents, yet it cites no instance in which Judge Bason abused his discretion. Is it because the costs of this program are too excessive or the distance to Texas too far? Is it because the majority feels the program of treatment inappropriate for this child? Trial courts are given no guidelines for exercising their discretion. One can only conclude from the opinion that the majority feels that Judge Bason abused his discretion by placing Scott in a program beyond the borders of North Carolina. However, would the majority result have been any different had the same program at the same cost been available within our state but several hundred miles from Scott’s home county? I realize, of course, that an appellate court cannot always answer questions which are not asked and must deal with the record before it. However, I fear that the majority opinion today will be confusing to our trial judges as they attempt to decide whether their dispositions for juveniles are based on “sound discretion.”
I wish to make it clear that I do not advocate that juvenile judges be given the authority to send children all over the country for treatment wherever and whenever they wish. Obviously, there is a limit to the amount of public funds which can be expended for such purposes. Equally obvious, as the majority acknowledges, is that North Carolina must develop effective programs for such children. The Legislature must address this serious problem. In the meantime, however, Scott Brownlee should not be denied a program which is in his best interests and which the present juvenile code plainly allows, G.S. § 7A-647(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979). I do not think this Court should engage in judicial legislating.
The result of the decision of this Court today is to take Scott Brownlee from a program found to be in his best interest and to bring him back to Wake County to face an uncertain future. Perhaps that will not matter. Like the majority, I have no idea whether Scott has made any progress whatsoever. It may be that this young man’s mind is so disturbed that no program anywhere in the world could prevent his graduation from juvenile delinquent to hardened criminal. It seems to me, however, that we ought not to give up on him in the middle of treatment and return him to a situation which offers little hope. The odds that he will soon be an adult criminal *560will surely be greater if he is returned. Such a result, I might add, will be far more expensive to the public than the costs of his present program. With so much at stake, I simply cannot understand why a majority of this Court chooses to read words into our juvenile code which are not there.
During oral argument, one member of this Court stated that he could not conceive that our Legislature intended to give juvenile judges the authority, to send children, at county expense, to such faraway places as Texas, Hawaii or England. I agree that not even the first member of our Legislature consciously considered that our emotionally disturbed children would be sent so far away. Such a conclusion on our part, however, should not result in the decision reached by the majority today. Rigid adherence to such a view has led a majority of this Court to usurp the legislative process. Moreover, our juvenile judges will find it far more difficult in the future to utilize novel and innovative programs for delinquent children.
Assuming the Legislature never contemplated the situation presented by the record before us, what should this Court do about it? The answer is, of course, that we should construe the statute according to its plain meaning and not attempt to divine what the Legislature would have intended had it considered this situation. We should affirm the action of the trial court because it was proper under the present code. The Legislature convenes in this city in less than three weeks and can, if it wishes, amend the statutes to more clearly reflect the legislative intent, whatever that may be. The public money spent during the interim would surely not be an unwise investment when compared to the harm this decision may cause to Scott Brownlee and to thousands of other young people in the future.
I vote to affirm.
Justice EXUM joins in this dissent.