On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing, the appellee-plaintiff Johnson contends that, notwithstanding the principle that we apply the law in effect at the time of appeal, the trial court was correct to deny directed verdict to Hensel Phelps, because there was no affirmative showing by Hensel Phelps that it had three or more employees regularly in service in Georgia and hence was subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Code Ann. § 114-107) and entitled to immunity from tort liability under Code Ann. § 114-112 and the decision in *633Wright Assoc. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496 (277 SE2d 41).
The appellee is correct that a directed verdict shall not be granted unless “there is no conflict as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict” (Code Ann. § 81A-150), and that ordinarily the number of employees must be affirmatively proved in order for the employer to take advantage of the provisions of the Act. McCluskey v. American Oil Co., 224 Ga. 253 (161 SE2d 271). However, in this case, the appellant Hensel Phelps was the statutory employer under Code Ann. § 114-112, and hence was by law subject to the Act and was required by law to comply with the Workers’ Compensation Act (Haygood v. Home Transp. Co., 244 Ga. 165, 166 (259 SE2d 429); and Wright Assoc., supra, p. 499), was liable to the injured employee to the same extent as his immediate employer the Winter Company (Code Ann. § 114-112) and was entitled to tort immunity under that code section and Code Ann. § 114-103 and Wright Assoc., supra.
Moreover, it is undisputed that Hensel Phelps did provide workers’ compensation insurance. Code Ann. § 114-607 provides: “A policy of insurance issued under this Title shall always first be construed as an agreement to pay compensation____[Compensation shall be paid to an injured employee... for a compensable accident as if the employer and/or the employee were subject to this Title, the policy of compensation insurance constituting a definite contract between [the] parties.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The appellee contends that the appellant’s remedy in this case was to move for a new trial (Code Ann. § 6-702) and that since Hensel Phelps did not do so, it is stuck with the verdict against it. But a motion for new trial was not the remedy in this case, because a motion for new trial may not be used to raise objections to the judgment only and not the verdict. Williams v. Cross, 197 Ga. 295 (2) (28 SE2d 924); Smith v. Wood, 189 Ga. 695 (2) (7 SE2d 255). A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was the appropriate remedy in this case, “but in all cases where such motion is an available remedy, the party may file the motion, or appeal directly from the final judgment and enumerate as error the overruling of the motion for directed verdict.” (Code Ann. § 6-702). That may not be politic in a case where new law has invalidated the judgment, but that is what the statute says. Moreover, the appellee cannot complain that he is injured by the appellant’s failure to seek and obtain judgment n.o.v. in this case, because the jury rendered severable verdicts against appellant and against co-defendant PBTB; the appellee would not in any case be entitled to a new trial against PBTB in hopes of obtaining a larger verdict. See Brissette v. Munday, 222 Ga. 162 (149 SE2d 110); and see *634Smith v. Nelson, 123 Ga. App. 712 (5), fn. 3 (182 SE2d 332). The law at the time of appeal of this case entitles the defendant Hensel Phelps to the directed verdict, even though the grounds underlying it were not urged for the obvious reason that they did not then exist. If, where the evidence and new law requires entitlement to a certain judgment, we required the grounds therefor to have been urged below although the defendant could not have known of them, the rule that we apply the law at the time of appeal would be meaningless.
Motion for rehearing denied.