dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Contrary to the majority’s holding, I believe that careful scrutiny of N.C.G.S. § 7A-596 demonstrates that showups are within the contemplation of the statute. The legislature clearly drafted its definition of nontestimonial identification procedures so that it logically must include showups. In listing the types of procedures requiring court orders, N.C.G.S. § 7A-596 reads “voice samples, photographs, and lineups or similar identification procedures requiring the presence of a juvenile.” The majority seems to argue that showups are much less intrusive upon a juvenile’s privacy when compared with all of the listed procedures and therefore are not “similar” procedures under the statute. I fear the majority misunderstands the syntax of the sentence in question. The phrase “or similar identification procedures” does not refer back to the entire list (as it would if the sentence read “voice samples, photographs, lineups, or similar identification procedures”) but instead refers only to the word “lineups.” Overlooking one important comma and the word “and” changes the meaning entirely. If we are to interpret the statute as it was written by the legislature, we need compare showups only to lineups in determining if they are indeed similar procedures.
While a showup usually occurs earlier in the investigative process, in purpose and in practice it is closely related to a lineup and has been consistently treated as similar by the courts. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1199 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1149 (1966). Like the *575lineup, it is an eyewitness-oriented procedure which seeks to identify the perpetrator of a crime by allowing the witness to view the suspect. The majority fails to explore adequately any perceived dissimilarities between showups and lineups, but makes much of the fact that N.C.G.S. § 7A-594 directs law enforcement officers to pursue the “least restrictive course of action” when taking juveniles into custody. The majority reasons that showups, because they may occur early in the investigation and thus allow quick release from suspicion, constitute a minimal intrusion upon the juvenile. This is most emphatically not the case.
Showups are recognized to be innately more suggestive than lineups. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 234, 18 L.Ed. 2d at 1161; State v. Matthews, 295 N.C. 265, 245 S.E. 2d 727 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1128, 59 L.Ed. 2d 90 (1979). They must be used with great caution to avoid infringing upon constitutional rights. In labelling the showup as unrestrictive, the majority goes so far as to claim that the procedure actually protects the juvenile more than other identification techniques would. I believe this assertion erroneously equates protection with convenience. It is unclear to me what benefit the juvenile can derive from being subjected to the dangers of an inherently suggestive identification performed without a court order and without the presence of an attorney. While the fact that the procedure is over quickly may expedite the investigation, it potentially imperils the rights of the juvenile far more than the less suggestive lineup would and must fail the least-restrictive-means test for that reason. Even accepting the majority’s argument that the juvenile benefits from a supposedly quicker release, the gain is an inconsequential one when compared to the protections lost. In any case, I remain unconvinced that obtaining a court order creates significant inconvenience and delay. Since juvenile suspects are routinely released into the custody of their parents, the length of the juvenile’s detention would not materially increase if a court order were obtained before the showup is conducted. Such an order could easily be obtained once the juvenile has been released from temporary police custody, and the use of showups would not be eliminated completely. The majority’s red herring concerning a juvenile discovered under the porch of the victim’s house does not prove the need for showups without a court order. In such a situation, the officer’s investigation is or reasonably should be focused upon a *576single prime suspect who has been closely connected to the scene of the crime. No hardship results' in seeking a court order before conducting a showup, lineup, or other identification procedure.
In my view, the enactment of a lengthy and detailed juvenile code shows great concern on the part of the legislature not only for dealing effectively with juvenile crime, as the majority suggests, but also for safeguarding the individual rights of juveniles. Juveniles are not, after all, miniature adults. Our criminal justice system recognizes that their immaturity and vulnerability sometimes warrant protections well beyond those afforded adults. It is primarily for that reason that a separate juvenile code with separate juvenile procedures exists.
I find persuasive evidence in the structure of the juvenile code and in the history of N.C.G.S. § 7A-596 itself that the legislature intended to favor juvenile protections over law enforcement expediency. Although one of the purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7A-596 is to authorize nontestimonial identification orders like those allowed for adults, the legislature is careful to indicate that the adult criminal code is a separate entity and that adult identification procedures will not apply to persons charged under the juvenile code. This implies that the two identification sections, while identically worded, will not always be identically interpreted and applied. I would point out that the other provisions relating to nontestimonial identification of juveniles are similar to those in adult cases but contain some significant modifications. For example, nontestimonial identification is authorized only if the offense would be punishable by more than two years in prison if committed by an adult. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-598 (1986). Also, any person conducting nontestimonial identification of a juvenile pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-596 without a court order is guilty of a misdemean- or. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-602 (1986).
Such modifications demonstrate the legislature’s intention to treat juvenile nontestimonial identification much more conservatively than similar adult identifications, limiting and controlling the situations in which juveniles can be subjected to the procedures. The legislature clearly was not willing to sanction as broad a use of juvenile nontestimonial identification as that in adult cases. It defies logic to suggest that the legislature, in enacting these juvenile protections, meant to sacrifice juveniles to *577suggestive showup identifications for the sake of expediting an investigation. Nowhere does the legislative history of N.C.G.S. § 7A-596 even remotely hint at such a result. The majority, in looking to the Juvenile Code Revision Committee’s report for guidance, ignores the implications of the committee’s commentary. The committee plainly states, in reference to N.C.G.S. § 7A-596, that “[t]his section requires that an officer obtain a court order before fingerprinting, photographing or conducting any other nontestimonial identification on a juvenile.” Final Report, Juvenile Code Revision Committee, at 185, Comment C (1979) (emphasis added). Far from indicating that the statute was drafted with some exclusions in mind, this language is all-encompassing. It demonstrates the committee’s desire to place a comprehensive prohibition on the conducting of juvenile identification procedures without a court order.
Taking into account the similarity between lineups and show-ups, the greater risk to juvenile rights posed by showups, and the legislative intent to provide broader protections to juveniles, I would affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that showups require a court order under N.C.G.S. § 7A-596.
The interesting question raised by the amicus curiae brief must await resolution until presented in a proper case.
Justices Frye and Parker join in this dissenting opinion.