(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusions that concentrated levels of carbon dioxide are a pollutant and that carbon dioxide was discharged within the meaning of the insurance contract's exclusion clause. The majority's opinion unnecessarily broadens the coverage of the pollution exclusion clause.
Recently, we held that one form of a pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous because there were two reasonable interpretations of the clause.1 In Beahm v. Pautsch, 180 Wis. 2d 574, 584, 510 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Ct. App. 1993), we held that the clause could be read to exclude coverage for liability that accrues from the discharge of smoke into the atmosphere or it could be read to exclude coverage for liability where the discharged substance caused harm because of its toxic *420nature. In adopting a limiting interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause, we noted that "[n]owhere in its history is there any suggestion that the pollution exclusion clause was intended to exclude more than coverage for liability for environmental damages." Id.2
I am convinced that the language in the pollution exclusion clause under analysis in this case is also ambiguous. There are at least two interpretations of the clause. First, it can be interpreted as the majority interprets it, to exclude coverage for damages arising from an accumulation of carbon dioxide due to inadequate building ventilation; or, second, it can be read to limit coverage to liability for industrial environmental damages as that is understood by a reasonable person.
When confronted with an ambiguous exclusionary clause, the rule of construction is that the clause is to be strictly construed against the insurer and must also be interpreted to mean what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood the words of the contract to mean. Tara N. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 77, 90-91, 540 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Ct. App. 1995). I conclude that a reasonable person would narrowly interpret the pollution exclusion clause to situations involving environmental catastrophes related to industrial pollution. This interpretation is consistent with the principle that we narrowly construe exclusionary clauses, rather than *421broaden them to include the concentration of "foreign" substances due to poor building ventilation. A reasonable person would expect the clause to avoid liability for the spillage of petroleum products in a creek, but would not expect it to include the avoidance of liability for the accumulation of carbon dioxide in an office because provisions were not made for introducing fresh air into the office.
The majority relies upon United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 164 Wis. 2d 499, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1991), for the proposition that the term "pollutant," as used in the absolute pollution exclusion clause, is not ambiguous because it is not "reasonably or fairly susceptible to more than one construction." Id. at 503-05, 476 N.W.2d at 282-83. In Ace Baking, it was concluded that a "pollutant" can be any substance, foreign to another substance, that makes it physically impure or unclean. Id. at 505, 476 N.W.2d at 283. Using this language, the majority concludes that in concentrated levels carbon dioxide "can become injurious, even lethal. At those levels, it is foreign1 to a safe human environment." Majority op. at 412.
The majority's conclusion is imprecise because it does not identify at what level concentrations of carbon dioxide qualify as a foreign substance. It also fails to specify how much exposure, at that level, is required before the carbon dioxide becomes injurious to human health. For example, OSHA has established a limit of exposure of 5000 ppm for an eight-hour shift. See Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Subpart Z — Toxic And Hazardous Substances, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1996).
My principal disagreement with the majority is the conclusion that this case is different from Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 158 Wis. 2d 64, 462 *422N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990). The majority distinguishes Leverence as follows:
In this case, the exhaled carbon dioxide was not converted from one substance to another; nor was it formed over time; nor was it trapped in some unknown confined area. To the contrary, the carbon dioxide was in its potentially harmful state immediately upon being expelled directly into the atmosphere of the work environment by the human act of breathing.
Majority op. at 413-14. This conclusion that carbon dioxide is potentially harmful as soon as it is expelled is inconsistent with the majority's earlier conclusion that "[i]n its ordinary state [carbon dioxide] ... is a harmless substance. But in concentrated levels, it can become injurious, even lethal. At those levels, it is foreign' to a safe human environment." Majority op. at 412.
The differences between Leverence and this case are insignificant. In Leverence, the allegation was that the construction methods and materials allowed water vapor to accumulate in the walls. Id., 158 Wis. 2d at 72, 462 N.W.2d at 222. In this case, the allegation is that improper construction — the failure to provide outside air intake — caused the accumulation of carbon dioxide. In Leverence, no contaminants were released but rather they formed over time because of environmental conditions. Id. at 97, 462 N.W.2d at 232. In this case, the concentrations of carbon dioxide formed over time due to environmental conditions created by the failure to introduce fresh air into the building. The only difference in Leverence and this case is that in Leverence it was microorganisms that were promoted by the presence of accumulated water vapor that did *423the damage, id. at 72, 97, 462 N.W.2d at 222, 232; and here, it is the level of carbon dioxide that allegedly caused the damage. Because the operative facts are parallel between Leverence and this case, I would conclude that the pollution exclusion clause does not apply.
I also believe the pollution exclusion clause is inapplicable because the presence of carbon dioxide was not the result of "actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants." First, the involuntary human act of exhaling waste products from the act of breathing cannot reasonably be made to fit within the insurance policy's alternatives of how a pollutant becomes present in the environment. Second, the insurance policy language indicates that the pollutant's presence must result from some form of action; in this case, the presence of carbon dioxide is the result of inaction — failing to provide fresh outside air to the office.
The Seventh Circuit has had the occasion to discuss a pollution exclusion clause similar to the one in this case. I find that court's discussion to be persuasive.
Without some limiting principle, the pollution exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results. To take but two simple examples, reading the clause broadly would bar coverage for bodily injuries suffered by one who slips and falls on the spilled contents of a bottle of Drano, and for bodily injury caused by an allergic reaction to chlorine in a public pool. Although Drano and chlorine are both irritants or contaminants that cause, under certain conditions, bodily injury or property damage, one *424would not ordinarily characterize these events as pollution.
To redress this problem, courts have taken a common sense approach when determining the scope of pollution exclusion clauses. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 768 F.Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1991), aff'd, 987 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1993), for instance, held that the clause did not bar coverage for injuries arising from an individual's ingestion of malathion during a municipal pesticide-spraying operation. Id. at 1468-71. Similarly, A-1 Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or.App. 890, 632 P.2d 1377, 1379-80 (1981), aff'd, 293 Or. 17, 643 P.2d 1260 (1982), held that coverage was not barred for paint damage to vehicles which occurred during the spraypainting of a bridge. See also Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. McFadden, No. 90-5487, slip op. (Mass. Super. Ct. May 28, 1991) (clause does not bar recovery for apartment-dweller's ingestion of lead paint) aff'd, 595 N.E.2d 762 (Mass. 1992); Cole v. Celotex Corp., No. 87-6170 (La.Dist. Feb. 15, 1990) (recovery not barred for release of asbestos particles during installation, handling and removal of insulation). The bond that links these cases is plain. All involve injuries resulting from everyday activities gone slightly, but not surprisingly, awry. There is nothing that unusual about paint peeling off of a wall, asbestos particles escaping during the installation or removal of insulation, or paint drifting off the mark during a spraypainting job. A reasonable policyholder, these courts apparently believed, would not characterize such routine incidents as pollution.
Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1993).
*425I dissent because I believe the majority opinion broadens the scope of the pollution exclusion clause bringing within its exclusion many incidents that are not, historically, industrial pollution. The accumulation of carbon dioxide in a building and the resulting injuries are the result of the everyday activity of exhaling gone slightly awry because the building owner failed to ventilate the building. Under such circumstances the pollution exclusion clause should not apply.
In Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996), the Kentucky court commented that "[t]he drafters' utilization of environmental law terms of art ('discharge,' 'dispersal,' 'seepage,' 'migration,1 'release,' or 'escape' of pollutants) reflects the exclusion's historical objective — avoidance of liability for environmental catastrophes related to intentional industrial pollution."