(concurring and dissenting):
*294Initially, I point out that I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the solicitor’s explanation for striking the black juror because he thought she and Gill once lived on the same street is racially neutral. I do not agree, however, that this racially neutral reason is sufficient to sustain the strike of the black juror if the solicitor’s second reason for the same peremptory strike (the hardship explanation) is found pretextual. As I read the record, the trial judge concluded that inasmuch as the solicitor struck the black juror for a racially neutral reason (lived on the same street as Gill), there was no need to further analyze the hardship explanation.1 Additionally, the parties do not attempt to examine the validity of the hardship explanation in their briefs, but argue instead whether the solicitor’s racially neutral explanation sustains the strike of the black juror regardless of the hardship explanation.2 Thus, the sole Batson issue before us is whether the racially neutral explanation is sufficient to sustain the peremptory strike of the black juror even if the hardship explanation was, in fact, pretextual and constitutionally infirm.
Efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in jury selection are not novel in our judicial system. More than 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that racial discrimination by the State in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879). *295Throughout the century following Strauder, the Fourteenth Amendment was used to police the jury system, and the United States Supreme Court consistently and repeatedly reaffirmed the basic constitutional principle that the purposeful or deliberate exclusion of African-Americans from jury participation on account of race violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567 (1880); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed. (2d) 759 (1965); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed. (2d) 491 (1968); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed. (2d) 498 (1977).
However, it was not until the 1960’s in Swain v. Alabama that a criminal defendant invoked this constitutional principle to object to the prosecution’s alleged racially discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge. See generally Amy E. Had-dad, Constitutional Law — Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection — Criminal Defendant’s Racially Discriminatory Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 229 (1992). Swain, a black man, challenged his conviction for raping a young white female on the ground that blacks had been unconstitutionally excluded from his jury. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203, 85 S.Ct. at 826. Swain first argued that the State’s use of peremptory challenges to strike all black people from the jury violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 204, 85 S.Ct. at 827. He also argued that the systematic practice of excluding black jurors is “invidious discrimination for which the peremptory system is insufficient justification.” Id. at 223, 85 S.Ct. at 837. The Court rejected Swain’s attempt to establish an equal protection claim premised solely on the pattern of jury strikes in his own case, and held instead that proof of systematic exclusion of African-Americans through the use of peremptories over a period of time might establish such a vio*296lation. Id. at 224-226, 85 S.Ct. at 838-839. The Swain standard for proving a Fourteenth Amendment violation, requiring systematic discrimination by the prosecutor over many cases, soon proved impossible for defendants to satisfy.3 Thus, the continuing practice of prosecutors using peremptory challenges to strike all or most blacks from juries caused the United States Supreme Court in 1986 to re-examine the Swain standard of proof in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed. (2d) 69 (1986).
The Supreme Court in Batson rejected Swain’s evidentiary formulation because it placed on defendants “a crippling burden of proof.” Id. at 92, 106 S.Ct. at 1721. The Court reasoned that racial discrimination in jury selection not only harms the defendant on trial, but also the entire community by undermining public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Id. at 87, 106 S.Ct. at 1718. It held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state prosecutor in a criminal case from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors based solely on their race on the assumption that African-American jurors as a group would not impartially consider the state’s case against an African-American defendant. Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719.
The policies underlying Batson illustrate that the ultimate goal is to eliminate discriminatory jury selection practices. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell announced the particular manner in which discrimination may be proven. A prima facie case of purposeful discrimination is made out “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”4 Id. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-2049, 48 L.Ed. (2d) 597 (1976)). In making out the prima facie case, the Court also noted that the defendant is *297entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges “permit those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.” Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953)); see also State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E. (2d) 701 (1987).
After the defendant demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to show racially neutral reasons for the exercise of his strikes. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; see also State v. Green, 306 S.C. 94, 409 S.E. (2d) 785 (1991). Although the explanation need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause, a party may not rebut a prima facie case by merely denying a discriminatory motive. Id.; see also State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 384 S.E. (2d) 707 (1989).
In determining whether the explanation is adequate, the trial judge should consider whether the reasons are: (1) neutral, (2) related to the case to be tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate. Id. 384 S.E. (2d) at 709. Because the trial judge’s findings regarding purposeful discrimination rest largely upon an evaluation of the credibility of the attorney making the strikes, we give those findings great deference. However, where the record does not support the attorney’s stated reason for making the strike, the trial court’s findings must be overturned. State v. Patterson, 307 S.C. 180, 414 S.E. (2d) 155, 157 (1992).
Even if the party whose strikes are challenged articulates legitimate reasons for the strikes, the party challenging the strikes may establish that the explanations are a mere pretext. A facially neutral reason will be rejected as a sham or pretext where the reason is not applied in a neutral manner. This may be accomplished by showing an inconsistent application of the purported reason as relates to similarly situated jurors. See State v. Grate, 310 S.C. 240, 423 S.E. (2d) 119 (1992) (solicitor struck two black males, ages 22 and 28, because they were young and he desired an older jury; however, a 21-year-old white female was seated, demonstrating the purported reason was a pretext); see also State v. Adams, 307 S.C. 368, 415 S.E. (2d) 402 (1992) (black male struck because docket clerk placed question marks beside his name, yet white male with question marks beside his name was empaneled); State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E. (2d) 891 (1989) (three black females stricken because they were patients of the defense wit*298ness doctor; however, solicitor allowed a white female who was also a patient of the same doctor to be seated). Thus, the explanation given for a strike must be applied equally across the board.
Even where the party challenging peremptory strikes can show that white venirepersons having certain characteristics were seated and African-American venireperson with those same characteristics excluded, there is no per se Batson violation and the solicitor may nevertheless avoid a finding of pretext if he can provide an additional nondiscriminatory reason for treating the white and African-American venireperson differently. See Sumpter v. State, 312 S.C. 221, 439 S.E. (2d) 842 (1994). While I agree with the majority that the burden is on the defense to prove the solicitor’s allegedly neutral reason was a pretext because it was not applied in a neutral manner, I think this burden is met once it is demonstrated that the white juror who was seated had the same disqualification as the unseated black juror. Id. 439 S.E. (2d) at 844 (defendant did not satisfy burden of proving that solicitor’s reasons were pretextual because no evidence was presented that white juror who was seated had the same disqualification as excluded black juror). For instance, in State v. Geddis, 313 S.C. 37, 437 S.E. (2d) 31 (1993), the solicitor struck a black 23-year-old female because of her young age, but allowed two white women, both twenty years of age, on the jury. The solicitor offered an additional and distinguishing nondiscriminatory reason for his seemingly inconsistent action. He explained that the two white jurors had shown great interest in watching another trial on the day prior to their selection in the instant case, thereby overcoming his normal practice of striking young females, and that the black juror had not displayed a similar interest. This, according to the court, demonstrated that the black and white jurors were not similarly situated and therefore the facially valid reason was not pretextual. Id. 437 S.E. (2d) at 33.
In the case before us, the court failed to examine the legitimacy of the two hardship explanations although Gill demonstrated they were similarly situated and the solicitor offered no further explanation which would create a distinction between them. Despite the speculation engaged in by the majority whereby it declares the white woman’s hardship explana*299tion might have been more legitimate and compelling than the black juror’s, thus justifying their disparate treatment, nothing in the record indicates either hardship explanation was more compelling or legitimate than the other, and the trial judge did not find any distinction between the two nor did he even attempt to evaluate any possible distinctions.5 Since the State did not provide a distinguishing explanation of why it did not exercise a peremptory challenge against the white venireperson who requested a hardship excuse while exercising one against the black venireperson who made an identical request, the hardship explanation for the strike against the black venireperson was a mere pretext. See Oglesby, 379 S.E. (2d) at 892 (originally neutral reason may be proven to be pretextual because not applied in a neutral manner); see also Foster v. Spartanburg Hosp. System, 314 S.C. 282, 442 S.E. (2d) 624 (Ct. App. 1994) (regardless of the reasonableness of the explanation provided by the striking party, it is clear the reason was not applied in a neutral manner and therefore the explanation forms no reasonable basis for the exclusion and was merely a pretext for excluding the juror based on race). This case can be distinguished from Sumpter and Geddis where the evidence showed that the black and white jurors were not similarly situated since their disqualifications were not the same.
Thus, concluding for the purposes of this appeal that Gill established the hardship explanation was a pretext, the ultimate question before this court, as pointed out by the majority, is whether a pretextual explanation for a peremptory strike necessarily constitutes a Batson violation when a valid, race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question is also offered. Based on the above-discussed precedential underpinnings of the Batson decision and its underlying rationale, I am of the opinion that even though the prosecutor may have given one racially neutral explanation, the racially motivated explanation, as evidenced by the finding of pretext, vitiates the legitimacy of the entire jury selection procedure. Once it is found that the exercise of even one peremptory challenge is racially motivated, this in and of itself gives rise to an infer*300ence of discriminatory purpose and violates the mandates of Batson, which explicitly prohibits the State from exercising strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. To hold otherwise, I believe, completely guts the whole notion of pretext, and offends the policies underlying Batson.
Although the specific question of whether a showing of pretext establishes a Batson violation when another racially neutral and valid explanation has been provided has not been resolved by the appellate courts of this State, there is a paucity of federal and foreign state case law on this issue. My research reveals courts have taken two well-defined approaches to ruling on these challenges. Texas, Georgia, and the Military Courts have adopted the “tainted” approach, where a racially motivated explanation will vitiate the entire selection process regardless of the genuinness of other explanations for the strike. See, e.g. Moore v. State, 811 S.W. (2d) 197 (Tex. App. 1991) (venireperson would have problem assessing punishment (valid) and was member of minority club (invalid)); United States v. Greene, 36 M.J. 274 (C.M.A. 1993) (possible antagonism against government (valid) and Latino “macho” type attitude (invalid)); Rector v. State, 213 Ga. App. 450, 444 S.E. (2d) 862 (1994) (venireperson’s low education and occupation (valid) and gold tooth (invalid)); Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga. App. 85, 424 S.E. (2d) 368 (1992) (age (valid) and assumption that venireperson would act along racial lines (invalid)); see also McKinney v. State, 761 S.W. (2d) 549 (Tex. App. 1988); Speaker v. State, 740 S.W. (2d) 486 (Tex. App. 1987).
A second approach is that a racially neutral explanation will sustain the peremptory strike, even if an additional racially based reason is present. The Second Circuit has adopted this approach in applying the “dual motivation” analysis to Batson that is applied in other areas of Equal Protection jurisprudence. In Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F. (2d) 24 (2nd Cir. 1993), in referring to other spheres of constitutional law, the court stated that “the Supreme Court has made it clear that the challenged action is invalid if motivated in part by an impermissible reason but that the alleged offender is entitled to the defense that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the improper motive.” Id. at 26; see also, United States v. Iron Moccasin, 878 F. (2d) 226 (8th Cir. 1989) (although not formally holding that one valid reason will suffice, *301where prosecution offered three reasons for the strike, acceptance of the first removes necessity to look at other two). Under this approach, if the party alleging a Batson violation is able to show an improper motivation, then the party exercising the peremptory challenge has an affirmative duty to then demonstrate that the same challenge to the juror would have been made in the absence of the improper motivation.
Finally, in United States v. Alcantar, 897 F. (2d) 436, 440 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit stated that “where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons are offered by the prosecution [for exercising a peremptory strike], the need for a meaningful adversarial hearing to discover the true motivation behind the challenges is especially strong.” This approach suggests a middle ground between the approaches discussed above and requires the trial judge to determine the dominant reason behind the strike.
My review of South Carolina cases has uncovered only two cases that directly reflect on this issue. In State v. Martinez, 294 S.C. 72, 362 S.E. (2d) 641 (1987), the solicitor struck two black jurors because they “were of the same sex and age as appellant and also had ‘possible’ criminal records.” The court implicitly conceded the solicitor’s use of age as an explanation was “insufficient” because the State had seated a white juror of the same approximate age. Our Supreme Court, nevertheless, sustained the strikes because the black jurors “were noted as having possible criminal records.” In State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 384 S.E. (2d) 707 (1989), however, the court found a Batson violation where a juror was stricken for three reasons, two of which were found to be racially neutral. The court ruled that the third explanation that the juror “shucked and jived” was a racial stereotype and “evidence of the prosecutor’s subjective intent to discriminate and clearly violates the mandates of Batson.” Id. 384 S.E. (2d) at 710.
In basically adopting the second approach, the majority cites Martinez as support for the adoption. Because I cannot square Tomlin with Martinez, I believe we should follow Tomlin which implicitly takes the “tainted” approach. As stated in Rector v. State, “[w]hile we realize that it is unrealistic to expect trial counsel to put aside every improper influence when selecting a juror, we conclude that is exactly what the law requires” Id. 444 S.E. (2d) at 865 (citing State v. Tomlin, 299 *302S.C. 294, 384 S.E. (2d) 707 (1989)). The courts that have used the “tainted” approach reason that if race or gender becomes a factor in the exclusion of a juror, the jury selection process has become contaminated and “no neutral explanation can serve to rebut the presumption that the condemned practice of exclusion based on race occurred----”
A review of the many cases decided by our Supreme Court addressing the Batson issue makes it clear that the court will give great deference to a trial judge’s ruling regarding his assessment of whether a party exercising a peremptory strike did so with a racial or gender motivation. See State v. Patterson, 307 S.C. 180, 414 S.E. (2d) 155 (1992). Additionally, it appears that only the more apparent pretextual explanations will be condemned by the court. See, e.g., State v. Dyar, — S.C. —, 452 S.E. (2d) 603 (1994) (because the solicitor had no actual knowledge of the criminal records of white jurors, he manifested no subjective racial motivation for striking a black juror with a similar criminal record even though his office had furnished defendant’s counsel the white jurors’ names as veniremen with criminal records). So in fairness to the majority, the Supreme Court may at this juncture in the development of the parameters of Batson approve the approach adopted by the majority. However, I think to do so would effectively and practically destroy an appellate court’s ability to judge the pretextual character of Batson challenges and will hasten Justice Clarence Thomas’ prophecy that “defendants will rue the day that this court ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of peremptory strikes.” Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, —, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2360, 120 L.Ed. (2d) 33 (1992). I would reverse on the Batson issue.
The court stated:
Well, I’m going to allow — we are going to go forward because I did have this second [living on same street] reason but I wanted the State to be aware had that been the only reason, I’m not sure how I would have ruled and I’m not going to make a ruling because I don’t need to because it is moot but I do have concern about incomplete — relying on incomplete information and I think that in the future that for the State to make the argument that has been made today, the State is going to have to better reflect that they made a diligent effort to keep appropriate notes or the person who is making the motion should be the one who is saying I’m not relying on somebody’s else’s notes, I’m relying on my own. I’m not going to go through here to check them all but I would be very concerned if I went through and found that there were no notes made on any white jurors as to being excused but there were on black jurors. I don’t think that happened and I’m not saying that it did but those are the kind [sic] of things that the court would have to look into were we to go further on that point. Do you understand?
The State concedes in its brief “that ordinarily these facts (surrounding the hardship explanation) would at least indicate that the State’s articulated *295reason may be pretextual.” It argues, however, the court should consider surrounding circumstances in determining whether an articulated reason is truly pretextual. The State continues:
In Appellant’s case, there was more than one reason why the assistant solicitor felt that [the black juror] would not make a good juror for Appellant’s trial. It appears that even if [the black juror] had not made the hardship request, the State would still have exercised a strike against her because of their apprehension that she may have known Appellant when he lived on her street.
The stringent burden of proof adopted in Swain required the defendant to show “when, why, and under what circumstances in cases previous to this one the prosecutor used his strikes to remove Negroes.” Swain, 380 U.S. at 226, 85 S.Ct. at 839.
In the most recent South Carolina decision concerning the establishment of a prima facie case, the Court noted, “[i]n our opinion, requesting a Batson hearing in effect sets out a prima facie case of discrimination ... the striking of any juror can raise the inference of race and/or gender based discrimination.” State v. Chapman, — S.C. —, —, 454 S.E. (2d) 317, 320 (1995).
Instead the trial judge accepted the State’s assertion that this issue was moot due to the State’s second independent reason for the strike and denied the Batson motion.