dissenting.
In my view today’s majority opinion is at odds with the spirit and intent of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations (“No-Fault”) Act, our construction of the Act in the recent case of Wiard v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 698 (310 SE2d 221) (1983), and the general rules governing resolution of motions for summary judgment. I therefore dissent.
This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of Allstate’s motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals’ reversal of that ruling. In Georgia the parties opposing a motion for summary judgment (here the Staffords) are entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences which can be drawn from the evidence, and all unfavorable inferences must be construed against the movant. Burnette Ford v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551 (181 SE2d 866) (1971). Summary judgment should be granted only where it is affirmatively shown that a claimant would not be entitled to recover under any set of facts which could be proved at trial. OCGA § 9-11-56 (Code Ann. § 81A-156); Frady v. Irvin, 245 Ga. 307 (5) (264 SE2d 866) (1980).
In support of its summary judgment motion Allstate presented the affidavit of Richard Willson, an Allstate employee, who averred that the company in December of 1974 and February of 1975 conducted mass mailings of OCGA § 33-34-5(c) (Code Ann. § 56-3404b) notices of optional coverages to all existing named insureds. This affidavit does not say that Willson himself mailed a notice to the Staffords (in fact, it does not mention the Staffords by name), nor does it attempt to corroborate the alleged mailing to the Staffords by reference to a computerized listing of Allstate insureds or postal receipts of any kind. It is simply circumstantial evidence, in *43the form of testimonial evidence by an Allstate employee, to the effect that notice was generally sent to Allstate policyholders. In reply, the Staffords each filed an affidavit denying receipt of the notice allegedly mailed by Allstate.
Today’s majority opinion holds as a matter of law that the Willson affidavit describing the general workings of the mass mailing procedures proves that Allstate satisfied OCGA § 33-34-5(c)’s (Code Ann. § 56-3404b) notice requirement; hence, the Staffords are “deemed” to have rejected the optional PIP coverages “offered” them by Allstate. I disagree. Although Allstate’s proof of compliance with the statute’s mailing procedures (though weak) entitled it, on summary judgment, to a presumption of receipt by the Staffords, this presumption was rebutted by the Staffords’ contrary proof, thus creating an issue of fact for the jury. See Sturdivant v. Allstate Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 19 (2) (237 SE2d 408) (1977). In an analogous line of cases, the Court of Appeals has held that where an insurance company’s proof that notice of cancellation of a policy was properly addressed and mailed is rebutted by a policyholder’s affidavit alleging non-receipt, a jury question is made out. Garber v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 131 Ga. App. 366 (206 SE2d 86) (1974); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Russell, 102 Ga. App. 597 (117 SE2d 239) (1960); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ga. App. 376 (100 SE2d 142) (1957). A federal district court, faced with circumstances identical to the present case, has concluded that the issue of whether the policyholder actually received the notice required under OCGA § 33-34-5(c) (Code Ann. § 56-3404b) should go to the jury. “Given the potential for computer error... and the fact that the notices were sent out to fifty-eight to sixty-two thousand insureds ... a real possibility exists that the notices were not sent to the plaintiffs in this action through some error.” Shave v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 FSupp. 1006, 1010 (S. D. Ga. 1982). For these reasons, and particularly in light of the fact that Allstate presented no direct proof that the notice intended for the Staffords was actually mailed to or received by them, I would hold that the trial judge was correct in denying Allstate’s motion for summary judgment. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 51 Ga. App. 496 (180 SE 869) (1935) (evidence must “affirmatively show” that letter was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed before presumption of receipt arises); Sturdivant v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra (“direct proof’ of mailing required).
My position is, I believe, consistent with this court’s interpretation of the No-Fault Act in our prior decisions of Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 250 Ga. 709 (300 SE2d 673) (1983) and Wiard v. Phoenix Ins. Co., supra. In Flewellen we said that the intent of the legislature in enacting § 33-34-5 (Code Ann. § 56-3404b) was to make *44certain that “ ‘insurers offer optional coverages to applicants for no-fault insurance and that an applicant’s waiver of his privilege to obtain optional coverages be made knowingly and in writing.’ ” We also emphasized that “the mandate of the law was clear . . . [its] obvious purpose [was to make] the insured aware of the absolute right to minimum optional benefits.” Id. at 714 (emphasis in original). More recently, this court in Wiard reasoned that OCGA § 33-34-5(c) (Code Ann. § 56-3404b) must be read in conjunction with subsection (b) of the statute, as construed in Flewellen. Accordingly we held that a F7ewe77en-qualified subsection (c) document necessarily consists of two parts: “(1) written information clearly stating the optional no-fault PIP coverage and the optional no-fault vehicle damage coverage, and (2) a means for the insured to make a written acceptance or rejection of each.” Wiard, supra at 700.
Today’s decision, however, emasculates both Flewellen and Wiard insofar as those decisions imply that both new applicants and existing policyholders are entitled to make a knowing, informed choice whether to purchase optional PIP coverage under OCGA § 33-34-5 (Code Ann. § 56-3404b). By interpreting Allstate’s evidence of compliance with the mailing procedure outlined in subsection (c) as creating an irrebuttable presumption of receipt of the documents by the Staffords (and hence their rejection of the optional coverages), we slam the door of recovery on them and future claimants who never received the information required by the statute and who can prove that they never received it. This result is unjust and unnecessary. “To place the duty on the insured to examine and renegotiate his personal injury protection coverage, when he has not been given the information which the statute requires the insurer to provide, would gut the statute.” Shave v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra at 1012. Because I cannot join this interpretation of the statute, I respectfully dissent.