dissenting.
I dissent to Divisions 2 and 3 of the majority opinion, and to the reversal.
1. As to Division 2, I agree that the officer’s statements transgressed a strictly-construed closure of opinion evidence, as the conclusions which he presented to the jury could be drawn with equal ease by any intelligent citizen. (Obviously, a dead man cannot place a chair leg upon the fabric of his trousers.) It is this very apparency which reduces any error to harmlessness. Surely, the jury understood the circumstances of the killing — with or without any assistance from any expert.
Our case of Fordham v. State, 254 Ga. 59 ( 325 SE2d 755) (1985), is inapplicable. There, the investigating officer was permitted to testify over objection that nothing in the statements of a defendant would justify the killing of the victim. “The officer’s opinion was improperly admitted, and because it went to the very heart of the case, we cannot call it harmless.” 254 Ga. at 60.
2. As to Division 3, while it would have been preferable for the demonstration relative to the handgun to have taken place during the evidentiary stage of the trial, there was no harm. The pistol was in the evidence. Twelve jurors had an opportunity to test the “pull” of the trigger, and to form their own conclusions. Manifestly, the prosecutor’s reference to the physical characteristics of the weapon during argument — if error — was harmless.