concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the Court today but for different reasons.
*93In my view, the reasoning as set forth in the Court’s prior decision is based on a sound analysis of the facts, and the rules of law therein enunciated properly interpret the legislature’s statutory intent. See: Cannon v. Taylor, 87 Nev. 285, 486 P.2d 493 (1971).
The majority places undue weight upon facts brought before this Court for the first time by respondents at their requested rehearing. The fact that respondents may have relied on oral representations by the Attorney General’s ofiice prior to the publication of its opinion is not sufficient to overturn this Court’s earlier determination. It should be pointed out that in respondents’ points and authorities on rehearing, notably submitted by the City Attorney of North Las Vegas as attorney for respondents, a chronological breakdown of facts is set out as an aid to the Court. This chronology indicates that respondents raised their salary from its former level 14 days following the adoption of Senate Bills 450 and 451, while the Attorney General’s Opinion No. 422 was not issued until June 14, 1967, some sixty days following adoption, and 46 days after the respondents had fixed a new salary level. To me, reliance on these facts is tenuous, at best.
However, I am in agreement with the rule as stated by the majority that “a case of this kind must stand on its own facts.” As a general proposition where government officials are entitled to rely on opinions of the state’s Attorney General, and do rely in good faith, they are not responsible in damages to the governmental body they serve if the Attorney General is mistaken. Although this is not a case wherein talk of damages is appropriate; rather it is one for the repayment of improper compensation.
In my judgment, if there is a sound basis for overturning our earlier determination, it is respondents’ argument on rehearing that appellants are estopped by the doctrine of laches from asserting a taxpayer’s claim against respondents.
The fact is that on April 29, 1967, respondents established salary levels above those set at the time of their election to office. Subsequently on May 13, 1969, and after a period of almost two years, appellants filed their complaint. And as was noted by the Court in its prior decision, “this class action suit was instituted by the appellants, as taxpayers, on the day before the expiration of the respondents’ term of office.”
Expenditures of municipal funds, as well as other actions taken by city councils, are regularly published in local newspapers. In fact, by law, proposed and final budgets compiled by city councils must be published. NRS 354. Knowledge or *94notice on the part of appellants of the alleged wrong is an important factor in determining whether delay in bringing a taxpayers’ action constitutes laches. Johnson v. Black, 49 S.E. 633, insufficient notice; Torgeson v. Connelly, 348 P.2d 63.
And delay in bringing a taxpayers’ action, where the complainants have express or implied knowledge or notice of the situation, may constitute such laches as to bar relief. Conners v. Lowell, 140 N.E. 742; See generally 27 Am.Jur.2d 710, Equity § 167.
After reviewing pertinent sections of the record of the case at bar, I can discern no valid reason why appellants delayed filing suit for nearly two years. Appellants, as reasonably diligent taxpayers, are charged with knowledge of public notices required to be published for their benefit. Of course, a delay however long, by itself, does not constitute laches. There must also be prejudice to the respondents resulting therefrom. As the majority has indicated, the respondents acted in good faith, and to require them, at this late date, to return funds which they had in good faith believed they had earned (and at which rates their successors in office are paid) is not justified under the circumstances.
The record reflects a void as to when appellants discovered respondents had established an improper salary level, however, the requirement of “reasonable diligence” on the part of appellants cannot be disregarded. Thus, in my judgment, a delay of this magnitude under the facts and circumstances as this record presents, was fatal to appellants.
I would affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment.