dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority maintains the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA are applicable in the context of the Juvenile Code, and asserts in fn. 1 that this Court has not previously addressed the question. I disagree.
The first case cited in fn. 1, In the Matter of Arends, 88 N.C. App. 550, 364 S.E.2d 169 (1988), contains the following statements:
Petitioner submits to this Court the contention that Chapter 50A [the UCCJA] should control although the proceedings in juvenile court were brought under Chapter 7A. This argument is untenable.
Id. at 553, 364 S.E.2d at 171.
The jurisdictional prerequisites of the UCCJA would only govern in permanent custody situations. The order entered by the juvenile court . . . was not an order for permanent custody. . . . Temporary placements of neglected children are made pursuant to the North Carolina Juvenile Code.
Id. at 556, 364 S.E.2d at 172. Whether I or the majority agree with the conclusion, the above quotations can fairly be read only “squarely” to reject as “untenable” the contention that the UCCJA is applicable to proceedings in the juvenile court. It is well-established that subsequent panels of this Court are bound by previous decisions absent modification by our Supreme Court. In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). Arends therefore mandates our holding herein that the trial court under the circumstances sub judice was not encumbered by the UCCJA and properly assumed jurisdiction, not only to issue its non-secure custody order under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-573 & 7A-574(a)(2) (with timely reviews under N.C.G.S. § 7A-577), but also to conduct an adjudicatory hearing pursuant to Chapter 7A, Article 51, and to enter a disposi-tional order pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-647.
Nonetheless, under the Juvenile Code, the trial court’s disposi-tional order, while indisputably well-intended, must be vacated. G.S. § 7A-647, “Dispositional alternatives for delinquent, undisciplined, abused, neglected, or dependent juvenile,” provides in pertinent part as follows:
*773The following alternatives for disposition shall be available to any judge exercising jurisdiction . . . :
(2)c. Place him in the custody of the Department of Social Services in the county of his residence, or in the case of a juvenile who has legal residence outside the State, in the physical custody of the Department of Social Services in the county where he is found so that agency may return the juvenile to the responsible authorities in his home state. . . .
A juvenile having legal residence outside this state, without dispute the circumstance of the juveniles herein, may be placed in the custody of the local Department of Social Services solely for the purpose enunciated in the section. The trial court placed the Van Kooten children in the custody of petitioner for the achievement of commendable purposes, but lacked authority to do so. That portion of the order inconsistent with G.S. § 7A-647 must be vacated and this matter remanded for entry of an order directing petitioner to “return the juvenile [s] to the responsible authorities in [their] home state” of Iowa.
Finally, I note in passing that the majority presumes, absent any findings by the trial court supported by competent evidence in the record, that Colorado, where a court of competent jurisdiction previously entered a custody decree concerning the children in question, “no longer has jurisdiction with respect to the custody of these children.” While the majority’s assessment may ultimately be determined to be accurate, it is our province only to review findings and conclusions of the trial court and not to interpose our own.