*354On Motion for Rehearing.
1. We find no merit in Joe D. Graham’s motion for rehearing and it is hereby denied.
2. Defendants contend that we erred in Division 7 of our opinion in finding that the trial court erred in assessing costs against Graham. Defendants concede that OCGA § 9-15-2 allows a party to file a civil suit without first paying costs. However, defendants argue that OCGA § 9-15-2 does not completely relieve a pauper of paying costs; if the pauper loses the case, defendants argue, costs are cast upon him just as upon any other losing party. Defendants argue this is mandated by OCGA §§ 9-15-1 and 9-15-11.
OCGA § 9-15-1 reads: “In all civil cases in any of the courts of this state, except as otherwise provided, the party who dismisses, loses, or is cast in the action shall be liable for the costs thereof.” OCGA § 9-15-11 provides that when a case is disposed, the costs shall be included in the judgment against the losing party. Defendants argue these two sections, read in conjunction with OCGA § 9-15-2, evince a legislative intent to forgive costs and fees connected with the initial filing of suit in the case of a pauper, but not to forgive ultimate costs in the action if the pauper loses. In support of its argument, defendants cite us to federal decisions, and assert that this is the practice of “virtually every superior court judge of Fulton, DeKalb, Bibb, Butts, Baldwin, Ware and Tattnall Counties. . . .” We are not persuaded by defendants’ argument for the following reasons.
The federal statute allowing proceedings in forma pauperis is 28 USC § 1915. Section (a) reads in pertinent part: “Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution, or defense of any suit, action, or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs . . .” (Emphasis supplied). Section (e) of the statute reads in pertinent part: “Judgment may be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit or action as in other cases. ...” The federal courts have read their statute to work exactly as defendants argue the Georgia statutory scheme should operate: a pauper’s affidavit allows filing and pursuit of the action, but loss of the action authorizes imposition of costs. See, e.g., Robinson v. Howard Univ., 455 A2d 1363 (D.C. 1983); Flint v. Haynes, 651 F2d 970 (4th Cir. 1981). This reading seems eminently correct for the federal statute which is couched in terms forgiving a pauper only the prepayment of fees. However, compare OCGA § 9-15-2: “When any party, plaintiff or defendant, in any action or proceeding held in any court in this state is unable to pay any deposit, fee or other cost which is normally required in the court, if the party shall subscribe an affidavit to the effect that because of his indigence *355he is unable to pay the costs, the party shall be relieved from paying the costs and his rights shall be the same as if he had paid the costs.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is apparent that the Georgia statute is much broader in scope than is the federal statute. The federal statute waives only the prepayment of costs; the Georgia statute for the pauper waives any deposit, fee, or other cost; it further states that the party is relieved from paying costs and his rights are considered as if he had paid. OCGA § 9-15-1 simply states the general rule that the losing party pays costs, except as otherwise provided. Clearly, OCGA § 9-15-2 is the exception. OCGA § 9-15-11 is simply an express direction of how the mandate of OCGA § 9-15-1 is to be carried out. Where OCGA § 9-15-1 does not apply, clearly OCGA § 9-15-11 is also inapplicable.
Decided March 4, 1985 Rehearing denied March 29, 1985 Joe D. Graham, Jr., pro se. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, John C. Jones, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.Defendants argue that our decision creates a group of “super citizens . . . incarcerated felons” who may rampage through the courts filing frivolous and harassing suits at will, and that without the ability to assess costs, defendants are powerless to stop these evil “super citizens.” Two responses to this argument are in order. First, as defendants note in their own brief, those inmates who have absolutely no money have nothing to fear from the assessment of costs; they would not be deterred regardless of any assessment, for they are judgment-proof. In other words, they are paupers within the meaning of OCGA § 9-15-2. Second, our decision in no way removes from defendants the ability to deter those inmates who have some money by assessing costs. If the inmate has money, defendants or the court on its own motion may traverse the pauper’s affidavit. If the court finds that the inmate is not a pauper and assesses costs, that factual finding is final and will not be reviewed by this court.
However, in this case the pauper’s affidavit was never traversed, and there is nothing in the record to show that the trial court made any finding of fact regarding Graham’s ability to pay. Therefore, it was error to assess costs. Portis v. Evans, 249 Ga. 396 (1) (291 SE2d 511) (1982); Martin v. State, 151 Ga. App. 9 (9) (258 SE2d 711) (1979).
Judgment adhered to.