concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment reached by the majority and with all that is said in the majority opinion with the exception of the discussion contained in Division 6 of that opinion. I also agree that the enumeration discussed in that Division is without merit, but for a different reason than that enunciated by the majority. While, contrary to the majority, I believe that some of the testimony objected to was improperly admitted in contravention of Code Ann. § 38-408, there is no basis for reversal on this ground since the record reveals that testimony of the same nature was admitted without objection. See Whitley v. State, 188 Ga. 177 (3) (3 SE2d 588) (1939); Zeeman Mfg. Co. v. L. R. Sams Co., 123 Ga. App. 99 (4) (179 SE2d 552) (1971); Green, Ga. Law of Evidence (2nd Ed.) § 14. However, I believe that the majority’s characterization of appellant’s offers as being “in the nature of settlement, not compromise” is erroneous and arises from an overbroad application of the narrow exception recognized in Teasley v. Bradley, 110 Ga. 497 (35 SE 782) (1900). See this writer’s dissent in Campbell v. Mutual Svc. Corp., 152 Ga. App. 493, 499 (263 SE2d 202) (1979).