I concur with the majority’s conclusion that appellant’s convictions must be reversed, but write separately because I would analyze several of the issues differently.
In Part I, the majority concludes that the trial court erred in allowing witness McKinney to testify to statements made to *120McKinney by accomplice Holmes. The admission of these hearsay statements, which implicated appellant in the crimes, violated appellant’s confrontation clause rights, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), and were not admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), SCRE. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994); State v. Fuller, 337 S.C. 236, 523 S.E.2d 168 (1999). The State’s argument that accomplice Holmes’ statement should nonetheless be admitted because it is corroborated by other evidence fundamentally misreads Williamson and Fuller. These opinions hold that the portion of an accomplice’s hearsay statement (even a confession made to the police) which is “truly self-inculpatory” may be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) if (1) the state is proceeding under a co-conspirator liability theory and (2) “the statement was sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest such “that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true,” and this question can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Here, the whole of accomplice Holmes’ statement, not merely a “truly self-inculpatory” portion, was admitted. Accomplice Holmes’ hearsay statement to witness McKinney is simply not the type of statement which may be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3).
In Part II of the opinion, the majority concludes that accomplice Fuller’s redacted statement was inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3). I agree, because as the majority notes in footnote 3, Fuller’s statement minimized his role and shifted blame to appellant. In my view, Fuller’s “arguably inculpatory statements are too closely intertwined with his self-serving declarations to be ranked as trustworthy” and consequently they cannot be deemed reliable. Williamson, supra, 512 U.S. at 608, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Thus, it too is not a “truly self-inculpatory” statement of an accomplice which may be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). Further, since Fuller’s redacted statement was not within any hearsay exception, its admission violated appellant’s confrontation clause rights. Lilly v. Virginia, supra.
In Part III, the majority appears to adopt a rule that in separate trials, an accomplice’s confession, even if it meets Williamson’s and Fuller’s Rule 804(b)(3) “truly self-inculpa*121tory” test, can never be admitted because to do so would violate the confrontation clause. I disagree. In my opinion, an accomplice’s truly self-inculpatory confession, made under circumstances demonstrating it was sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest, may be admissible -without running afoul of the constitution. See Williamson and Fuller. Further, other hearsay statements by an accomplice may be admissible in the defendant’s trial without violating the confrontation clause because they fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.1 Cf., State v. Dennis, 337 S.C. 275, 523 S.E.2d 173 (1999)(admission of codefendant’s excited utterance that defendant shot the victim did not violate defendant’s confrontation clause rights). My analysis therefore differs from that part of the majority opinion which holds that the admission of an accomplice’s confession in a separate trial is a per se violation of the confrontation clause.
For the reasons given above, I concur in the result reached here.
. For example, admission of a statement pursuant the excited utterance exception found in Rule 803(2), SCRE, does not violate the confrontation clause. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992).