In this action for fraud and deceit Jones Chevrolet appeals from a jury verdict awarding Dunsil $800.00 actual, and $5,800.00 punitive, damages. Jones assigns error to the trial judge’s (1) refusal to grant a nonsuit or direct a verdict for Jones, (2) submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury, and (3) charge to the jury. We find no error as to the first two points but reverse on the third.
Dunsil bought a used car from Jones. She told the salesman she did not want a “wrecked” car because she already had one. He replied in essence that he had a good car. Dunsil later discovered that the frame of the car was bent; uncontradicted testimony at trial showed that the damage would have been caused by a wreck. In addition, the testimony showed that the damage was discoverable by inspection underneath the car.
In deciding on the motions for a nonsuit and directed verdict, the trial judge must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting the *295motions; if more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the judge must submit the case to the jury. Skipper v. Hartley, 242 S. C. 221, 130 S. E. (2d) 486 (1963); see also Williams v. Kinney, 267 S. C. 163, 226 S. E. (2d) 555 (1976). Here there was sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury. Fraud may be established not only by showing that the defendant knew of the falsity of his representations, but also by showing that he made the representations in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. Carter v. Boyd Construction Co., 255 S. C. 274, 178 S. E. (2d) (1971); Aaron v. Hampton Motors, 240 S. C. 26, 124 S. E. (2d) 585 (1962).
The submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury was proper. Knowledge by the tortfeasor that his representations were false is not required for an award of punitive damages. It is only necessary that the defendant was “conscious, or chargeable with consciousness, of his wrongdoing.” Carter v. Boyd Construction Co., supra, 255 S. C. at 283, 178 S. E. (2d) at 540.
Appellant next assigns error to the charge. The trial judge jumbled propositions of law applicable to fraudulent breach of contract actions (ex contractu) with principles applicable to fraud and deceit actions (ex delicto). The instructions by the court of irrelevant and inapplicable principles of law was clearly erroneous and may have been confusing to the jury. In Wright v. Harris, 228 S. C. 144, 89 S. E. (2d) 97 (1955), this Court restated the rule that it is reversible error to charge a correct principle of law as governing a case when such principle is inapplicable to the issues on trial. In reversing, the Court held it was error to charge the law pertaining to “breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act” in an action for “fraud and deceit.” This precise error in the instant case prompts reversal and remand *296to the Court of Common Pleas for Dorchester County for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Littlejohn, Ness and Rhodes, JJ., concur. Lewis, C. J., dissents.