dissenting. Assuming for the sake of argument that Mrs. Hall’s representation that she was entitled to a year’s support was such a fraud as would authorize the setting aside, of the year’s support judgment if all other requisite .conditions existed, I think that the vital question in this case is controlled by the principle that a judgment will not be set aside even at 1 the term at which it was rendered for a reason which could have *148been urged before the- judgment was rendered, and this covers the ground of fraud, as well as any other ground. Hogg v. Hogg, 206 Ga. 691 (58 S. E. 2d, 403). The Supreme Court has settled the question in several cases. The question whether negligence of the moving party precluded his right to have a judgment not based on a verdict set aside at the same term was clearly ruled on by the Supreme Court in Dougherty-Little-Redwine Co. v. Hatcher, 169 Ga. 858 (151 S. E. 796). The matter referred to was not fraud, but the principle is the same. The Hatcher case was cited with approval on the same question in Cahoon v. Wills, 179 Ga. 195 (175 S. E. 563), and Hurt Building v. Atlanta Trust Co., 181 Ga. 274 (182 S. E. 187), and by this court in Morris v. Morris, 82 Ga. App. 384 (61 S. E. 2d, 156). These decisions mean, in my judgment, that the ground which will authorize the setting aside of a judgment, even at the term at which rendered, is such a one as could not have been urged before the rendition of the judgment sought to be set aside. So the rule as to the setting aside of judgments during the same term is the same as the rule applying in equity cases as to judgments sought to be set aside after the expiration of the terms when rendered. Young v. Young, 188 Ga. 29 (2 S. E. 2d, 622), and cases cited. The executor forcefully urges that the extrinsic fraud or extrinsic cause rule does not apply to the power of a court to vacate a judgment not based on a verdict at the same term, and that a court has the inherent power to vacate a term judgment not based on a verdict, even if fraud is absent, on broad principles, in its discretion, to promote justice. This power has been limited to a mere legal discretion so many times that citations to that effect are unnecessary. The Supreme Court cases cited control in my opinion this case, and I have no recourse other than to bow to them as binding precedents regardless of what my private opinion is as to the common-law rule as applied to the facts in this case. Mobley v. Mobley, 9 Ga. 247, is not contrary to the cases cited, because in the Mobley case the plaintiffs were minors without guardians. The executor contends that the ruling in the Hatcher case, supra, is not in point. I think that the record shows to the contrary. It is true that the bill of exceptions in that case states that the only issue involved was the validity of the judgment setting *149aside a year’s support for Mrs. Hatcher. However, the judge of the superior court affirmed the auditor’s rulings in the case and this judgment was excepted to. One of the rulings of the auditor was that the demurrer of Mrs. Hatcher to the petition for injunction, etc., should be sustained. In the receiver’s petition to the court of ordinary to set aside the judgment awarding a year’s support, it alleged that it had certain valid defenses which it would have presented to the court had it had any notice of the proceedings, among which was the fact that the will of Clarence W. Hatcher made provision for his widow in lieu of a year’s support. The issue raised by Mrs. Hatcher’s demurrer to this petition was by agreement passed on by the auditor. The auditor ruled that Mrs. Hatcher’s demurrer to the petition to set aside should be sustained. The judge of the superior court affirmed the auditor’s ruling and that judgment was excepted to. It seems to me that the issue was clear-cut in the Hatcher case whether the receiver could have set aside a judgment awarding a year’s support, after citation was duly published, at the same term at which the judgment was rendered, on a ground which could and should have been urged before judgment. Whether the court should have treated with this question in view of the statement in the bill of exceptions that there was only one issue involved is beside the point. The court dealt specifically with the question and directly ruled on it. If this ruling in the Hatcher case is obiter in that case, its citation on the same question in the other two cases makes the ruling in those two cases authoritative rulings in those cases. See Cofer v. Maxwell, 201 Ga. 846 (41 S. E. 2d, 420), to see to what extent the Supreme Court has gone in limiting a court’s power during the term over its judgments. Since the petition of the executor did not allege that it was ignorant of the contract which it alleged barred Mrs. Hall’s year’s support before the judgment setting apart the year’s support, the court erred in overruling the demurrer by Mrs. Hall to the petition to vacate the judgment awarding the year’s support.