dissenting.
Plaintiffs claim that the package inserts and promotional literature provided by defendants for their drugs Fluothane and Anectine gave inadequate warnings of the dangers involved in their use, in particular, the risk that malignant hyperthermia might occur in certain individuals. Plaintiffs claim further that the defendants’ failure to provide adequate warnings proximately caused injury to Ervin Lee Holley. Plaintiffs have presented affidavits supporting their assertions that the information in the package inserts and promotional literature was inadequate and that, if it had been adequate, it would have notified anesthesia personnel and Mr. Holley’s injury would not have occurred.
In response, defendants presented the deposition of Dr. Donald Hooper, the anesthesiologist in charge when Ervin Holley suffered injury. Dr. Hooper testified that he did not rely on package inserts when he administered Fluothane and Anectine to Mr. Holley. Rather, he testified that he had developed an extensive independent knowledge of the symptoms and treatment of malignant hyperthermia as an adverse reaction to Anectine and Fluothane during his medical training as an anesthesiologist and through his reading of the medical literature. Indeed, he testified that he had worked to design malignant hyperthermia kits to be used in the operating rooms at Duke Medical Center. Dr. Hooper’s testimony suggests that he was in full knowledge of the *750information that an expanded warning on the package inserts and promotional literature might provide.
The evidence presented by plaintiffs does not contradict Dr. Hooper’s testimony that he had independent knowledge of the relation between Fluothane and Anectine and malignant hyperther-mia and of the treatment to be used when a patient shows signs of developing the syndrome. Given that Dr. Hooper’s testimony is undisputed, there is lacking the required element of proximate cause between the defendants’ alleged failure to warn and Ervin Holley’s injury.
Plaintiffs allege, however, that Dr. Hooper was an interested witness and that his credibility should be determined by the jury. The majority agrees, finding that Dr. Hooper was not only an interested witness, but also one whose testimony was “inherently suspect.” If Dr. Hooper was merely an interested witness, then under the rule of Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E. 2d 392 (1976), a summary judgment still could be grounded on his testimony if the opposing party failed to produce materials supporting their opposition or to utilize Rule 56(f) or failed to point to specific areas of impeachment or contradiction and summary judgment is otherwise appropriate, Kidd, 289 N.C. at 370, 222 S.E. 2d at 410.
I do not agree, however, that Dr. Hooper was an interested witness. My review of the record does not indicate that he had any connection with the defendants or plaintiffs, pecuniary or otherwise, which would have given him an interest in the outcome of this case of significance in a court of law. Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Hooper feared that his professional reputation might be injured if he revealed that he was not aware of the risk of malignant hyperthermia connected with use of Fluothane and Anectine. Plaintiffs assertion is mere speculation.
Moreover, Dr. Hooper’s deposition contains no inherent contradictions, or other reason to doubt its truthfulness. Unlike an affidavit, the deposition did contain testimony under cross-examination. Dr. Hooper’s deposition is therefore not “inherently suspect,” and presents no issue of fact for the jury.
Dr. Hooper’s testimony, then, would properly support summary judgment on grounds of lack of proximate causation.
The trial court’s order should be affirmed.