Duffy v. State

THOMAS, Justice.

The double jeopardy implications of separate sentences for aiding and abetting aggravated robbery and for conspiracy to commit burglary present the central issue in this case. Questions also are raised „as to whether the sentences imposed, nine years, eleven months and twenty-nine days to ten years to run consecutively to twenty-four years, eleven months and twenty-nine days to twenty-five years, constitute a denial of due process because the appellant, Scott Duffy, is foreclosed from the right to earn statutory good time credits, essential for an early parole, and amount to a violation of the separation of powers doctrine as between the executive and judicial branches of government. A further question is posed as to whether Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., was infringed because of the failure of the trial court to advise Duffy that it could impose consecutive sentences so that Duffy’s plea of guilty was nullified. We hold that there is no violation of the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy in this instance, and the plea of guilty is not abrogated by the failure of the district court to advise Duffy of the possibility of consecutive sentences. The record does not demonstrate that the issues relating to the constitutionality of the sentences imposed are ripe for review at this time. The denial by the district court of Duffy’s motion for correction of his sentences pursuant to Rule 36, W.R.Cr.P., is affirmed.

Duffy previously appealed his conviction. Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754 (Wyo.1986). In the initial appeal, counsel for Duffy attempted to urge error because of the trial court’s refusal to merge for sentencing the offenses of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery and conspiring to commit burglary. Trial counsel had not presented that claim in the district court, however, and the appellate counsel had not included the issue in the brief. Consequently, in accordance with our usual appellate discipline, we declined to address that issue. We noted that Duffy was not foreclosed from presenting a claim that his sentences are illegal by a motion under Rule 36, W.R.Cr.P. With respect to issues that were properly presented, the court found no error in the judgment and sentence which had been imposed.

Duffy accepted the invitation to pursue relief under Rule 36, W.R.Cr.P., and did file a motion in the district court to correct an illegal sentence. The district court did not set the motion for hearing within sixty days, and it then was deemed denied in accordance with Rule 301, U.R.D.C. This appeal is from the automatic denial of that motion.

Duffy now presents the same issues that were urged to the district court. The State, as appellee, has accepted Duffy’s statement of those issues, which is:

“1. Did the district court’s imposition of consecutive sentences in the present case violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions?
“2. Does the sentence in the present case violate due process by denying Appellant a liberty interest, the right to good time?
“3. Does the sentence as structured by the District Court infringe upon the powers delegated to the parole board and thereby infringe upon the constitutionally mandated separation of powers?
“4. Whether the guilty plea was taken in violation of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., and whether the proceedings were void and the sentence illegal?”

In the initial proceedings, Duffy entered pleas of guilty to one count of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery in violation of §§ 6-1-201 and 6-2-401, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.),1 and to one count of conspiracy *824to commit burglary in violation of §§ 6-3-301, 6-1-303 and 6-1-304, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.).2 The district court ruled that there was a sufficient factual basis to accept Duffy’s pleas of guilty to both charges. As we noted in Duffy, 730 P.2d 754, that factual basis was presented by a summation by the prosecutor of the available evidence to be used at trial and Duffy’s admission of the accuracy of that recitation. The record demonstrated that Duffy, while he was incarcerated in Castle Rock, Colorado, had planned the robbery of his grandmother. He did this by telephone calls to two accomplices in Wyoming. Duffy explained to them how to gain entry into his grandmother’s house and told them where they probably would find her valuables. The entire plan was that the two fellow conspirators would burglarize the grandmother’s home, which was located in •Fremont County, Wyoming, and they then would travel to Colorado to help Duffy escape from incarceration.

The two partners in crime went to the grandmother’s home in accordance with the plan. One waited outside in a car while the other broke a window of the home to gain entry. The grandmother was awakened by the sound of the breaking glass, and she got up and went to the place where she had heard the noise. There, she discovered the burglar reaching through the broken window and holding a pistol in his hand. He ordered the grandmother to unlock the front door and, when she complied, he entered the house and demanded that she lead him to the safe where she kept her money. The grandmother took him into the bedroom where he removed a .38 caliber pistol from a nightstand. Duffy had told him of the location of that firearm. The robber then insisted that the grandmother show him her other valuables, and she complied with that demand. She took him throughout the house, showing him whatever valuable property he asked for. The robber collected the property in a pillowcase and returned to the waiting vehicle. Police officers successfully apprehended both principals before they could carry out the plan to help Duffy escape, and both of them confessed the robbery to the investigating officers, implicating Duffy in their statements.

On the basis of this factual showing, the district judge accepted the guilty plea. Duffy then was sentenced to a term of not less than twenty-four years, eleven months, twenty-nine days, nor more than twenty-five years, on the charge of being an accessory before the fact to aggravated robbery, and to a consecutive term of not less than nine years, eleven months, twenty-nine days, nor more than ten years, for conspir*825acy to commit burglary. The court ordered that these sentences were to be served after Duffy was released from incarceration in Colorado.

Duffy’s initial and primary contention is that the imposition of separate sentences for aiding and abetting aggravated robbery and for conspiracy to commit burglary placed him in jeopardy twice because the evidence relied upon to establish the factual basis for his plea of guilty on each of the charges was the same series of phone calls from Colorado to Wyoming. He contends that the plan developed from these phone calls resulted in a “single transaction”, the burglary of his grandmother’s house. In addressing claims of double jeopardy previously, this court consistently has held that each crime committed should be punished. We have agreed with the clear majority of jurisdictions that espouse a philosophy of crime and punishment and eschew the proposition that it is an acceptable result in our society for there to be crime without punishment.

The rule that we have espoused for resolving the question of whether a defendant has been twice placed in jeopardy by virtue of multiple convictions and sentences is to look to the intention of the legislature with respect to whether the conduct should be punished as a single offense or as more than one. Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350 (Wyo.1989); Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367 (Wyo.1988); Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1987). See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983).

“ ‘Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the [double jeopardy clause] is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” Birr, 744 P.2d at 1119, quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).3

In determining the question of legislative intent, we have examined statutory definitions, Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561 (Wyo.1989),4 and we also have evaluated the other circumstance surrounding the crimes charged, whether they grow out of different transactions or different evidence is required to establish the separate offenses. Nowack.5 If the conduct that es*826tablishes an element of the offense is repeated, we have held that separate crimes were committed even though the other evidence overlaps or is identical. Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877 (Wyo.1987); Tuggle v. State, 733 P.2d 610 (Wyo.1987); State v. Carter, 714 P.2d 1217 (Wyo.1986); Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212 (Wyo.1979).

“ ‘ * * * [I]f the offenses charged are separate and distinct either with respect to statutory definition, or, because * * * they grow out of different transactions and different evidence is needed to prove each, then the constitutional inhibition against double jeopardy is not applicable and, so long as the offenses charged are not factually inconsistent, a defendant may be found guilty and judgment of sentence thereon may be had as to each of the offenses charged.’ ” Jackson v. State, 522 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Wyo. 1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 1055, 95 S.Ct. 637, 42 L.Ed.2d 652 (1974), quoting State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio App. 124, 165 N.E.2d 814, 820 (1960).

See also Goodman v. State, 601 P.2d 178 (Wyo.1979); Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173 (Wyo.1976). This rule was explained in this way in Goodman, 601 P.2d at 185:

“ * * * Two or more distinct offenses may emanate from the same transaction or act, and the rule that a person cannot be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense has no application where two separate and distinct crimes are committed by one and the same act. People v. Hairston, 1970, 46 Ill.2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840, 847, cert. den. 402 U.S. 972, 91 S.Ct. 1658, 29 L.Ed.2d 136. Where two statutes are intended to suppress different evils, the acquittal or conviction on one will not prevent prosecution of the other. Decker v. State, 1971, 251 Ark. 28, 471 S.W.2d 343, 344; State v. Ahuna, 1970, 52 Haw. 321, 474 P.2d 704, 707 * *

With respect to those instances in which different statutes are involved, the question has been resolved by a determination that the legislature intended to define separate crimes, punishable separately. Conversely, when we have determined that the intention was to create only a single continuing offense or to describe alternative means of committing the same offense, the State may not structure multiple violations even though some separate evidence might support the several charges.

As noted in Nowack, we have approached this latter concept in Kallas v. State, 704 P.2d 693 (Wyo.1985), and later in Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132 (Wyo.1986), cert. denied 480 U.S. 907, 107 S.Ct. 1353, 94 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). In Kal-las, we relied upon United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979), in holding that, when the same conduct violates more than one provision of the criminal code, the State may elect which violation to charge and pursue. This is the rule of Batchelder, with the clear implication flowing from it that an attempt to punish all of the options would result in a violation of the concept of double jeopardy.

As an example of repeated violations of the same statute, in Hamill, this court held that the legislature intended to protect the victim against each identifiable sexual penetration. Consequently, .even though a continuing course of conduct was involved, each sexual penetration demonstrated a separate crime. Following that case, in Baum, 745 P.2d at 882, we said:

“ * * 4 In sequence, appellant performed fellatio upon the victim and then made the victim reciprocate. It would not be reasonable for this court to determine that these two distinct acts of fellatio were only one criminal act. We hold that the trial court was proper in handing down two separate sentences for counts II and III for which appellant was convicted.”

Baum contended that avoidance of double jeopardy demanded that the acts be separated by a substantial period of time or space. In response, the court stated:

“ ‘ “Where, * * * different criminal acts are at issue, supported by different factual evidence even though separated in time only by a few.seconds, one offense by definition cannot be ‘included’ in the other. The defendants can properly be punished for [all], under different, or the same, statutory provisons.” ' ” Baum, *827745 P.2d at 882, quoting State v. Molitoni, Hawaii App., 711 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1985), quoting State v. Pia, 55 Hawaii 14, 19, 514 P.2d 580, 584-585 (1973) (emphasis in original).

In Carter, 714 P.2d 1217, a similar analysis was pursued. The court concluded that separate evidence supported the conviction for delivery of a controlled substance and the conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and the legislature intended that each violation be separately punished. Accord State v. Bocian, 226 Neb. 613, 413 N.W.2d 893 (1987). We there distinguished prior cases holding that a defendant could be convicted of only one offense if the same evidence, delivery of a controlled substance, was used to support a charge that the defendant possessed the controlled substance with intent to deliver it and then demonstrated the delivery. These cases can be categorized as those in which an alternative method of violating the statute was described by the legislature. See Dycus v. State, 529 P.2d 979 (Wyo.1974); Jackson, 522 P.2d 1356.6

In those instances in which the language and purpose of the statute indicate a legislative intent to structure a single offense with alternative methods specified by which the statute may be violated, any violation of the statute is a single offense. According to the general rule, this is the result even if the evidence demonstrates that the statute has been violated in both of the alternative ways and, in such an instance, only one conviction can be sustained.

“ ‘The rule is well settled that, where a statute makes either of two or more distinct acts, connected with the same general offense and subject to the same measure and kind of punishment, indictable separately and as distinct crimes, when each shall have been committed by different persons or at different times, they may, when committed by the same person at the same time, be coupled in one count, as constituting altogether but one offense. In such cases the several acts are considered as so many steps or stages in the same affair, and the offender may be indicted as for one combined act in violation of law; and proof of either of the acts mentioned in the statute and set forth in the indictment will sustain a conviction/
“Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 525; Howard v. State, 191 Ind. 232, 131 N.E. 403; State v. Jackson, 242 Mo. 410, 146 S.W. 1166; Grayson v. State, 92 Ark. 413, 123 S.W. 388, 19 Ann. Cas. 929; Bradley v. State, 20 Fla. 738; Smith v. State, 40 Fla. 204, 23 South. 854; State v. McWilliams, 7 Mo.App. 99; The People v. Mackin, 159 Ill.App. 125; People v. Gossett, 93 Cal. 641, 29 Pac. 246; Bishop’s New Criminal Proc., Vol. 1, § 436, and many cases cited in Wharton’s Crim. Proc. (10th ed.) § 742.” State v. Tobin, 31 Wyo. 355, 367-68, 226 P. 681, 685 (1924).

In that case, the court ruled that Tobin had been illegally sentenced because he had been convicted of both gambling and permitting gambling to be carried on in his house. The court held that one act necessarily was embraced in the other. Examination of the statutes and the authority cited in that opinion establishes that the court perceived the purpose of each statute to be directed toward the same evil, prohibiting gambling, and that both gambling and permitting gambling were intended to be alternative means of committing the same offense. See also §§ 3389 and 3391, W.C. S.1920; Howard v. State, 191 Ind. 232, 131 *828N.E. 403 (1921).7 The result was that, even though separate evidence demonstrated that the appellant had transgressed both provisions, he could be sentenced for only one violation, even though committed in the alternative.

The rationale of Tobin was invoked in Loddy v. State, 502 P.2d 194 (Wyo.1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1134, 94 S.Ct. 877, 38 L.Ed.2d 760 (1974), with the result that the defendant could be sentenced for only one offense when charged with malicious destruction of a telephone line and larceny of the same line. The reasoning is not precise, but the court did not hold that separate offenses merged into one simply because they were part of the same transaction. The court quoted extensively from 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law and, in the same section as that quoted, the following statement appears:

“It is generally recognized that if accused enters a plea of guilty or is convicted on several counts of an indictment, and each count is for a separate and distinct offense, a separate sentence may be pronounced on each count, and the court may pronounce separate and distinct sentences which are cumulative, and are to run consecutively. This is true, even though the several offenses were committed in the course of a single transaction, or arose out of one general set of circumstances.” 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1567(3) at 424-28 (1961) (footnotes omitted).

Loddy is consistent with the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to punish separately the destruction of telephone line which was stolen, any more than it would intend to punish separately the breaking of a window which was accomplished in the course of a burglary.

In Dorador, 520 P.2d 230, and the cases which follow it, Tobin was relied upon to hold that the defendant could be convicted of only one offense when charged with delivery of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver the same substance. The alternative method of violation was articulated in the same statute in this way:

“'* * * [I]t is unlawful for any person to * * * deliver, or possess with intent to * * * deliver, a controlled substance.’ Section 35-347.31(a), W.S.1957, (Cum. Supp.1973), as quoted in Dorador, 520 P.2d at 231.

The court concluded that the legislature intended that a violation of the statute would result in only one conviction even though the language provided for alternative ways of committing the offense. The same evil was addressed. See also Dycus, 529 P.2d 979; Boyd, 528 P.2d 287; Jackson, 522 P.2d 1356. Compare Carter, 714 P.2d 1217.

In Jerskey, the rationale of Tobin was invoked with the result that Jerskey could not be convicted of both possession with intent to déliver a controlled substance and an attempt to deliver the same controlled substance. The evidence demonstrated that a package containing seven bricks of marijuana had been sent to Jerskey. The authorities intercepted the package, removed six of the bricks, and then permitted the package with the one remaining brick to be delivered to Jerskey. The court ruled that the same evidence supported both charges and that, had the police not inter*829vened, the package would have been delivered with all seven bricks. Consequently, separate charges of possession with intent to deliver and an attempt to violate the statute could not be sustained. In that instance, the product of the court’s decision was that a lesser included offense, attempt, could not be punished separately from the actual offense. See Brown, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221. Only one sentence could be sustained.8

The rationale of the Wyoming cases is consistent with that of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the question of whether separate evidence demonstrates separate offenses or a continuing single offense. The defendant in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), contended that two sequential drug transactions constituted only one offense. The Court there said at 301-02, 52 S.Ct. at 181:

“ * * * The sales charged in the second and third counts, although made to the same person, were distinct and separate sales made at different times. It appears from the evidence that shortly after delivery of the drug which was the subject of the first sale, the purchaser paid for an additional quantity, which was delivered the next day. But the first sale had been consummated, and the payment for the additional drug, however closely following, was the initiation of a separate and distinct sale completed by its delivery.
“The contention on behalf of petitioner is that these two sales, having been made to the same purchaser and following each other with no substantial interval of time between the delivery of the drug in the first transaction and the payment for the second quantity sold, constitute a single continuing offense. The contention is unsound. The distinction between the transactions here involved and an offense continuous in its character, is well settled, as was pointed out by this court in the case of In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 [7 S.Ct. 556, 30 L.Ed. 658]. There it was held that the offense of cohabiting with more than one woman, created by the act of March 22, 1822, c. 47, 22 Stat. 31 [now 18 U.S.C.A. § 514], was a continuous offense, and was committed, in the sense of the statute, where there was a living or dwelling together as husband and wife. The court said [120 U.S. at 281, 286, 7 S.Ct. at 559, 562]:
“ ‘It is, inherently, a continuous offense, having duration; and not an offense consisting of an isolated act.
# sjs * ⅜ ⅝ sfc
“ ‘A distinction is laid down in adjudged eases and in textwriters between an of-fence continuous in its character, like the one at bar, and a case where the statute is aimed at an offence that can be committed uno ictu.’
“The Narcotic Act does not create the offense of engaging in the business of selling the forbidden drugs, but penalizes any sale made in the absence of either of the qualifying requirements set forth. Each of several successive sales constitutes a distinct offense, however closely they may follow each other.”

The second issue addressed in Blockbur-ger was whether separate offenses could be sustained because a single act of criminal conduct, the sale of narcotics, amounted to a violation of two distinct statutes. The court answered that question in the affirmative because, in that case, each of the statutes required proof of a fact that the other did not. Later, in Ciucci v. State of Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 78 S.Ct. 839, 2 L.Ed.2d 983, reh. denied 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1367, 2 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1958), the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that the murder of four people, in what apparently was a single criminal episode, created four separate offenses. The court held that it did not violate the double jeop*830ardy clause to prosecute the four indictments in separate proceedings.

A dissenting opinion urged the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits a state from subjecting a defendant to double jeopardy through multiple prosecutions when the charges arise out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction. In later cases, the Supreme Court has held that the same evidence may not be used to sustain multiple offenses in separate proceedings if one was a lesser included offense of the other. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977); Brown, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221. The thrust of these later opinions is that a defendant cannot be subjected to multiple trials for those included and greater offenses even though the offenses are supported by different evidence. The rule of these cases is that no different result is obtained by trying a lesser included offense separately from the greater offense than would ensue if they were tried together. See Nowack.

Similarly, in Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958), a single gunshot which caused injury to two police officers was not held to result in separate offenses because the court concluded that was not the intent of Congress. In that case, the Court carefully noted that if two shots had been fired each injuring a different officer, separate offenses could be sustained. See Baum, 745 P.2d 877; Tuggle, 733 P.2d 610; Carter, 714 P.2d 1217; Hamill, 602 P.2d 1212; Vigil, 563 P.2d 1344; Ladner; Ciucci; Blockburger; Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 35 S.Ct. 710, 59 L.Ed. 1151 (1915).

When a court decides that the legislature intended a violation of two statutory provisions by a single act to be punished only once, double jeopardy results even though separate evidence might be used to support multiple offenses. Schultz, 751 P.2d 367; Birr, 744 P.2d 1117; Garrett; Hunter. This rule is quite like the rule relating to alternative means of violating the same statute or a conclusion as to a continuing offense. If the legislature has expressed its intent in unambiguous language in the statute, the inquiry ends. Schultz; Hunter. The Wyoming legislature has not provided any definitive statutory guidance in this instance and, therefore, we resort to the usual rules of statutory construction to discern the legislative intent. Compare Hunter; United States v. Harris, 832 E.2d 88 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.1987); State v. Frank, 416 N.W.2d 744 (Minn.App.1987); Nevada Department of Prisons v. Bowen, 103 Nev. 477, 745 P.2d 697 (1987) (applying statutes expressing a clear legislative intent without resorting to rules of statutory construction).

In Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400 (Wyo.1977), our examination of the relevant statutes convinced the court that the elements of the charged offenses 'were different and that each statute was intended to address a separate evil. In that case, we reversed a conviction for first degree murder, but affirmed a conviction for killing an unborn child by assault and battery on a pregnant woman. The evidence showed that both of the convictions were premised upon the same conduct, a single gunshot wound to the mother. The case then was retried, and Goodman was found guilty of manslaughter of the mother. Upon appeal, we concluded that the legislature intended to impose separate punishments for each offense, and Goodman’s argument that he had been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense was not acceptable. Goodman, 601 P.2d 178.

In Birr, the court dealt with the question of whether a conviction of felony murder and the underlying felony, aggravated robbery, could be punished separately. To determine the question of legislative intent, the court looked to the language of each statute and applied the Blockburger test. The court then considered the purpose of each statute, identifying the gravamen of the offense and the evil intended to be addressed, and it also looked at the placement of the two statutes and the penalty provided to determine if both offenses contained separate penalty provisions. See *831also Lauthem; Schultz. This inquiry is no different from that in any other instance in which the court is involved in statutory construction, see Schultz, except that the rule of lenity does require the resolution of any ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Ladner. Our approach is like that used in the federal system to discern congressional intent, although the relevant legislative history is more available in the federal context. In Wyoming, we have little legislative history to be of assistance. Nowack; Lauthem. See Garrett; Ball; Hunter.

Properly applied, the test of Block-burger examines the legislative definition without considering the facts. Garrett; Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1293, n. 17, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975).

“ * * * The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182.

This rule is simply a rule of statutory construction and should not be afforded preeminence over other rules. Furthermore, it should not be invoked when it leads to a conclusion that is inconsistent with legislative intent. Schultz; Garrett.9

Legislative intent first is expressed in the language of the statute, and it can be presumed that, when two statutes contain different elements, they were intended to address different offenses. Ball; United States v. Stafford, 831 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir.1987). The statutory language also will indicate if different evils were intended to be addressed. Garrett. Defining the offenses in different statutes with separate penalties structures a presumption that the legislature intended separate punishments under each statute. Birr; United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 105 S.Ct. 611, 83 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).

When these principles are applied to this case, the conclusion must be that Duffy was not placed in double jeopardy by the two convictions. Any overt act by one of the other conspirators was sufficient to complete the crime of conspiracy to commit the burglary, see Schultz; Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852 (Wyo.1987). The armed robbery occurred after the conspiracy violation had been committed. The separate convictions could be sustained on the basis of a finding that separate evidence supported each charge. Furthermore, the two statutes do not provide an alternative means of committing a single offense, and the prosecutor did not attempt to parse the conspiracy count into multiple conspiracies. Therefore, the rules espoused in Tobin, 226 P. 681, and Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 7 S.Ct. 556, do not apply. While, arguably, the convictions could be affirmed as different offenses supported by different evidence, see Schultz, the record does not justify a conclusion that they did not rest on. the same evidence. The only evidence presented by the prosecutor to provide the factual basis for the pleas of guilty to the two offenses was the several phone calls from Duffy to his accomplices and the subsequent actions of the accomplices. This makes it necessary to determine whether the offenses are separate and distinct by virtue of their statutory definition. See Goodman, 601 P.2d 178.

In Schultz, we held that the legislature intended the offense of conspiracy to be a separate offense from the substantive crime that was the object of a conspiracy. In Garcia v. State, 774 P.2d 623 (Wyo.1989), we held that felony murder and con*832spiracy to commit aggravated robbery were intended by the legislature to be separate offenses. That same rationale pertains here. Each of the offenses with which Duffy was charged contain elements that the other does not, which satisfies the Blockburger test. The gravamen of conspiracy, and the evil intended to be addressed by the conspiracy statute is the agreement of criminal minds and the potential threat to the public from such agreements. Percival v. State, 745 P.2d 557 (Wyo.1987); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168, reh. denied 434 U.S. 880, 98 S.Ct. 241, 54 L.Ed.2d 164 (1977); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312, reh. denied 365 U.S. 825, 81 S.Ct. 687, 5 L.Ed.2d 703 (1961); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489, reh. denied 329 U.S. 818, 67 S.Ct. 26, 91 L.Ed. 697 (1946).10 The purpose of the aggravated robbery statute is to protect the person and the property of the individual. See Birr. Consequently, •the gravamen of robbery is different from that of conspiracy. These statutes are set forth in separate sections of the criminal code, and each contains its independent penalty provision. These indicators all point to only one conclusion, that is, that the legislature intended these offenses to be punished as separate offenses. The result is that Duffy could be convicted of each of the charged offenses, and the court could impose consecutive sentences for those convictions without violating Duffy’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

In his next argument, Duffy contends that the sentence imposed is illegal because the one-day difference between the minimum sentence and the maximum sentence in each instance does not permit him to accumulate good time against his maximum sentence. In support of this contention, Duffy asserts that, since the State granted him a right to earn good time, he has been invested with a protected liberty interest that cannot be denied without due process. This argument is premised on the rationale that, according to Dorman v. State, 665 P.2d 511 (Wyo.1983), any good time earned cannot be applied to reduce his minimum sentence.

In Dorman, we held that the legislature had created only a limited interest in good time, conditioned on the fact that any good time could not reduce a sentence below the minimum imposed by the court. That decision was based on the statutes and rules in effect at the time. The opinion quotes § 7-13-402(a), W.S.1977, which provided:

“The Board shall have the power to grant a parole * * * to any person imprisoned in any institution under sentence ordered by any district court of this state, other than a life sentence, and who shall have served the minimum term pronounced by the trial court * *

The court then noted the provision in § 1, Ch. IV of the Rules and Regulations of the Parole Board that:

“ ‘Section 1. Definition. Good time allowance is a reduction of the maximum sentence of an inmate as a result of his good, proper and helpful attitude, conduct ' and behavior in the institution and/or as a result of his adherence to the rules of the institution. Good time allowance shall not be granted or awarded to an inmate so as to reduce the time served to less than the minimum sentence. (Emphasis added.)’ ” Dorman, 665 P.2d at 513.

After Dorman’s sentence was affirmed, the statutory provision and the rule relied upon in that decision both were modified. Section 7-13-402(a), W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl.), provides:

“(a) The board may grant a parole to any person imprisoned in any institution under sentence, except a life sentence, ordered by any district court of this state, provided the person has served the minimum term pronounced by the trial court less good time, if any, granted under *833rules promulgated pursuant to W.S. 7-13-420.”

The governor then adopted rules relating to good time allowance for inmates of the Wyoming State Penitentiary and the Wyoming Women’s Center, in accordance with the authority granted by § 7-13-423, W.S. 1977 (1984 Cum.Supp.) (now set forth in § 7-13-420, W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl.). The new rules provided with respect to the definition of good time allowance:

“Section 1. Definitions, (a) ‘Good time allowance’ is a reduction of the maximum sentence of an inmate in the amount of ten (10) days per month for each month served on a sentence as a result of the inmate’s proper and helpful attitude, conduct and behavior in the institution and/or as the result of his/her adherence to the rules of the institution.”

The restriction set forth in the prior definition of good time that “good time allowance shall not be granted or awarded to an inmate so as to reduce the time served to less than a minimum sentence” was deleted.

In light of the recent statutory amendments and modification of the rules, there now appears to be no restriction that prevents the reduction of Duffy’s maximum sentence below his minimum sentence. Duffy has not argued that he is entitled to be released now if his good time earned is deducted from his maximum sentence. Neither has he presented any evidence that would indicate that he is presently being denied any good time to which he would be entitled under the statute and the rules. Under those circumstances, Duffy’s argument does not present a cognizable claim that is ripe for our review. It will be appropriate for him to seek that relief when he can establish that the combination of good time added to the time served demonstrates that he has served the maximum term and is entitled to release. The record does not demonstrate any invasion of a constitutional liberty interest at this time that would justify a conclusion that Duffy’s sentence is illegal.

In the third argument presented by Duffy, the claim is made that his sentence is illegal because it violates the separation of powers provision of the Wyoming Constitution. Duffy contends that the sentence restricts the authority of the Board of Parole to release him prior to the service of the minimum sentence imposed by the district court. The decision of the court in Duffy, 730 P.2d 754, and the preceding explanation of the adjustment in the statute and the rules resolves this claim.

As a final argument, Duffy asserts that his sentence is illegal because the guilty plea was accepted in violation of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P. The essence of this claim is Duffy’s argument that the trial judge, in order to comply with Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., must advise him that consecutive sentences could be imposed. In pertinent part, Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., states:

“(c) Advice to defendant. — Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo conten-dere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
“(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; * *

The record demonstrates that the trial court advised Duffy of both the maximum and minimum sentence for each offense, and it shows that Duffy was aware of the maximum sentence that he faced. At the hearing in which the court accepted his pleas of guilty, the court stated:

“THE COURT: * * * Do you recall when you were in this Court at an earlier time in August, particularly, August 14, at which time you were advised of certain of your constitutional rights, and you pled ‘not guilty?’
“MR. DUFFY: Yes, I do.
“THE COURT: And do you remember, I told you that under Count I of the Information, you could be imprisoned for not less than five or more than twenty-five years, and Count II, you could be imprisoned for not more than ten years or less than one year and fined $10,000?
“MR. DUFFY: Yes, I do understand.”

*834It is clear that Duffy was advised of the maximum sentence for each offense prior to the acceptance of his guilty plea.

We have required strict compliance with the provisions of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., in order to demonstrate the validity of a plea of guilty and to avoid questions on post-conviction relief. Gist v. State, 768 P.2d 1054 (Wyo.1989). See Keller v. State, 723 P.2d 1244 (Wyo.1986); Crawford v. State, 701 P.2d 1150 (Wyo.1985). While we have required strict compliance with the provisions of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., we have not added to those requirements. See Carson v. State, 751 P.2d 1315 (Wyo.1988); Percival. There is no requirement in Rule 15 that the court advise a defendant of the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences. The rule only requires that the defendant be informed of the maximum sentence for each offense. The trial court complied with the rule, and Duffy’s plea properly was accepted.

The product of our consideration of Duffy’s claims is that he has not demonstrated an illegal sentence. Since he has not, the district court correctly dismissed his motion to correct and reduce his sentence, and the disposition by the trial court is affirmed.

. Section 6-1-201, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.) provides:

"(a) A person who knowingly aids or abets in the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or procures a felony to be committed, is an accessory before the fact.
*824"(b) An accessory before the fact:
******
“(iii) Upon conviction, is subject to the same punishment and penalties as are prescribed by law for the punishment of the principal.”

Section 6-2-401, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.), provides:

"(a) A person is guilty of robbery if in the course of committing a crime defined by W.S. 6-3-402 [larceny] he:
"(i) Inflicts bodily injury upon another; or "(ii) Threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury.
******
"(c) Aggravated robbery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more than twenty-five (25) years if in the course of committing the crime of robbery the person:
******
“(ii) Uses or exhibits a deadly weapon or a simulated deadly weapon.”

. Section 6-3-301, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied structure * * * with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.
"(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000.00), or both.”

Section 6-1-303, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement."

Section 6-1-304, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:

"The penalty for * * * conspiracy is the same as the penalty for the most serious crime which is * * * an object of the conspiracy

. While the protection against double jeopardy has been described as designed, in part, to prevent multiple punishments for the same offense, the respective double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and the Wyoming Constitutions prevent multiple convictions for the same offense. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985); Dorador v. State, 520 P.2d 230 (Wyo.1974). In neither instance, however, does the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause inhibit multiple indictments for the same offense in a single proceeding. If the defendant is found guilty on charges represented by two counts that constitute a single offense, the court then must vacate one of the convictions so that the double jeopardy clause is not violated. Ball; Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173 (Wyo.1976). Cf. Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344 (Wyo. 1977).

. If it is clear that the legislature intended alternative means of committing a single offense, only one conviction can be attained even though different evidence would be required to demonstrate the alternative means of committing the offense. See Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173 (Wyo.1976); Dycus v. State, 529 P.2d 979 (Wyo.1974); Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287 (Wyo.1974); Jackson v. State, 522 P.2d 1356 (Wyo.1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1055, 95 S.Ct. 637, 42 L.Ed.2d 652 (1974); Dorador v. State, 520 P.2d 230 (1974); Loddy v. State, 502 P.2d 194 (Wyo.1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1134, 94 S.Ct. 877, 38 L.Ed.2d 760 (1974); State v. Tobin, 31 Wyo. 355, 226 P. 681 (1924). Accord, Ex parte Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 7 S.Ct. 556, 30 L.Ed. 658 (1887); People v. Thomas, 163 Ill.App.3d 670, 114 Ill.Dec. 746, 516 N.E.2d 901 (Ill.App.1987).

.When it is clear that the legislature intended to punish each criminal act separately, because different evidence is essential to establish the separate charges, multiple convictions may be sustained. Eg., Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877 (Wyo.1987); Tuggle v. State, 733 P.2d 610 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Carter, 714 P.2d 1217 (Wyo.1986); Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212 (Wyo.1979); Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344 (Wyo.1977). See also Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958); Ciucci v. State of Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 78 S.Ct. 839, 2 L.Ed.2d 983, reh. denied 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1367, 2 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 35 S.Ct. 710, 59 L.Ed. 1151 (1915).

. In some cases, language has been adopted indicating that merger is a separate claim from double jeopardy, but the rationale discloses that those decisions are premised on an implied conclusion of legislative intent. Merger for purposes of punishment occurs because of double jeopardy and, absent a constitutional restraint, the legislature is free to define offenses in its wisdom. It then becomes the duty of the court to sustain the legislative intent if that is constitutionally possible. In those instances, a conclusion that the legislature intended separate punishments would have resulted in upholding that intent to punish separately, absent a clear constitutional violation. The decisions manifest a conclusion that the legislature did not intend to punish separately. Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287 (Wyo.1974), cert. denied 423 U.S. 871, 96 S.Ct. 137, 46 L.Ed.2d 102; Dorador v. State, 520 P.2d 230 (Wyo.1974).

. In Howard v. State, 191 Ind. 232, 131 N.E. 403, 404-05 (1921), the Supreme Court of Indiana had addressed a similar statute and held:

"A statute often makes punishable the doing of one thing or another, sometimes thus specifying a considerable number of things. Then, by proper and ordinary construction a person who in one transaction does all, violates the statute but once, and incurs only one penalty. Yet he violates it equally by doing one of the things. Therefore the indictment on such a statute may allege, in a single count, that the defendant did as many of the forbidden things as the pleader chooses, employing the conjunction 'and' where the statute has ‘or’ and it will not be double, and it will be established at the trial by proof of any one of them. Bishop's, New Criminal Procedure, vol. 1, § 436.
"In the instant case we hold that the offense of permitting gambling is merged in the offense of keeping a gambling house, and that the allegation in the affidavit that the defendant 'unlawfully and knowingly permitted William Hall and others unknown to play at certain games for money and other articles of value’ is surplusage and need not be proved to sustain a conviction."

. The court in Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173 (Wyo.1976), examined the evidence to conclude that identical evidence was relied upon to support a violation of the two statutory provisions, and the analysis is similar to that in Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1987). Had the court pursued the problem under the same analysis articulated in Birr, the result would have been the same.

. In Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo.1987), we pointed out that application of the Blockburger test is not a reliable indication of legislative intent if the statute provides for violation in alternative ways. We cited the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). In those instances, the manipulation of the language of the statutes to conform to the legislative intent can be avoided by focusing on the gravamen of the offense and the evil intended to be addressed. Cf. Whalen; Birr.

. This case demonstrates that the consensus of criminal minds often involves the planning of several substantive offenses. In this instance, the participants in the robbery also planned to travel to Colorado and to aid Duffy in making his escape from the institution in which he was incarcerated.