dissenting:
While the majority is correct in stating that the term “charitable” should include more than the traditional “alms-giving to the poor,” I must say that the majority will be viewed as being exceedingly “contemporary” by concluding that “charitable” encompasses “promoting the game of golf.” I dissent.
The majority senses, quite justifiably, that its opinion granting tax exempt status to the Coeur d’Alene Public Golf Club will be viewed as inconsistent with our recent prior denial of such status to an old-age retirement center in Canyon County Assessor v. Sunny Ridge, 105 Idaho 98, 675 P.2d 813 (1983). Therefore the majority attempts to point out the following “notable distinctions” between the cases.
First, the majority states that “Sunny Ridge Manor benefited a relatively small group” able to physically and financially take care of themselves. However, there is no evidence in the record to show that the golf club members or its patrons are somehow not physically or financially able to care for themselves. It is common knowledge that' most golfers are healthy. The fact that the club has ingeniously created a marketing scheme to partially finance its game through its real estate sales seems to indicate financial savvy. There are no facts in the record to show that the number of club members or patrons of this particular club constitutes a great percentage of the community. Nor should this case turn on any perceived determination that the “broad public appeal” of golf is greater than the “broad public appeal” of taking care of the elderly. This case cannot be distinguished from Sunny Ridge on the first perceived distinction.
Next, the majority states that the entire cost of the operation of the Sunny Ridge Retirement Home was borne by the recipients of its services. The evidence shows *108that the patrons of the club also pay for their services. The remaining operating costs are paid by the proceeds from the sales of real estate. The buyers of the real estate apparently are willing to pay enhanced prices for the proximity to and the view of the golf course from their backyards. The fact that a business uses revenues from one segment of its consumers to subsidize another segment of its consumers does not mean that the former is making a charitable donation to the latter. Each is paying the price that the market will bear.
Next, the majority states that “except for the absence of profitmaking,” there is little difference between Sunny Ridge Man- or and a commercial condominium complex. However, the golf club in the present case is probably even more similar to commercial golf courses than Sunny Ridge Manor is to its commercial counterpart. The club contains the requisite eighteen holes, restaurant and pro shop. The only noticeable difference might be lower green fees. I point out that the residents of Sunny Ridge Manor also received medical care for substantially lower fees.
Next, the majority concludes that in Sunny Ridge there were only limited donations to support the facility, and much of that from its residents, who were also recipients of the services. However, in this case the club has also been the recipient of only limited donations. We do not know that the initial acreage was donated. The stipulated facts state only that it was “acquired.” In fact, the only donations were to partially finance the construction of the first nine holes in the early 1950’s. The facts do not reveal from whom the donations came; the reader must speculate as to whether the donors were members of the club and enthusiastic patrons who are also recipients of the services.
Finally, the majority states that there was no evidence in Sunny Ridge of outside donations to reduce the cost of services. Neither is there such evidence in this case. The facts do not state the source of the limited donations in the early 1950’s.
The majority goes on to imply that the purchasers of adjoining real estate are making donations to the golf club and its patrons. The purchasers are receiving valuable real estate for their purchase price and are in no way making outside charitable donations to the golf club. The reduced rate for golf instruction to student groups is a common marketing tool used by recreational facilities. The theory is that the students will enjoy and take up the game and return many times to the facility at the regular rate. The club has failed to show that its motivation is any different from that of any other commercial recreational facility which provides cut rates to instruct students. The majority's attempt to distinguish Sunny Ridge is unpersuasive.
The majority states:
“To deny application of the state’s exemption statute to one type of recreational facility is to deny it to all, an unfortunate result for the truly charitable public recreational facility.”
I fear that this will be interpreted as a blanket exemption to any non-profit organization providing recreation for a fee. The very reason that the Court approaches these exemptions on a “case by case” basis is to weed out the “truly charitable” from the “not so truly charitable.” Each recreational facility must be required to prove its own set of facts and circumstances entitling it to a charitable exemption. The facts stipulated in this case do not provide an adequate basis on which to analyze the eight considerations set out in Sunny Ridge as to whether the facility could qualify as a “charity.” For example: how did the club acquire the initial acreage of real estate? If donated, were the donors members of the club, or did they receive benefits? What percentage of the construction cost was donated? In how many years has the club made a profit, and how much profit? Are the restaurant and pro shop leased out to private entrepreneurs as is often the case? What percentage of the community uses the facility? How much lower are the “green fees” charged by the club when compared to other private golf courses? What percentage of the operat*109ing costs is financed by the “green fees”? What is the motivation of the club in providing reduced rates to instruct students? What specific charity or type of charity would the assets be donated to upon dissolution? (With “charity” defined as broadly as the majority does today, it could conceivably be another profitmaking venture.) Answers to these questions would be extremely relevant to the eight considerations outlined in Sunny Ridge.
The burden is on the club to establish clearly the right to an exemption. Bistline v. Bassett, 47 Idaho 66, 272 P. 696 (1928). “Idaho is committed to the rule that: [a] statute granting tax exemption ... be strictly construed____” North Idaho Jurisdiction of Episcopal Churches, Inc. v. Kootenai County, 94 Idaho 644, 647, 496 P.2d 105, 108 (1972). See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Ada County Assessor, 101 Idaho 138, 609 P.2d 1129 (1980). On the slim factual showing in this case, the club has failed to carry its burden, and a strict construction of I.C. § 63-105C does not allow the club a property tax exemption as a “benevolent or charitable corporation.”